Pirates of the Gulf of Aden

A federal judge in the Eastern District of Virginia threw out piracy charges brought by the government against six Somali men who allegedly attempted to attack a US naval vessel. The defense, in challenging the charges, relied on the 1820 Supreme Court case United States v. Smith. That case defines piracy, according to the "law of nations," as "robbery upon the sea."

All options on the table? - Public Sector Pensions

This is a great piece from Economist.com's Democracy in America blog. I enjoyed it because it addresses the elephant in the room, puts together some calculations, and questions the value we place on teachers in this country.

As for commentary on it, I would simply say it's important to keep ALL options on the table if we're serious about reducing the deficit over the long run (I remain far less concerned in the short run), and it's disingenuous to blatantly cherry-pick the examples that allow you to stir up class warfare.

On a personal note, my dad was a fireman. He had to retire because of a medical condition, a condition directly related to his duties as a fireman, before he had put 20 years in. I don't think it's asking too much that he be well-compensated for his service to his community long after that service has to conclude.

Government Program, Employees: Efficient, Productive

At least when it comes to the United States Census which cost $1.6 billion less than expected. Savings are attributed in part to "workforce productivity across field operations"--the folks that knocked on your door if you did not return your census form.

Air Fares - A better deal?

This post springs out of a comment war from some time back between our favorite antagonist and the editors. The New York Times has this article out today talking about airfare prices over time. From the article, two things are clear:

1) Generally speaking air travel is getting more expensive.

2) Airlines are failing to report full fee collection data, essentially hiding the true cost of a ticket today as compared to historic ticket prices. We're trying to compare apples to oranges.

This lack of reporting leads to a higher level of imperfect information, creating a market inefficiency. A consumer does not know clearly what the cost of the trip is. This is compounded by the purchasing patterns in air travel where baggage needs of the traveler can change between the time of purchase of the actual ticket and the levying of fees at check-in.

Again, all we're saying is the customer experience has not improved and the price has increased. Those two facts would seem indicate that deregulation is not a Godsend.

Green Movement Reflection

Michael Singh takes the long view on Iran's Green Movement, declared dead by many.

On June 10, when the Iranian opposition movement cancelled its planned commemoration of the anniversary of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s disputed reelection, commentators assumed that the Green Movement was finally finished. For months, it had been criticized as lacking strong leadership and for being unable to seriously challenge Iran’s entrenched regime.

But the history of political turmoil in twentieth-century Iran suggests that the movement may yet survive. After all, movements propelled by similar social currents have succeeded in dramatically changing Iran in the past.

Underplayed Story

About ten days ago, on July 28, something quite strange happened in the Straits of Hormuz. A Japanese oil tanker, owned by Mitsui OSK and carrying two million barrels of oil, was struck by something. Crew members reported seeing a flash. Damage included a blown off lifeboat, shattered windows, and a strangely regular shaped dent in the hull of the tanker near but above the water line.


Speculation as to the source of the damage abounded during the days in which the tanker sat in port being examined by officials from the UAE. Among these were freak waves, terrorist attacks, collisions with submarines, or collisions with a marine mine, potentially left over from the Iran-Iraq war.

Then, eight days after the event, the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, an al-Qaeda affiliate responsible for attacks on resorts in Egypt in 2004 and 2005, claimed credit for what it termed an attack on the tanker. At that time, most experts dismissed the claim as untrustworthy because it came so long after the attack occurred, the damage to the hull of the tanker was regular, there was no apparent breach of the hull, and no scorch marks. But just one day later, Officials from the United Arab Emirates reported that their investigation had determined the tanker had been attacked using homemade explosives and dingy.

Attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf are extraordinarily rare. Any assault—attempted or successful—in the vital Straits of Hormuz should cause considerable concern. A successful assault in the Straits could potentially bottle up 40% of the worlds crude—at least temporarily. The effect on the price of crude would likely be astronomical.

