So before the post-mortem, some thoughts on the three, yes three speeches tonight. If I get a moment, there might be a fuller analysis tomorrow. At that point, though, the whole thing will be sullied by the pundit class.
President Obama's State of the Union
Liked it. I thought he did a great job of reminding people of the role of government in our nation, it's ability to provide investment in roads, but also science and technology. I thought he struck the right tone that says, "Listen we gotta make some changes and a lot of those changes are going to come from Republicans." It wasn't transformative and I constantly feel like the rhetorical expectations of Obama are always sky-high. He can never live up to the expectations, but I remember a time that if Bush spoke in complete sentences, he was a conquering hero. I would have liked more specifics, but I understand why he wasn't. Most importantly he has staked out the ground of responsible middle, which could help him get some things done over the next two years, but I wonder, if you make enemies on both sides what does that due to your re-election bid?
Representative Paul Ryan's Republican Response
Vastly better then the responses in recent years and I think Rep. Ryan did a good job staking out the Republican position. It's a position I greatly disagree with, but it was concise, seemed legitimate, and was focused on spending which is an easy sell. I thought he provided a great counter-point to the President, though I found wrapping themselves in the patronage of the founding fathers to be unseemly.
Representative Michele Bachmann's Tea Party Response
First, this isn't an actual party. It's a second Republican response and I question CNN's decision to air it. That said, I watched it. There were charts, horribly misleading charts that ignored a fiscal crisis. Also, who was she speaking to? Reminds me of a Mitch Hedburg joke where everyone is looking slightly to the left. On the whole, atrocious. Scattered, trite, disingenuous, and backward-looking. Quite honestly, it made Rep. Ryan and Republicans look like adults, while the Tea Party remains people stuck in a middle school civics class.
Again, the pundit class will breakdown every syllable before I wake tomorrow, but there are some initial thoughts.
Tuesday, January 25, 2011
DCExile's 2011 State of the Union Drinking Game
He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union
It’s that time of year again, the annual State of the Union address. And, therefore, time for the annual State of the Union Drinking Game. Your rules for 2011 are:
- If you’re at home, sit in an unusual spot--your Congressmen are, you can too--drink half a beer
- During the pre-speech commentary, take one shot of whiskey (if you’re a Democrat) or one shot of tequila (if you’re a Republican) each time “shellacking” is used in the context of the mid-term elections.
- Also during the pre-speech commentary, take a drink from an illicit flask each time the commentators mention “date night” or otherwise make the State of the Union sound like your high school prom.
- Waterfall beginning with the youngest person in the room each time Daniel Hernandez’s 21st birthday is mentioned. (In all seriousness, thank you Mr. Hernandez for saving Rep. Gifford’s life.)
- “The State of Our Union is Strong” = shotgun a beer.
- Every time John Boehner cries, drink one shot of 151. If he’s crying, you should be crying, too. If you’re a woman, hide your tears because only men may cry at the drop of a hat without being too weak to lead. If you’re Nancy Pelosi, leave the room and scream expletives into a pillow.
- Every time Joe Biden looks to be talking out of turn or cussing take a sip of Jameson neat. Slainte, Joe Biden.
- Every time bipartisanship is mentioned, take a shot of tequila with a friend with whom you disagree politically. Optional: Anytime you hear “cross the aisle” conduct a Chinese fire drill.
- Every time someone mentions the State of the Union being a new opportunity for Pres. Obama to connect with the American people, drink a Something on the Side or a Hot Flash Sparkler.
- Every time Main Street is mentioned, take two sips of a Rolling Rock and remember fondly when it was made at Old Latrobe, before it was purchased by Anheuser-Busch InBev.
- Every time Wall Street is mentioned, take two sips of a Budweiser and remember fondly when it was owned by an American company.
- Every time Job Creation is mentioned, drink a Coors Light. It will be ironic, trust us.
- When healthcare is mentioned, if you are a Democrat, sit very quietly in the corner, chug a beer, and pray that the law survives until 2014. If you’re a Republican, chug a beer, tear up your insurance card and run repeatedly into a wall until you are concussed. Then go to an ER and wait.
- While the President describes a partial freeze in government spending mix and chill a vodka martini. Drink the entire thing before he finishes describing the plan. Optional: eat a bag of pork rinds.
- During any description of clean energy, take one shot of Hendricks Gin for each minute the description goes on. It’s cucumber infused and will provide you with a sense of clean energy. That is, until you pass out from it and wake up hungover. Much like what happens when you buy into a clean energy plan.
- Anytime Samuel Alito is shown talking back to the President during his speech, drink two shots of bourbon: one for the death of decorum, one for the realization he will be a justice on the Supreme Court longer than you will be alive.
- If you live to the GOP rebuttal, mix together all the liquor you can find in your home. Chug it. If it tastes as vile as what Paul Ryan is spewing, you’ve mixed it correctly.
- If you live to the Tea Party rebuttal to the rebuttal, turn off the television. Go to bed.
What Kind Of Day Has It Been
- Tonight is the State of the Union Address. It will begin at 9:00pm Eastern.
- Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani gets life in prison without parole. This may quiet the critics of civil trials for terrorism suspects who condemned the process after evidence against Ghailani extracted through torture was excluded.
- Rahm's ballot exclusion has been stayed.
- Protests in Lebanon.
- Bigger protests in Egypt. Remember Tehran in July 2009 when you watch this video, though.
Charter Cities Considered
The Council on Foreign Relations held an event yesterday where Dr. Paul Romer laid out his idea for charter cities as places for those in the bottom billion to go to find employment and opportunity(audio/video, 60mins). He lays out these tenets or starting points for charter cities:
- First, they would be founded and organized ideally by people outside of the country where the city will go. The idea is to bring in new conceptions of law and social norms or rules that would under gird this new city.
- Second, people would be allowed to voluntarily enter and leave the charter city, though there may be requirements for entry and there may be subsidy to get a family moved.
- Third, the charter city would likely be run, not by someone elected by the residents, but by someone selected by this initial steering committee of people from outside the country.
Romer asks the question: What would we make a city into if we started from scratch? The idea is analogous to a charter school. The benefit, according to Romer, is being able to redefine the rules and relationships between the residents of the city, the governors of the city, and the companies that would invest in the city. He cites Hong Kong in the 1950s, Singapore, and a new project in Honduras as examples.
I give credit for a big idea, but there are a number of things about this that I'm uncomfortable with. First, it seems like cultural colonialism. There is a hubris in thinking, well Western Europeans have some of this down, why don't they go take the model, unfettered, to poor people. Second, there is an inherent lack of democracy in such a system. Yes, people can vote with their feet and leave, but we're talking about the bottom billion here. What will they leave to?