Krugman almost always explains it best

Couldn't help but link to this blog post by Paul Krugman discussing why letting the high-income tax cuts expire is good policy. I'll let the Nobel prize winner speak for himself:

The basic framework we have for thinking about consumer spending goes back to none other than Milton Friedman, whose “permanent income” hypothesis says that people will save most of any income change they see as merely transitory. Telling rich people that we’ll keep their taxes low for a couple more years is, for them, a transitory income gain; they’ll save the bulk of it.

Isn’t the same true for lower-income people? Not to the same extent. Permanent-income reasoning doesn’t fully apply when some people are “liquidity-constrained” — they have depressed income, which would make them want to spend more than they earn right now, but they’re out of assets and unable to borrow, or unable to borrow except at relatively high interest rates. People in that situation will spend much or all of any temporary windfall.

So if we give money to people likely to be liquidity-constrained, they are likely to spend it. That’s why aid to the unemployed is an effective stimulus; it also suggests that tax cuts for lower-income workers will be relatively effective at raising demand. But the affluent, who typically have lots of assets and good access to borrowing, are much less likely to be in that situation.

For those that disagree, please identify the accepted counter theory against what Mr. Friedman outlined.

The Least Deliberative Body

It has become cliche to refer to the US Senate as the world's most deliberative body. In policy circles it would seem to serve as a reason for the Senate's inaction on any number of issues, and yet, after reading George Packer's piece in The New Yorker I was left thinking that the cliche is all wrong.

Deliberative

-adjective

1. having the function of deliberating, as a legislative assembly

2. having to do with policy; dealing with the wisdom and expediency of a proposal

What struck me about Packer's article is, as Sen. Merkley mentions in the article, is how there really isn't any deliberation. There isn't debate. There's posturing, procedural maneuvering, and pedantic speeches given to CSPAN cameras, but no deliberation.

The Senate has been reduced from what de Toucheville once described as a place where "they represent only the lofty thoughts [of the nation] and the generous instincts animating it, not the petty passions," to a place where arcane rules are wielded to grind everything to a halt.

I think there are 3 reasons for this:

1) Fund-raising

2) Eternal Elections

3) A perversion of well-intentioned rules

The Constant Cash Scramble

I once read that a Congressperson needs to raise $10,000 per week from the moment they take office in order to be competitive in the next election. The infusion of money into the political system is not new, but the seeming acceleration of that infusion should frighten people. Sure every voter gets a vote, but how is that going to compete against a few million dollars from a specific industry with a targeted agenda? The Senators now serving have to play to these interests because this is where the big dollars are coming from. That means a lot of little favors that snowball into big hurdles for really moving things forward.

The Eternal Election

If you watch cable news, when's the last time you heard "possible presidential candidate, so and so?" Our media has become captured by the horse race and so have our elected officials. For the Senate that means really just three days of legislating every week. It also means the senators aren't talking to each other. They aren't spending time together. This isn't a wish for Harry Reid and Richard Shelby to go skipping down the Capitol steps together, but if you don't know someone how can you hope to negotiate with them? If you don't trust, don't know enough to respect them how do you deliberate anything? What's clear from Packer's article is you don't.

Rules Perversion

Most of us know there's a rule in the Senate that any senator can place an anonymous hold on an appointee and that rule has been used rather frequently (and frivolously) in the recent past. What I did not know until reading Packer's article was that the hold was originally intended to give a Senator that had to travel some distance (on horseback no less) to hold up confirmation until they could ask the appointee questions. It was never intended to be an instrument to hold an administration hostage. This is one example of several that Packer outlines where rules with good intentions have been perverted to satisfy a senator's "petty passions."

So what do we do about it?

If these are the main reasons (I'm quite certain there are others) then what is to be done to change things? First, we have to start taking the money out of politics. The Supreme Court set us back with that with the Citizens United decision. I, like many liberals, disagreed with that decision for one main reason. The decision, in essence, equated money with free speech. I think this is a dangerous precedent and a threat to a democracy. If we are truly a country of "one person, one vote" then we need to ensure that the rules of campaigns and fundraising follows along similar lines. This would allow senators to think grander and not feel so beholden to special interests.

Second, we need the media to stop reporting the horserace and start reporting the issues. There's a disincentive to do this. The horserace is cheap to report, flashy, and constantly evolving to satisfy the appetite of a news cycle that people feel the urge to constantly feed. But if the consumer demanded more, if it was as much about policy as it is about personality we would be taking a step in the right direction.

Third, the Senate needs to take steps to fix itself. This is probably the hardest and most perplexing aspect. The only people that can make the Senate more efficient are the same people that made it inefficient. There are some freshmen senators with an eye towards a rules change, but the old-timers are hesitant and as the freshmen become the old-timers they will likely be co-opted by the system they currently loathe. The Senate has the power to change, perhaps it lies in the people to give them the will.

What's next?

The cynic in me figures there will be a rash of blog posts (not unlike this one) decrying the Senate and urging change. That drum beat will quickly fade and nothing will happen. The optimist in me thinks that maybe these young guns in the Senate will force some change. The revolutionary in me thinks we're reaching a tipping point in our government, a dangerous tipping point where the people see the ineffectiveness of government and lash out against it. This could be a time of renewal and positive realignment where Congress can get back to the people's business. But there is so much anger, so much rage focused on an enemy, but not an alternative that this realignment could be a major step backward.

We did this to ourselves. We are all of us complicit in the degradation of a once deliberative body. We have the power to make the changes needed. Do we too have the will? The humility? The attention span?

UPDATED:

David Broder steals my line. Irrelevant that his was published before mine.

Rep. Weiner Explains Himself

The New York Times has an op-ed today by Rep. Anthony Weiner (NY-D) talking about his angry speech on the house floor last week. If you haven't seen it, take a look.

The op-ed is his attempt to draw attention less to the spectacle and more to the substance of his comments. In his opinion, there aren't people on the other side of the aisle prepared to act in good faith. There is simply a party united in saying "No" and trying to reassign blame by blaming that the Democrats are acting with a spirit of bi-partisanship.

Now Ben has been saying for some time that the Dems should go it alone. He surmised some time ago that Repos weren't serious about being bi-partisan, they just wanted to look bi-partisan so they had cover when the voted "no" all the time. I was more moderate. I had hope there could be true bi-partisanship. I had hope that there was a middle ground and reasonable men and women could find it. I misplaced my hope.

I have seen President Obama, Sen. Reid, and even Speaker Pelosi try to find a middle ground. I have seen them offer to take up Republican ideas in major legislation, but the Republicans always wanted more. They wanted to govern from the minority. Guys (cause there aren't many women current serving as Republicans, Bachmann barely registers as human these days), you lost the election. You lost in 2006 and in 2008. Hell, you seem primed to under-perform in 2010.

This obstructionism wrapped up in false bi-partisan overtures is what makes Rep. Weiner so angry. It makes me angry. I just don't get to pound a podium on the House floor. Pity that.

A Shot Across the Bow

Anne Applebaum, a columnist with whom I infrequently agree, fires a shot across the bow of Republicans suddenly consumed with deficit spending and small government.

[Y]ou cannot start from scratch. You cannot forget history. You cannot pretend that the Republican Party has not supported big and wasteful spending programs—energy subsidies, farm subsidies, unnecessary homeland security projects, profligate defense contracts, you name it—for the last decade. Before the Republican Party can have any credibility on any spending issues whatsoever, Republican leaders need to speak frankly about the mistakes of the past.

They also must be extremely specific about which policies and which programs they are planning to cut in the future. What will it be? Social Security or the military budget? Medicare or the TSA? Vague "anti-government" rhetoric just doesn't cut it anymore: If you want a smaller government, you have to tell us how you will create one.

Quite right.

Tribes versus Government

Among a myriad of articles in today’s New York Times addressing Afghanistan, David Sanger pens one that purports to deconstruct the “what ifs” of Afghanistan: What if the Bush administration had put enough troops into the country to stabilize it after the Taliban’s ouster? What if the Bush administration had followed through on its promise of an Afghan Marshall Plan? What if the Bush administration had not been distracted by its war of choice in Iraq? Would then Afghanistan not have become a hash?