This leads to number three: this has the potentially to be a highly exploitative endeavor as companies are given incentives to invest, the cities governors aren't elected by the people, and the target populace are some of the poorest, least advantaged people who might accept a job in this city regardless of work conditions or compensation. And my final point, this is all so fanciful to me. It's the big dodge. If you could start from scratch, would you change things? I think most people would say resoundingly yes, but is that realistic? Is their the capital to do something like this and even if there is, how do you deal with all the pitfalls?
I took a class in college called "What is Good?" and part of the class explored planned utopias. The one thing I remember was that none of them worked out as planned. I don't think Romer expects these charter cities to be utopias, but I think he's wearing rose-tinted glasses if he thinks external agents can enter a country, design a semi-autonomous city-state, secure business investment, entice a populace to relocate, and then have the whole enterprise grow positively in both economic and social concerns.
Maybe we're at a point where we need to try something radical and new to try and deal with global poverty, but charter cities strike me as an idea full of good intentions, but you know what they say about the road to hell.
- First, they would be founded and organized ideally by people outside of the country where the city will go. The idea is to bring in new conceptions of law and social norms or rules that would under gird this new city.
- Second, people would be allowed to voluntarily enter and leave the charter city, though there may be requirements for entry and there may be subsidy to get a family moved.
- Third, the charter city would likely be run, not by someone elected by the residents, but by someone selected by this initial steering committee of people from outside the country.
Romer asks the question: What would we make a city into if we started from scratch? The idea is analogous to a charter school. The benefit, according to Romer, is being able to redefine the rules and relationships between the residents of the city, the governors of the city, and the companies that would invest in the city. He cites Hong Kong in the 1950s, Singapore, and a new project in Honduras as examples.
I give credit for a big idea, but there are a number of things about this that I'm uncomfortable with. First, it seems like cultural colonialism. There is a hubris in thinking, well Western Europeans have some of this down, why don't they go take the model, unfettered, to poor people. Second, there is an inherent lack of democracy in such a system. Yes, people can vote with their feet and leave, but we're talking about the bottom billion here. What will they leave to?
This leads to number three: this has the potentially to be a highly exploitative endeavor as companies are given incentives to invest, the cities governors aren't elected by the people, and the target populace are some of the poorest, least advantaged people who might accept a job in this city regardless of work conditions or compensation. And my final point, this is all so fanciful to me. It's the big dodge. If you could start from scratch, would you change things? I think most people would say resoundingly yes, but is that realistic? Is their the capital to do something like this and even if there is, how do you deal with all the pitfalls?
I took a class in college called "What is Good?" and part of the class explored planned utopias. The one thing I remember was that none of them worked out as planned. I don't think Romer expects these charter cities to be utopias, but I think he's wearing rose-tinted glasses if he thinks external agents can enter a country, design a semi-autonomous city-state, secure business investment, entice a populace to relocate, and then have the whole enterprise grow positively in both economic and social concerns.
Maybe we're at a point where we need to try something radical and new to try and deal with global poverty, but charter cities strike me as an idea full of good intentions, but you know what they say about the road to hell.
The Short List
- Questions of security emerge in the aftermath of the Moscow bombing. The Washington Post has a graphic of the attack location, in an area of nearly every international airport is lightly policed.
- Lebanon has elected Najib Miqati,
a member of Hezbolaha member of the Harakat Majd and the March 8 Alliance, to lead the government. Some protests have broken out. - President Obama gives his State of the Union Address tonight. It's widely perceived as the most important policy speech of his presidency so far.
- The British economy contracted .5% in the final quarter of 2010.
- The Economist briefly considers the rising tide of pain states will experience in the face of budget crises.
Monday, January 24, 2011
Discomfort, Individualism, and Nero
Courtney Martin has a post up over at The American Prospect about demagoguery and discomfort. I think it's a smart, hopeful post. She says:
I don't think American citizens deserve certainty. I know it makes us comfortable--both in our political sphere and in our personal lives -- but it's dangerous and delusional. It leads us to elect people who don't acknowledge the full complexity of the times we are facing and fail to take responsibility for their own errors in judgment (case in point: Sarah Palin's "blood libel" pity party rather than a genuine acknowledgement of her misguided and violent rhetoric and symbology). It tempts us into believing we aren't complicit in our contemporary challenges -- that the BP oil spill or the War in Iraq has nothing to do with our gas-guzzling SUVs, that the genocide in the Congo is not connected to our conflict-mineral enhanced cell phones and laptops, that the economic meltdown is uncoupled with our complacency or consumption.
That's a strange passage to find hopeful and if I think you read the whole thing the whole "hope" thing comes through a bit better. I think on the whole she's urging Americans to get beyond rabid individualism and consider a wider humanity that is inter-connected. Or maybe, the better lesson is to accept responsibility as an individual for our part in the world's challenges.
Maybe that's the biggest challenge America faces. We, as a nation and as individuals, have an aversion to accepting responsibility for our own failings, instead it's more gratifying and expeditious to blame someone else. If that be the case, we risk being Nero with the lyre.
I don't think American citizens deserve certainty. I know it makes us comfortable--both in our political sphere and in our personal lives -- but it's dangerous and delusional. It leads us to elect people who don't acknowledge the full complexity of the times we are facing and fail to take responsibility for their own errors in judgment (case in point: Sarah Palin's "blood libel" pity party rather than a genuine acknowledgement of her misguided and violent rhetoric and symbology). It tempts us into believing we aren't complicit in our contemporary challenges -- that the BP oil spill or the War in Iraq has nothing to do with our gas-guzzling SUVs, that the genocide in the Congo is not connected to our conflict-mineral enhanced cell phones and laptops, that the economic meltdown is uncoupled with our complacency or consumption.
That's a strange passage to find hopeful and if I think you read the whole thing the whole "hope" thing comes through a bit better. I think on the whole she's urging Americans to get beyond rabid individualism and consider a wider humanity that is inter-connected. Or maybe, the better lesson is to accept responsibility as an individual for our part in the world's challenges.
Maybe that's the biggest challenge America faces. We, as a nation and as individuals, have an aversion to accepting responsibility for our own failings, instead it's more gratifying and expeditious to blame someone else. If that be the case, we risk being Nero with the lyre.
What Kind Of Day Has It Been
- Rahm Emanuel has been disqualified from the Chicago Mayoral ballot. He will appeal.
- Jared Loughner pleads not guilty.
- A candidate backed by Hezbollah is poised to become the next Prime Minister of Lebanon, replacing the Westward looking Saad Hariri. Notably, Najib Mikati was briefly PM after the assassination of Rafik Hariri in 2005. He is also a Sunni Muslim, which will not upset the traditional confessional distribution of authority in Lebanon.
- A suspected suicide bombing of major Moscow airport killed 30.
- Thousands of documents leaked to Al Jazeera--and provided by Al Jazeera to the Guardian--indicate both a great deal of cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian Authority security services and huge concessions on the part of the Palestinian Authority to advance the goal of peace and statehood. The revelations are likely to discredit Mahmoud Abbas at home and Israel abroad.