Though his tone is negative, Sanger is ultimately inconclusive. He does question, however, whether “30,000, or even 60,000, [troops] could have brought stability to a vast country, where tribes, not governments, are the ruling powers?” He notes, “The Taliban—a native movement—would almost certainly have waited it out, figuring Washington could not sustain so large a force for very long.”

It strikes me that Sanger’s analysis rolls up a bit of Orientalism with two curious assumptions. The Orientalism is obvious in Sanger’s contrast between government and tribes. The dichotomy is, of course, false. Tribal power and governmental power are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, tribes can be an incredibly effective mode of governance and an excellent building block on which to develop communal reconciliation and broader governance. Both the US experience in Anbar province in Iraq and the history of Somaliland since 1991 provide excellent examples of tribes behaving in just this way. The dichotomy, though, is not Sanger’s alone—the Western penchant for contrasting civic government, epitomized in Western states, with any mode of governance that is alien is well trod territory.

The curious assumptions in Sanger’s analysis are that he apparently believes the Taliban to both be static and monolithic, and popular. Sanger’s belief that the Taliban could have waited out a US/NATO deployment of 30,000-60,000 troops suggests that he believes the Taliban circa 2001 and the Taliban today to be the same, unchanging, and monolithic. Sanger’s implicit contrast of the Taliban, “a native movement,” with Karzai’s government and its supporters suggests that he believes the Taliban to have an Afghanistan-wide base of support.

Comparing the budding truth of Sanger’s second assumption to the origin of the Taliban—and its level of popular support in 2001—demonstrates that his first assumption is false. The Taliban began as a Pashtun movement and in large measure it remains so today. It is true that the insurgency is spreading from Pashtun heartlands—both in the south, Helmand, and in the north, Kunduz—to reach non-Pashtun majority provinces. The Taliban’s emerging national strength has only come through nearly a decade of Western malfeasance in Afghanistan—without failing to deliver on promises of reconstruction and improved livelihood, without scuttling the goodwill of the Afghan people by killing so many civilians, without supporting an obviously corrupt regime while pretending otherwise, it is unlikely that the Taliban would have garnered popular support beyond the ranks of the Pashtun. It is little wonder that the Taliban were able to inflict so little damage on the ISAF for so many years—it took time for ISAF to do sufficient damage to itself vis-à-vis the civilian populace for the Taliban to reap benefits in the form of increased popular support, greater numbers of fighters, and greater freedom of movement. Thus, a greater security presence at the outset—provided that security force employed COIN principles properly—would likely have made all the difference in the world.

Blinder & Zandi: Methodology & Impact

As promised, I took the time to review Blinder and Zandi's full report, paying particular attention to methodology outlined in Appendix B. It's all pretty straight forward and nothing jumped out at me as particularly specious.

One reaction to my post yesterday and the report was that government spending (G) doesn't result in increased demand. This is a patently false statement because the aggregate demand equation in the short-run is essentially the GDP equation restated.

If G becomes larger, then AD becomes larger. I would also restate I have not seen any evidence of government spending crowding-out private investment.

On a slightly divergent note, the stimulus bill has been criticized because it has not created jobs, but if you look at where the stimulus bill put money, the largest part that has currently paid is in tax cuts ($188 billion). I would argue that President Obama was wrong to seek some sort of commen ground with Republicans in the Senate that had him approving a bill that didn't put enough people back to work. Instead, the bill was meant to entice private industry to hire workers with a payroll tax holiday. This is an indirect process that has paid very limited dividends.

Finally, I'll close on this point. In the New York Times article John B. Taylor of the Hoover Institution is quoted as saying that the stimulus program had, "very little impact." Little impact, as he observes it, is still an impact. In this situation, when private investment had dried up and the gears of the economy had threatened to halt entirely policy measures were taken that averted a crisis.

It's fine to discuss the levels of impact of these measures, but I haven't heard any serious economist say they had absolutely zero positive impact on our economic situation.

Mission Creep in Somalia

It looks like the African Union will deploy an additional 2,000 peacekeepers to Somalia. At the same time, the AU may loosen the peacekeepers’ rules of engagement, rendering that moniker even less apt than it is already.

While the AU’s commitment to its Somali mission is admirable—and a hopeful sign for the continent’s future in some respects—it may be extraordinarily misplaced. The truth of the AU mission is that there was no peace for the peacekeepers to keep at the outset. Instead, the AU really served a stop-gap function, allowing Ethiopia to withdraw its troops after it invaded Somalia and toppled the ICU. In the wake of Ethiopia’s withdrawal, the AU troops have functioned as international props for the Transitional Federal Government—a western-backed farce. Increasing the number of AU troops and loosening their rules of engagement will likely only serve to transform the peacekeepers ever more into the TFG’s security service, enmeshing the AU’s mission ever more into the international community’s quixotic attempts to deliver the TFG Somalia.

Unfortunately, the AU and the TFG cannot hope to succeed. Foreign troops are incredibly unpopular in Somalia, the TFG is a Potemkin government of war lords and would-be elites without any real power base—think an entire Iraqi government, formed in Damascus, composed of Chalabis, and then delivered to the Green Zone. The only likely resolution to Somalia’s persistent anarchy is a homegrown, indigenous government. Don’t laugh—it is just such a government that has preserved stability and more than a semblance of democracy in Somaliland. Such a government requires local support, a local constituency, credibility, and of course legitimacy—all things lacking in the TFG.

Grading Government Intervention in the Great Recession

The New York Times reported on a new paper by two leading economists, Alan Blinder and Mark Zandi, that used econometric modeling to demonstrate how government intervention helped stem a second Great Depression and kept us at a Great Recession.

The paper notes, "that without the Wall Street bailout, the bank, the emergency lending and asset purchases by the Federal Reserve, and the Obama administration’s fiscal stimulus program, the nation’s gross domestic product would be about 6.5 percent lower this year. In addition, there would be about 8.5 million fewer jobs, on top of the more than 8 million already lost; and the economy would be experiencing deflation, instead of low inflation."

Immediately critics will point out that Blinder worked in the Clinton administration and Zandi is a registered Democrat. I would humbly suggest that party affiliation doesn't make someone's research automatically irrelevant.

And I'll note that i haven't read the whole paper, but will be in the next 24 hours to look at some of the assumptions and the models they used. I mean, I should use my bachelors degree for something, right?

Finally, I'll request that people looking to question the conclusions Blinder and Zandi reach base their criticism on the paper and its methodology, not just knee jerk rejection that a registered Democrat couldn't possible comment on the stimulus. Thanks.

Bruce Bartlett on Republican Intellectual Emptiness

I read this post on the Democracy in America blog at Economist.com. They posed 6 questions to Bruce Bartlett about the economy and the deficit. I don't think one can call Bruce a liberal, (though maybe a European conservative) but his comments parallel what Paul Krugman, who is unapologetically a liberal, has been saying. Here are some selected passages:

"Which Should be a higher priority for the federal government at the moment, deficit reduction or economic stimulus?"

"Clearly, economic stimulus."

On Taxation

"I would add that I do disagree with the Republican fixation on taxation. Federal taxes as a share of GDP are at their lowest level in two or more generations—14.9% versus a postwar average of 18.2%. There is not one iota of evidence that the economy is suffering from excessive taxation and no evidence that the sorts of tax cuts favoured by Republicans—mainly tax cuts for the wealthy—would do any good given the nature of the economy’s problems. Tax cuts don’t help those with no incomes because they are unemployed, businesses running at a loss, or investors with a large stock of capital losses. In my view, the Republican obsession with taxes is based on pure dogma, not analysis."