The Iran End Goal
As we mentioned in The Short List last week, new talks are underway between Iran, the US, and a handful of other nations. According to Matthew Fuhrmann, Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, it's time for a diplomatic offensive. The concept of a diplomatic offensive is maybe just slightly more ethereal then the concept of diplomacy itself, but I think Mr. Fuhrmann hits on the right tone, though I disagree with some of his points.
Mr. Fuhrmann's argument is largely predicated on the idea that Iran is "reaching a critical juncture about its willingness to build nuclear weapons." From there, Mr. Fuhrmann considers how far Iran is willing to go for a nuclear weapon and at what price. Correctly, he says that Iran is not North Korea, and it unwilling to starve its populace to achieve nuclear weapons technology. The rest of the argument hinges on the notion that Iran can be convinced to abandon its nuclear program.
He believes setbacks that Iran has faced, both those designed by sanctions and those precipitated by a recent economic decline in Iran gives the world more time and a chance to later the tone. "[H]arsh rhetoric, gradually tighter sanctions, and covert actions will not solve the problem," according to Mr. Fuhrmann, "it will only buy time." Given the goal of having Iran abandon its nuclear program, and given this moment when Iran might be more amenable to negotiations, Fuhrmann advocates for some minor economic concessions to Iran. Give them a little more carrot then stick, so to speak. He believes giving Iran some concessions could help the US and our allies regain some trust with Iran, provided, of course, we followed through on the concessions. From there more good will could be established and diplomacy could take its course as we, limitedly, welcome Iran back to the international fold and Iran abandons its nuclear program.
I agree with Mr. Fuhrmann that the tone is off, that concessions need to be on the table, and that sanctions serve to only delay Iran. However, where I disagree is the idea that Iran will give up its nuclear program. Given the current government, the current governing bodies, and the current toxic levels of enmity between the US and Iran, I can see no reason to believe abandonment of the program is on the minds of Iran's decision makers. I tend to think that the acquisition of nuclear weapon technology is as much a matter of national pride as it is self defense for Iran. Given that i don't think Iran will abandon its nuclear program anytime soon, I fall short in offering legitimate ways forward. Suffice to say, concessions aren't a bad thing and they have to be part of the discussion, but clearly the whole strategy has to be tethered to what our end goal is.
Mr. Fuhrmann's argument is largely predicated on the idea that Iran is "reaching a critical juncture about its willingness to build nuclear weapons." From there, Mr. Fuhrmann considers how far Iran is willing to go for a nuclear weapon and at what price. Correctly, he says that Iran is not North Korea, and it unwilling to starve its populace to achieve nuclear weapons technology. The rest of the argument hinges on the notion that Iran can be convinced to abandon its nuclear program.
He believes setbacks that Iran has faced, both those designed by sanctions and those precipitated by a recent economic decline in Iran gives the world more time and a chance to later the tone. "[H]arsh rhetoric, gradually tighter sanctions, and covert actions will not solve the problem," according to Mr. Fuhrmann, "it will only buy time." Given the goal of having Iran abandon its nuclear program, and given this moment when Iran might be more amenable to negotiations, Fuhrmann advocates for some minor economic concessions to Iran. Give them a little more carrot then stick, so to speak. He believes giving Iran some concessions could help the US and our allies regain some trust with Iran, provided, of course, we followed through on the concessions. From there more good will could be established and diplomacy could take its course as we, limitedly, welcome Iran back to the international fold and Iran abandons its nuclear program.
I agree with Mr. Fuhrmann that the tone is off, that concessions need to be on the table, and that sanctions serve to only delay Iran. However, where I disagree is the idea that Iran will give up its nuclear program. Given the current government, the current governing bodies, and the current toxic levels of enmity between the US and Iran, I can see no reason to believe abandonment of the program is on the minds of Iran's decision makers. I tend to think that the acquisition of nuclear weapon technology is as much a matter of national pride as it is self defense for Iran. Given that i don't think Iran will abandon its nuclear program anytime soon, I fall short in offering legitimate ways forward. Suffice to say, concessions aren't a bad thing and they have to be part of the discussion, but clearly the whole strategy has to be tethered to what our end goal is.
The Short List
- The Tunisian interim government briefly shut down the most popular private television station. Many believe this violates pledges to allow freedom of expression.
- The World Economic Forum gets underway in Davos, Switzerland today, but the conference faces some soul searching and anemic expectations.
- Pakistani spy, Sultan Amir Tarar, died while under militant captivity 10 months after being kidnapped in northwest Pakistan. Tarar was an important gunrunner for the CIA during the Soviet invasion of Aghanistan, and became a Pakistan's point man with the Taliban.
- Ireland's Prime Minister, Brian Cowen, has been forced to call elections within a month as the Green Party withdraws from the coalition government. The prior timeline had elections scheduled for March.
- For China, central planning in the coal markets has become tricky.
Saturday, January 22, 2011
Horse Racing without Horses or Riders
Apparently tired of the slow start to the 2012 Republican nomination battle, the Washington Post has determined to inject some excitement by, well, inventing it: "Who can win the 2012 GOP nomination?"
RE: What To Do With Pakistan
I take issue with the pros that Jason believes will fall out of disengagement with Pakistan. It is not clear to me that our current engagement in Pakistan in anyway constrains U.S. or NATO freedom of action in Afghanistan. What constraints the U.S. faces have more to do with the role the Afghan government plays in coordinating or approving operations or, in cases like Marjah, the Afghan government’s inability to find Afghan civilians to fill key governmental positions. As far as I can tell, the United States concerns itself little if at all with Pakistan when operating on the Afghan side of the border. Indeed, there is a least some evidence that the United States concerns itself little with Pakistan when operating on the Pakistani side of the border!
That brings me to my next point of departure with Jason’s assessment: concern for Pakistani public opinion. I do not see much evidence that the United States has been concerned a great deal with Pakistani public opinion. The United States drone operations in Pakistan are unsurprisingly very unpopular among the Pakistani public. Despite this, drone strikes are increasingly common. There were 118 drone strikes in 2010, more than double the 2009 tally and triple the 2008 tally.
Finally, I do not see how disengaging will afford greater mission clarity, which is not to say that there is presently any mission clarity.
That brings me to my next point of departure with Jason’s assessment: concern for Pakistani public opinion. I do not see much evidence that the United States has been concerned a great deal with Pakistani public opinion. The United States drone operations in Pakistan are unsurprisingly very unpopular among the Pakistani public. Despite this, drone strikes are increasingly common. There were 118 drone strikes in 2010, more than double the 2009 tally and triple the 2008 tally.
Finally, I do not see how disengaging will afford greater mission clarity, which is not to say that there is presently any mission clarity.
Friday, January 21, 2011
What Kind Of Day Has It Been
- Today marked the 1 year anniversary of the Citizen's United decision. Politico notes that Republicans are beginning to acknowledge the advantage the decision has given them. The Center for Responsive Politics has more on the impact of the decision.
- Facebook settles for a mere $1 billion.
- Yet more evidence that Israel and the United States cooperated in the deployment of the Stuxnet worm, which is thought to have significantly retarded Iranian uranium enrichment processes.
- Tony Blair admitted ignoring the opinion of the British Attorney General that invading Iraq would be illegal without U.N. Security Council approval.
- As expected, South Sudan voted overwhelmingly--nearly 99%--for secession in last week's referendum.
Healthcare - File under "Captain Obvious"
Matt Ygelsias called my attention to this story out of Vermont, where Harvard healthcare economist William Hsiao was hired by the Vermont legislature to find new designs for Vermont's healthcare system. Hsiao has offered a single-payer system. Hsiao outlined in the report that, "getting one entity to process claims, reforming medical malpractice and taking other steps would save $2.1 billion in health spending by 2025." My initial thought was "Well, duh." I then rolled my eyes and tossed my hair back dismissively.
The Short List
- Karzai looks to Russia to help revive some projects in Afghanistan that were originally started during the Soviet occupation.
- Iran, the U.S., and other have gone into another round of talks regarding Iran's nuclear program, but expectations are low.
- Google shakes up its management team in an effort to get back to that start-up mentality, despite being worth $200 billion and having over 24,000 employees.
- The Republican Study Committee is proposing $100 billion in cuts to non-defense discretionary spending. This would reduce most federal agency budgets by 30%. The plan also calls for the elimination of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, the National Endowment for the Arts, Amtrak, and USAID.
- The Economist considers income inequality.
What to do with Pakistan: Part Two
I haven’t forgotten you Pakistan, but China stopped by and the whole day job got in the way. Now where were we. Last time I was commenting on T.X. Hammes and more generally about the messy history between Pakistan and the U.S. This post is about just a few of the pros and cons of disengagement with Pakistan.
So what happens if the U.S. disengages from Pakistan? First the pros:
And now, the cons:
This is not even close to an exhaustive list, but I think it illustrates the point. It’s easy to knock the current policy, but it’s very hard to come up with an alternative. There are benefits from disengaging from Pakistan, however Pakistan, if not the best of allies, is an important power in a region that we can’t afford to have a blind spot. I have a feeling the frustrations that T.X. Hammes outlines are some of the same frustrations voiced in meeting rooms at the White House, the Pentagon, and the State Department (or at least I hope they are) but sometimes there isn’t a good alternative and all you’re left with is the least bad alternative. Obviously as a super power it sounds neither super nor powerful to pursue a least bad policy, but I don’t see a clear alternative. Do you?
So what happens if the U.S. disengages from Pakistan? First the pros:
- Greater autonomy to operate on the Afghan side of the AfPak border
- Be less concerned about the Pakistan public reaction to U.S. actions
- Have greater mission clarity and direction from unilateral action plans
And now, the cons:
- Loss of access to superior human intelligence network.
- Loss of international legitimacy for the mission since it would likely be unilateral.
- Loss of input/leverage over Pakistan’s nuclear program.
This is not even close to an exhaustive list, but I think it illustrates the point. It’s easy to knock the current policy, but it’s very hard to come up with an alternative. There are benefits from disengaging from Pakistan, however Pakistan, if not the best of allies, is an important power in a region that we can’t afford to have a blind spot. I have a feeling the frustrations that T.X. Hammes outlines are some of the same frustrations voiced in meeting rooms at the White House, the Pentagon, and the State Department (or at least I hope they are) but sometimes there isn’t a good alternative and all you’re left with is the least bad alternative. Obviously as a super power it sounds neither super nor powerful to pursue a least bad policy, but I don’t see a clear alternative. Do you?
Thursday, January 20, 2011
Thousands are Sailing
A story in the Wall Street Journal reports that as many 100,000 Irishmen and women are expected to leave Ireland due to its economic woes between April 2010 and April 2012. Unlike previous waves of Irish emigration, the primary destinations for Irish immigrants are in Europe: the UK, the Czech Republic, Poland, France, and Germany. And, while 23,000 have moved to Australia and New Zealand, only 2,800 have moved to the United States in search of economic opportunities. These figures stand in marked contrast to previous waves of Irish immigration, in which the United States was a prime destination for Irishmen and women seeking better lives.
What Kind Of Day Has It Been
- President Obama's poll numbers have jumped.
- Don't Ask, Don't Tell cost U.S. taxpayers $200 million. So, discrimination is not only wrong, damaging to U.S. national security, and founded on a bogus premise, it is expensive.
- Donald Trump attacked the Obama administration for holding a state dinner for President Hu Jintao on Fox & Friends. He repeated his criticism on CNN's Situation Room this afternoon. Despite his claims of indecision, I would say these potshots are a pretty clear indicator he is running for President.
- Blackwater may or may not be mixed up with mercenaries in Africa--mercenaries that are helping to train and defend the Somali Transitional Federal Government.
The Short List
- Tunisia's interim government attempts to hold on, even as demonstrators continue to clamor for the full purge of Ben Ali and his political party.
- Jared Loughner, the gunman accused of shooting Rep. Gabrielle Giffords and killing six, has been indicted on three charges (with more possible) including two counts of murder. Rep. Giffords is able to stand and will soon be heading to rehab.
- Wal-Mart has pledged to make thousands of its food lower in sodium and trans-fats. They have also pledged to lower the price of fresh fruit an vegetables.
- President Hu broke, uncharacteristically, from past Chinese rhetoric admitting, "a lot still needs to be done in China, in terms of human rights."
- The Economist considers the assasination of Salman Taseer and what it indicates about the shifting proclivities of sects of Muslims in Pakistan.
Wednesday, January 19, 2011
What Kind Of Day Has It Been
- Sargent Shriver passed away yesterday.
- The New York Times considers the etiquette of inviting a former president who is married to a current Secretary of State to a State dinner. Seriously.
- The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the al-Adahi case, essentially affirming the D.C. Circuit's revision of evidentiary as well as review standards. Wittes provides a summary but misses that important point.
- Insurgents struck Iraqi security forces for the second time in two days. These attacks follow a spate of U.S. soldiers killed there recently, along with other indicators of an insurgency not yet extinguished.
- The U.N. is sending additional peacekeepers to Cote d'Ivoire, which sounds a bit ominous to me.
The Beginning of History
Francis Fukuyama has a very concise summation(behind a registration wall) of the interplay between China and the U.S., both the places they hold in the world, the parts to envy about each system, and a warning of adjustments both need to make Matthew Steinglass remarks that Dr. Fukuyama’s op-ed “puts it all together in a fashion that's close to perfect.” Certainly it’s a fantastic summation, but it does raise some questions.
Without a doubt, the Chinese model is hard to classify but it allows China “to make large, complex decisions quickly, and to make them relatively well, at least in economic policy.” Fukuyama contrasts this with India, where all manner of interests can derail a project, particularly infrastructure projects. But the big question, one we don’t really have the answer to yet and one that Fukuyama foreshadows is how this system responds in an economic downturn.