On which party has credibility on fiscal issues:

"The Republicans don’t have any credibility whatsoever. They squandered whatever they had when they enacted a massive UNFUNDED expansion of Medicare in 2003. Yet they had the nerve to complain about Obama’s health plan, WHICH WAS FULLY PAID FOR according to the Congressional Budget Office...The monumental hypocrisy of the Republican Party is something amazing to behold. And their dimwitted accomplices in the tea-party movement are not much better. They know that Republicans, far more than Democrats, are responsible for our fiscal mess, but they won’t say so...Consequently, I have far more hope that Democrats will do what has do be done. The Democratic Party is now the “adult” party in American politics, willing to do what has to be done for the good of the country. The same cannot be said of Republicans."

It's been clear for a while that President Obama and the Democratic leadership have not had a good faith partner across the aisle and it's refreshing that someone with the conservative credentials of Bruce Barlett is helping to call a spade a spade.

The Northwest Passage

Back in 2007, I wrote a short paper that argued, with the warming of the world's oceans and the opening of the mythic Northwest Passage, competition for the suddenly accessible mineral, natural, and hydrocarbon resources could result in armed conflict. Thus, this passage from George Friedman's The Next 100 Years, struck me:

[I]t was Mahan, the American, who understood two crucial factors. The collapse of the Soviet Union originated in American sea power and also opened the door for U.S. naval power to dominate the world. Additionally, Mahan was correct when he argued that it is always cheaper to ship goods by sea than by any other means. As far back as the fifth century BC, the Athenians were wealthier than the Spartans because Athens had a port, a maritime fleet, and a navy to protect it.

Getting Out is Hard To Do

Richard Haass purports to offer a way out of Afghanistan in this week’s Newsweek. In fact, Haass offers little more than fanciful and ultimately counterproductive policy suggestions.

Haass argues that the United States must clearly assess what are its Afghan objectives—a point with which I agree. He believes there are two American goals: “to prevent Al Qaeda from reestablishing a safe haven and to make sure that Afghanistan does not undermine the stability of Pakistan.” Unquestionably, these two goals are the United States’ prime objectives in Afghanistan.

However, the policy prescriptions Haass offers will not achieve either of the goals he outlined. Effectively, Haass believes that the United States should abandon the corrupt, ineffectual Karzai government in favor of power devolved to the provinces, coupled with rapprochement with the Taliban.

Haass arrives at this prescription in an eminently reasonable way. He argues that al-Qaeda and the Taliban are not one in the same—absolutely true. He argues that the two organizations have different goals—true, as well. He argues that there are a very small number of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan—true according to Leon Panetta, DCI. He argues that large troop deployments (over 100,000) intended to kill such a small number (60-100) is ineffective—yes, very true. He argues that the Taliban are predominantly Pastun—true, again. And that this renders the war in Afghanistan, against the Taliban, really an tribal-ethnic civil war—true, to a point.

Where Haass falters, and falters drastically, is his presumption that the war in Afghanistan is static. Haass believes that the United States can change tactics in Afghanistan, to focus on killing al-Qaeda in Pakistan, without causing a significant shift in al-Qaeda from Pakistan to Afghanistan. He believes this because he believes that the United States can convincingly deter the Taliban from harboring al-Qaeda. Remarkably, he believes that the US can do this after allowing a de facto partition of the country, with the Taliban operating what is effectively a Pashtunistan in South and Eastern Afghanistan.

The ability of the United States to affect the deterrent that Haass describes is questionable from both tactical and strategic perspectives. From a tactical perspective, the deterrent would require the United States to develop substantial intelligence among an extraordinarily hostile population—difficult in any environment, more difficult in an environment where you have 1. no US presence; 2. you’ve abandoned what of the civilian population that had assisted you in a 9 year counterinsurgency to their fates at the hands of the kin they turned on to assist you. From a strategic perspective, an effective deterrent would require something more than cruise missile or drone strikes, a presence the American people will not likely support after leaving Afghanistan once. The deterrent might sound good on paper but it will not be effective.