This authoritarian system, which has co-opted the business elite and essentially created a middle class, has been able to use sustained and extraordinary economic growth to dis-incentivize the desire for a more democratic government. However, there is still a large portion of the population that has not seen any success from this economic expansion. Perhaps given the sheer size of the country and the control the regime has institutionalized, they have been able to ignore this group. It should also be noted the government has responded to many of the concerns of all their constituencies, but I have doubts about how long they can stay ahead of the eight ball. The true test will come when GDP growth comes down to earth, which is not to say I hope it happens, only that it will happen. (Yes, I understand the irony of saying this will happen like so many people said China would be more democratic as its economy grew. Sometimes you gotta go out on a limb and think economic principles will hold.)
Fukuyama also takes aim at the American system and points out some of its weaknesses. He writes, “Americans pride themselves on constitutional checks and balances, based on a political culture that distrusts centralised government. This system has ensured individual liberty and a vibrant private sector, but it has now become polarised and ideologically rigid.” Quite right. Balancing our democratic traditions with the demands of a globally inter-connected economy where countries, more so then companies, remain the dominant players presents a tough needle to thread. I think we find ourselves at a crossroads in America with essentially two competing visions: we can move to weaken the federal government, lower taxes, continue to deregulate, and move back to something akin to the U.S. in the late 1700s or we will have to empower the federal government to make ever bigger decisions about the priorities and direction of the country, which could necessitate higher taxes and will necessitate greater bureaucratic autonomy (and maybe control). The former vision would likely guarantee an inability to compete with China, while the latter vision would compromise aspects of the American psyche that places a heavy premium on individual liberty.
Let me say clearly, I’m not a big fan of either scenario. While I see the social value of a stronger federal government, I remain suspicious of empowering that government to have even half the power the Chinese government now wields over its populace. This of course, presents a quandary since the middling-road hasn’t done much for us in the past 20 years or so to address our long-term fiscal challenges or allow our foreign policy to capitalize on that brief moment at the end of the Cold War to reinforce the benevolent hegemony of the United States. To bring it back to Steinglass, he ends his laudatory post on Fukuyama’s op-ed by noting, “It's not clear where we're heading, and we should keep our wits about us and adapt; we can be left behind, just as others were before us.” Alternatively, we’re not at the end of history, instead we are at the beginning of a new chapter in our history where the conventions of the last chapter will be challenged in new way. How the U.S. responds today might tell us in the future if we are watching the sun set on American global dominance.
Without a doubt, the Chinese model is hard to classify but it allows China “to make large, complex decisions quickly, and to make them relatively well, at least in economic policy.” Fukuyama contrasts this with India, where all manner of interests can derail a project, particularly infrastructure projects. But the big question, one we don’t really have the answer to yet and one that Fukuyama foreshadows is how this system responds in an economic downturn.
This authoritarian system, which has co-opted the business elite and essentially created a middle class, has been able to use sustained and extraordinary economic growth to dis-incentivize the desire for a more democratic government. However, there is still a large portion of the population that has not seen any success from this economic expansion. Perhaps given the sheer size of the country and the control the regime has institutionalized, they have been able to ignore this group. It should also be noted the government has responded to many of the concerns of all their constituencies, but I have doubts about how long they can stay ahead of the eight ball. The true test will come when GDP growth comes down to earth, which is not to say I hope it happens, only that it will happen. (Yes, I understand the irony of saying this will happen like so many people said China would be more democratic as its economy grew. Sometimes you gotta go out on a limb and think economic principles will hold.)
Fukuyama also takes aim at the American system and points out some of its weaknesses. He writes, “Americans pride themselves on constitutional checks and balances, based on a political culture that distrusts centralised government. This system has ensured individual liberty and a vibrant private sector, but it has now become polarised and ideologically rigid.” Quite right. Balancing our democratic traditions with the demands of a globally inter-connected economy where countries, more so then companies, remain the dominant players presents a tough needle to thread. I think we find ourselves at a crossroads in America with essentially two competing visions: we can move to weaken the federal government, lower taxes, continue to deregulate, and move back to something akin to the U.S. in the late 1700s or we will have to empower the federal government to make ever bigger decisions about the priorities and direction of the country, which could necessitate higher taxes and will necessitate greater bureaucratic autonomy (and maybe control). The former vision would likely guarantee an inability to compete with China, while the latter vision would compromise aspects of the American psyche that places a heavy premium on individual liberty.
Let me say clearly, I’m not a big fan of either scenario. While I see the social value of a stronger federal government, I remain suspicious of empowering that government to have even half the power the Chinese government now wields over its populace. This of course, presents a quandary since the middling-road hasn’t done much for us in the past 20 years or so to address our long-term fiscal challenges or allow our foreign policy to capitalize on that brief moment at the end of the Cold War to reinforce the benevolent hegemony of the United States. To bring it back to Steinglass, he ends his laudatory post on Fukuyama’s op-ed by noting, “It's not clear where we're heading, and we should keep our wits about us and adapt; we can be left behind, just as others were before us.” Alternatively, we’re not at the end of history, instead we are at the beginning of a new chapter in our history where the conventions of the last chapter will be challenged in new way. How the U.S. responds today might tell us in the future if we are watching the sun set on American global dominance.
The Short List
- Protests continue in Tunisia, but great uncertainty remains about who will step into the vacuum left by Ben Ali's flight. The Council on Foreign Relations surveys the likelihood that Tunisia revolution could catch on in other North African countries.
- Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid calls Chinese President Hu Jintao a dictator last night, while Secretary Clinton took to the morning shows to emphasize the need for a stronger bi-lateral relationship.
- Afghanistan's special election court, widely considered unconstitutional by international observers, has called for a month delay for Parliament's inauguration.
- The tone of the debate of healthcare repeal has been notably more civil.
- Economist.com considers industrial towns and how Tata has created a community around a steel mill.
Tuesday, January 18, 2011
What Kind Of Day Has It Been
- Lieberman is out. So is Conrad.
- Baby Doc Duvalier, who made a curious return to Haiti a few days ago, was arrested.
- Things don't seem to be settling down in Tunisia. The self-immolation that set off the Tunisian protests has inspired similar acts across North Africa.
- Anwar al-Aulaqi was convicted in absentia by a Yemeni court. Robert Chesney is dubious of its impact.
Not So Divided - Revisited
The original post prompted quite a few comments between Colin and myself, so I thought it would be interesting to post this entry from Will Wilkinson writing in Democracy in America on Economist.com. Mr. Wilkinson says:
Although Americans left and right have remarkably consistent "ideologically conservative but programmatically progressive" preferences when it comes to redistributive social policy, it benefits political parties and party politicians to greatly exaggerate their differences. Partisan brand identity and distinction is achieved largely through a commitment to a certain stock of rhetorical tropes and symbolic gestures that float almost entirely free of the party's substantive commitments. People are suckers for rhetoric, which is why merely rhetorical differentiation works at both the grocery store and the polling station. It is also why we are prone to believing crazy things about what the other "side" believes. And this leads to a rhetorical atmosphere corrosive to the trust necessary to facilitate compromises over policy that would be agreeable to most everyone. Our problem, and Mr Krugman's, is that we believe our own BS.
Basically, Mr. Wilkinson and I agree that the rhetoric is far more divided then the policy preference.
Although Americans left and right have remarkably consistent "ideologically conservative but programmatically progressive" preferences when it comes to redistributive social policy, it benefits political parties and party politicians to greatly exaggerate their differences. Partisan brand identity and distinction is achieved largely through a commitment to a certain stock of rhetorical tropes and symbolic gestures that float almost entirely free of the party's substantive commitments. People are suckers for rhetoric, which is why merely rhetorical differentiation works at both the grocery store and the polling station. It is also why we are prone to believing crazy things about what the other "side" believes. And this leads to a rhetorical atmosphere corrosive to the trust necessary to facilitate compromises over policy that would be agreeable to most everyone. Our problem, and Mr Krugman's, is that we believe our own BS.
Basically, Mr. Wilkinson and I agree that the rhetoric is far more divided then the policy preference.
The Short List
- As Tunisia starts to deal with a the successful overthrow of President Ben Ali, here is a survey of headlines from newspapers in the region. Meanwhile, Steven A. Cook considers what happens next.
- Hu Jintao, China's President, arrives in the U.S. today for a state visit. The Economist consider the choreography and the climate that will serve as the backdrop to this visit. Friend of DCExile, Nick Consonery, was on FoxNews last night talking about currency discussions between the U.S. and China.
- By failing to invade North Waziristan, Pakistan may be making U.S. drone strikes more effective.
- The UN has submitted a sealed indictment in the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese prime minister, Rafik Hariri, causing tensions in the city to elevate.
DC Exile Relaunch
To the dozen of you that have taken the time to read our little blog over the years, thank you. We’ve been talking and decided we need to revitalize and relaunch the blog. We want it to be more relevant, more substantive, and more interactive for you, our readers (Hi Mom!). We would also like to attract more readers, but it’s hard to claim a share of a saturated market. So, in our effort to give you more and be more professional we are going to do the following:
New Look
That part has to be pretty obvious at this point. We’re working on a logo, which is to say, we’d like to have a logo but lack the visual arts savvy to get it done. Suggestions/Help is welcomed.
Mission Statement
Yes, seriously, a mission statement. What are we doing this for (aside from our own egos) if we don’t have a statement to refer to before we post anything? We may, from time to time, indulge our intellects (and egos) with off topic posts, but generally speaking:
DC Exile is a blog that focuses on international and domestic politics and economics (with a progressive slant), emphasizing the issues and not the process.
Basically, we want to add to the discourse, not observe and report the horse race. Additionally, we want to avoid being part of the echo chamber of the blogosphere. We get tired of reading what Ezra has to say about what Ygelsias had to say about what Steinglass had to say about whatever topic. Also, ain’t like those guys are going to be referring to us anytime soon, especially if we’re just referring to them.
Features
The Short List - Like Ezra Klein’s “Reconciliation” post or Matthew Yglesias’s “Endgame” post, only to start the day. It will be a quick round up of headlines from the past twenty four hours. We’re looking to always post some links you’re less likely to have seen, though if you’re on your game some will be retreads.
Weekly Poll - Posted every Monday morning, we will ask our readership for their thoughts on a topic likely to be in the news in the week ahead.
What Kind of Day Has It Been? - A (mostly) daily closing post about something that happened that day, maybe someone’s good day or someone’s bad day. Embarrassing video/audio clips would be golden.
Articles
We will have two longer-form (500+ word) posts up each week going more in depth with a topic. They will be well researched and sourced without the vitriol that can cloud a hasty post. These posts will add to the substantive discussion of the topic being considered.
Reaction
Hey, this is a blog after all. We will still periodically post the hasty (often steeply slanted) post in reaction to some juicy bit to come across the ticker on a given day. This has been what we (or at least Jason) has been about recently and while it’s good for content generation, it doesn’t add much to the debate.
We hope all (14) of you are good with that. We truly believe this is a relaunch and not a redefinition of what we’re about at DC Exile. We also believe this will make the blog more valuable to those of you with limited interest in some of the topics we cover. Again, thanks for reading.
Sincerely,
Ben & Jason
New Look
That part has to be pretty obvious at this point. We’re working on a logo, which is to say, we’d like to have a logo but lack the visual arts savvy to get it done. Suggestions/Help is welcomed.
Mission Statement
Yes, seriously, a mission statement. What are we doing this for (aside from our own egos) if we don’t have a statement to refer to before we post anything? We may, from time to time, indulge our intellects (and egos) with off topic posts, but generally speaking:
DC Exile is a blog that focuses on international and domestic politics and economics (with a progressive slant), emphasizing the issues and not the process.
Basically, we want to add to the discourse, not observe and report the horse race. Additionally, we want to avoid being part of the echo chamber of the blogosphere. We get tired of reading what Ezra has to say about what Ygelsias had to say about what Steinglass had to say about whatever topic. Also, ain’t like those guys are going to be referring to us anytime soon, especially if we’re just referring to them.
Features
The Short List - Like Ezra Klein’s “Reconciliation” post or Matthew Yglesias’s “Endgame” post, only to start the day. It will be a quick round up of headlines from the past twenty four hours. We’re looking to always post some links you’re less likely to have seen, though if you’re on your game some will be retreads.
Weekly Poll - Posted every Monday morning, we will ask our readership for their thoughts on a topic likely to be in the news in the week ahead.
What Kind of Day Has It Been? - A (mostly) daily closing post about something that happened that day, maybe someone’s good day or someone’s bad day. Embarrassing video/audio clips would be golden.
Articles
We will have two longer-form (500+ word) posts up each week going more in depth with a topic. They will be well researched and sourced without the vitriol that can cloud a hasty post. These posts will add to the substantive discussion of the topic being considered.
Reaction
Hey, this is a blog after all. We will still periodically post the hasty (often steeply slanted) post in reaction to some juicy bit to come across the ticker on a given day. This has been what we (or at least Jason) has been about recently and while it’s good for content generation, it doesn’t add much to the debate.
We hope all (14) of you are good with that. We truly believe this is a relaunch and not a redefinition of what we’re about at DC Exile. We also believe this will make the blog more valuable to those of you with limited interest in some of the topics we cover. Again, thanks for reading.
Sincerely,
Ben & Jason
Friday, January 14, 2011
What Kind Of Day Has It Been
- Protests in Tunisia have driven the President from the country. The Prime Minister has claimed power for the time being. Al-Jazeera has good coverage.
- The RNC has a new Chairman, Reince Priebus.
- Blue Shield of California is going through with a controversial insurance rate hike.