Further, even assuming the United States is able to affect a convincing deterrent, there is little reason to believe that even a co-opted Taliban will be able to prevent al-Qaeda from reestablishing itself in their territory. Even in the late 1990s, when al-Qaeda moved into Afghanistan, it was not apparent that they did so with overt support from the Taliban. The relationship, I think, is better described as parasitic. The Taliban were a weak government, al-Qaeda was cohesive. In that environment, al-Qaeda was able to carve out a fiefdom in Afghanistan, irrespective of Taliban desires.

Finally, while Haass should be commended for his willingness to recognize the differences between al-Qaeda and the Taliban, we should remember that not all militants are created equally—at least vis-à-vis Pakistan. The government of Pakistan describes the world in terms of “good” and “bad” Taliban. Good Taliban are those Taliban that focus on Afghanistan (and Kashmir, but that’s a different matter) and do not harbor Pakistani ambitions. Bad Taliban are those Taliban (and al-Qaeda) that oppose the state of Pakistan. Under the aegis of Bad Taliban fit both al-Qaeda and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan. A vacuum in Afghanistan, or a weak Taliban controlled space in South and Eastern Afghanistan will likely offer safe haven for these so-called Bad Taliban to launch attacks in Pakistan, contributing to Pakistan’s destabilization and thereby undermining one of the twin goals of the United States in Afghanistan.

Tehran Bazaar on Strike

Arang Keshavarizan reports on a story I missed last week at Foreign Policy. The Tehran Bazaar was on strike for seven days. Support from the Bazaar has proved critical, historically, to regime capacity in Iran.

The Import of Somalia

Fareed Zakaria’s column in today’s Washington Post, seeking to dissect Somalia and the problem it poses—or to Zakaria, doesn’t pose—to US national security is wrong both on the merits of the argument and in its retelling of Somali history.

Let us begin with the history. The collapse of Somalia is usually dated to 1991—not Zakaria’s 1992—when Said Barre was finally driven from Mogadishu in January. In fact, Somalia was without effective government for at least several years before Barre’s ouster as the country struggled to address multiple anti-regime armed movements and recover from its disastrous war with Ethiopia.

The United States did not give tacit support to Ethiopia’s 2006 invasion of Somalia. The United States gave material support to Ethiopia, providing Ethiopia with intelligence and air support for its invasion.

The Islamic Courts Union, the emerging indigenous government of Somalia that Ethiopia and the United States help to oust, is a difficult movement to color broadly. They really were an alliance of Islamic courts that exercised extremely localized jurisdiction. Some of the courts were relatively moderate, while others were draconian in their interpretation and implementation of Sharia. To describe the ICU as a “radical movement” is, I think, overbroad—in fact, one of the erstwhile leaders of the ICU is now the president of the US-backed Transitional Federal Government.

As to whether the United States has suffered deleterious effects owing to the chaos in Somalia, the only answer to this question must be yes. In the governmental void of Somalia, members of al-Qaeda have reportedly found safe haven; the al-Shabab has been born, grown and strengthened; pirates operate with impunity from Somalia’s coast, reaching into the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and even the wider Indian Ocean. These waterways, particularly the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, are critical avenues of international shipping. Simply glancing at the IMB’s Live Piracy Map communicates the intensity of piracy occurring in and around the Horn of Africa as compared to the rest of the world. Reading the IMB’s Piracy Prone Areas and Warnings does an even better job. Somalia-based pirates have driven up the costs of ship insurance 4,000%; the costs of maintaining the naval flotilla in the Gulf of Aden—to which the United States contributes vessels and manpower—approaches $300 million. The impact of Somalia-based piracy on global trade has been estimated as high as $16 billion annually.

Beyond piracy, the strongest pole of power in Somalia, currently, is the extremely radical al-Shabab which emerged from the ashes of the ICU. Its links with al-Qaeda are worrisome in themselves, more worrisome in the wake of the Kampala bombings, which demonstrate an ability to mount at least regional operations. Again, this was the first cross-border operation mounted by al-Shabab and therefore represents a sea change in the behavior of a heretofore Somalia-centric organization. Finally, transit between Somalia and Yemen is common, frequent, and unregulated, making it possible, even likely, that al-Qaeda affiliates in Yemen and Somalia physically communicate.