- BP and Rosneft swap shares for a joint exploration deal in the Arctic.
Not So Divided
I don’t like doing it, but I have to respectfully disagree with Paul Krugman. His column today talks about what he perceives as two moralities. He believes, “we are a deeply divided nation and are likely to remain one for a long time. By all means, let’s listen to each other more carefully; but what we’ll discover, I fear, is how far apart we are.” Krugman continues:
One side of American politics considers the modern welfare state — a private-enterprise economy, but one in which society’s winners are taxed to pay for a social safety net — morally superior to the capitalism red in tooth and claw we had before the New Deal. It’s only right, this side believes, for the affluent to help the less fortunate.
The other side believes that people have a right to keep what they earn, and that taxing them to support others, no matter how needy, amounts to theft. That’s what lies behind the modern right’s fondness for violent rhetoric: many activists on the right really do see taxes and regulation as tyrannical impositions on their liberty.
My dissent is one of scope, not message. I believe there are people who consider taxes and social safety to be “tyrannical impositions on their liberty.” I also believe, if that’s where you are coming from, then violence seems an apt response. That said, I think the people who truly believe that are a very very small minority. I don’t think the divide is so great in reality, but rather in rhetoric.
A few highly influential conservative pundits have gotten very rich by stoking the flames of government’s illegitimacy and wrapping themselves in the cloak of individual responsibility. I doubt that actually believe all of it, but it makes them money. Why not keeping saying the extreme if it’s profitable?
I also think the current Republican party has determined that they should indulge this rhetoric because it is politically advantageous. Those that have been part of governing (as good will partners or not) like Speaker Boehner and Minority Leader McConnell have calculated the political advantage of accepting the rhetoric, while governing from a more center-right perspective. Yes, I believe they are being disingenuous. Not entirely, but on many issues I think they found it easier to grab a pitchfork, then to raise their voice for calm.
Finally, I just don’t think the number of people in this country that would condemn their neighbor to poverty because they don’t like paying taxes is very large. Most Americans aren’t so cruel, or so short-sided. I honestly believe those Americans who consider themselves right of center either have been recipients or know someone who has been a recipient of the safety net. This knowledge and the good it brought to themselves, a freind, or family member also reminds them that someday they might need that net, or their kids might, or their parents.
I understand what Krugman is trying to say, and I certainly wish for more honest conversations about what we truly object to, as opposed to what’s politically advantageous to object to, but I don’t think the divide is so great. But I also enjoy waffling between cynicism and optimism. Le sigh.
One side of American politics considers the modern welfare state — a private-enterprise economy, but one in which society’s winners are taxed to pay for a social safety net — morally superior to the capitalism red in tooth and claw we had before the New Deal. It’s only right, this side believes, for the affluent to help the less fortunate.
The other side believes that people have a right to keep what they earn, and that taxing them to support others, no matter how needy, amounts to theft. That’s what lies behind the modern right’s fondness for violent rhetoric: many activists on the right really do see taxes and regulation as tyrannical impositions on their liberty.
My dissent is one of scope, not message. I believe there are people who consider taxes and social safety to be “tyrannical impositions on their liberty.” I also believe, if that’s where you are coming from, then violence seems an apt response. That said, I think the people who truly believe that are a very very small minority. I don’t think the divide is so great in reality, but rather in rhetoric.
A few highly influential conservative pundits have gotten very rich by stoking the flames of government’s illegitimacy and wrapping themselves in the cloak of individual responsibility. I doubt that actually believe all of it, but it makes them money. Why not keeping saying the extreme if it’s profitable?
I also think the current Republican party has determined that they should indulge this rhetoric because it is politically advantageous. Those that have been part of governing (as good will partners or not) like Speaker Boehner and Minority Leader McConnell have calculated the political advantage of accepting the rhetoric, while governing from a more center-right perspective. Yes, I believe they are being disingenuous. Not entirely, but on many issues I think they found it easier to grab a pitchfork, then to raise their voice for calm.
Finally, I just don’t think the number of people in this country that would condemn their neighbor to poverty because they don’t like paying taxes is very large. Most Americans aren’t so cruel, or so short-sided. I honestly believe those Americans who consider themselves right of center either have been recipients or know someone who has been a recipient of the safety net. This knowledge and the good it brought to themselves, a freind, or family member also reminds them that someday they might need that net, or their kids might, or their parents.
I understand what Krugman is trying to say, and I certainly wish for more honest conversations about what we truly object to, as opposed to what’s politically advantageous to object to, but I don’t think the divide is so great. But I also enjoy waffling between cynicism and optimism. Le sigh.
The Short List
- The House will consider healthcare repeal next week.
- Protests continue in Tunisia, even as the President Ben Ali makes an offer of concessions. There appears to be a tacit link between the protests and Wikileaks.
- Opium prices have soared, hindering the U.S. backed anti-drug efforts in Afghanistan.
- The Economist reflects on rape, its ubiquity in war, and its costs.
Thursday, January 13, 2011
What Kind Of Day Has It Been
- Rep. Giffords continues to make progress, opening an eye spontaneously. Christina Taylor, the 9 year old girl killed in the Tuscon shooting, was laid to rest.
- Sen. Kay Bailey-Hutchinson calls it quits.
- Even when they try to avoid the horse race, the horse race finds them. And that leads the Economist.
- Tunisia continues to come unglued.
What to do with Pakistan?: Part One
T.X. Hammes has a piece in Foreign Policy this week discussing the White House’s policy review of the war in Afghanistan. In the report the White House says:
Pakistan is central to our efforts to defeat al-Qa’ida and prevent its return to the region. We seek to secure these interests through continued, robust counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency cooperation and a long-term partnership anchored by our improved understanding of Pakistan’s strategic priorities, increased civilian and military assistance, and expanded public diplomacy.
and
[T]he denial of extremist safe havens will require greater cooperation with Pakistan along the border with Afghanistan.
It all sounds good, but as Hammes points out, “[T]he government doesn't hint at how the administration will manage in the next four years to finally convince Pakistanis to change their fundamental strategic calculus after nine years of repeatedly failing to do so.”
In fact, I agree with everything that Hammes says in the piece, but it left me wanting. We’ve heard this before from countless op-eds, articles, and blogs. The punchline goes like this:
Afghanistan is still a mess. Karzai is feckless. We need Pakistan to get on our team. If we don’t address the Karzai and the Pakistan problems, our policy is adrift.
And then, seemingly whoever is writing just stops. The analysis ceases and we, the reader, are left adrift to some extent. I don’t blame them for stopping. This is the $1 trillion dollar question. How does the United States marginalize Karzai and convince Pakistan to get on our team, while still maintaining a presence in the region that allows us to shape the contours of events?
Steve Coll give us a maddening account of U.S. involvement and impotence in the region after the the Soviet withdrawal in his seminal Ghost Wars. (Which I only just recently read making me officially the last person with a passing interest in Afghanistan to have read it) Having the memory of the book close to mind while reading Hammes account makes me all the more frustrated that we haven’t been able to answer this question yet.
Why is this so hard? Why is Pakistan so recalcitrant? The short answer is that it’s a long story. In brief here’s what happened. When communists swept to power in Kabul in the late 1970s, Pakistan grew concerned they could be pinched on two sides, but the Afghans to the northwest and Indians to the south-southeast. Additionally, the socialist agenda implemented after the coup sought to undermine the preeminence of Islam in Afghanistan, particularly in the rural regions where a blend of sharia and Pashtunwali dictated daily interactions between people.
This attack on Islam resonated both in Pakistan and in the Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia. Prompted by the Soviet invasion in 1979 (seeking to prop up their overzealous Afghan clients), aid money began to pour into Islamic charities to cope with the refugees pouring across the Afghan border into Pakistan. Much of this money was used to build madrases, and the United States expanded its policy of equipping Afghan fighters displaced to Pakistan to return home and fight the Soviets. These mujaheddin fighters were not a single, cohesive group, but rather a disparate group based on ethnic, tribal, and geographic boundaries. They had common cause against the Soviets, but with the withdrawal of the Soviets in 1989, there was a vacuum created.
What followed was a lengthy and deadly power struggle between former mujaheddin groups. Pakistan started to play favorites because they wanted a client state in Afghanistan. They wanted a buffer along that border and they began to back specific Pashtun groups, funneling Gulf state aid money and weapons to these favored groups, while also assisting militarily, but quietly these same groups in their bids to crush rivals. Because of the struggle’s ability to be identified with a defense of Islam, Arab volunteers began to arrive with the aid money that had been there before. These Arab volunteers were answering the call of jihad and practiced an Islam that was more severe then the Afghans they came to fight alongside.
Out of this milieu of aid money, armed conflict, and religious fervency arose the Taliban. While not strictly an immediate client of Pakistan, the group practiced a severe form of Islam, had the military might to crush much of the opposition, and the organizational structure to provide social services that had long been lacking. Many Afghans in the south of the country didn’t believe in the Islam the Taliban stressed, but the promise of limited social services and the threat of death (literally) for non-compliance led to pacifism.
The whole thing snowballed from there and eventually the frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan was littered with every stripe of Islamic group training their soldiers for their specific jihad. It was easier for Pakistan to support the Taliban, or at least not denounce them, because they seemed to be the strongest group around and, Pakistan calculated, a group they could deal with. This situation was not totally altered, even after 9/11. Pakistan held nominal control over its tribal areas. The government's legitimacy rested on its ability to be positively identified with Islam, and while the personal religious conviction of Pakistan’s leaders would shift with time, the official adherence was paramount.
Where was the U.S. in all of this? Essentially, exactly where we are now. We’d fly in, shake some hands, make some requests, the Pakistani would demure or make vague assurances of cooperation, we’d fly out and it’d be business as usual. The U.S. simply lacked, and I believe still lacks, the operational assets to shape the course of events in AfPak.
Bringing it back full circle, this is the challenge. An administration will say some nice things about Pakistan. A high ranking official will fly in, shake some hands, and then we’ll leave. Hammes is right to criticize this, but what do we do given this situation? That’s the topic for my next post, when I’ll look at the policy options we have in working with Pakistan.
Pakistan is central to our efforts to defeat al-Qa’ida and prevent its return to the region. We seek to secure these interests through continued, robust counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency cooperation and a long-term partnership anchored by our improved understanding of Pakistan’s strategic priorities, increased civilian and military assistance, and expanded public diplomacy.
and
[T]he denial of extremist safe havens will require greater cooperation with Pakistan along the border with Afghanistan.
It all sounds good, but as Hammes points out, “[T]he government doesn't hint at how the administration will manage in the next four years to finally convince Pakistanis to change their fundamental strategic calculus after nine years of repeatedly failing to do so.”
In fact, I agree with everything that Hammes says in the piece, but it left me wanting. We’ve heard this before from countless op-eds, articles, and blogs. The punchline goes like this:
Afghanistan is still a mess. Karzai is feckless. We need Pakistan to get on our team. If we don’t address the Karzai and the Pakistan problems, our policy is adrift.
And then, seemingly whoever is writing just stops. The analysis ceases and we, the reader, are left adrift to some extent. I don’t blame them for stopping. This is the $1 trillion dollar question. How does the United States marginalize Karzai and convince Pakistan to get on our team, while still maintaining a presence in the region that allows us to shape the contours of events?
Steve Coll give us a maddening account of U.S. involvement and impotence in the region after the the Soviet withdrawal in his seminal Ghost Wars. (Which I only just recently read making me officially the last person with a passing interest in Afghanistan to have read it) Having the memory of the book close to mind while reading Hammes account makes me all the more frustrated that we haven’t been able to answer this question yet.
Why is this so hard? Why is Pakistan so recalcitrant? The short answer is that it’s a long story. In brief here’s what happened. When communists swept to power in Kabul in the late 1970s, Pakistan grew concerned they could be pinched on two sides, but the Afghans to the northwest and Indians to the south-southeast. Additionally, the socialist agenda implemented after the coup sought to undermine the preeminence of Islam in Afghanistan, particularly in the rural regions where a blend of sharia and Pashtunwali dictated daily interactions between people.
This attack on Islam resonated both in Pakistan and in the Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia. Prompted by the Soviet invasion in 1979 (seeking to prop up their overzealous Afghan clients), aid money began to pour into Islamic charities to cope with the refugees pouring across the Afghan border into Pakistan. Much of this money was used to build madrases, and the United States expanded its policy of equipping Afghan fighters displaced to Pakistan to return home and fight the Soviets. These mujaheddin fighters were not a single, cohesive group, but rather a disparate group based on ethnic, tribal, and geographic boundaries. They had common cause against the Soviets, but with the withdrawal of the Soviets in 1989, there was a vacuum created.
What followed was a lengthy and deadly power struggle between former mujaheddin groups. Pakistan started to play favorites because they wanted a client state in Afghanistan. They wanted a buffer along that border and they began to back specific Pashtun groups, funneling Gulf state aid money and weapons to these favored groups, while also assisting militarily, but quietly these same groups in their bids to crush rivals. Because of the struggle’s ability to be identified with a defense of Islam, Arab volunteers began to arrive with the aid money that had been there before. These Arab volunteers were answering the call of jihad and practiced an Islam that was more severe then the Afghans they came to fight alongside.
Out of this milieu of aid money, armed conflict, and religious fervency arose the Taliban. While not strictly an immediate client of Pakistan, the group practiced a severe form of Islam, had the military might to crush much of the opposition, and the organizational structure to provide social services that had long been lacking. Many Afghans in the south of the country didn’t believe in the Islam the Taliban stressed, but the promise of limited social services and the threat of death (literally) for non-compliance led to pacifism.
The whole thing snowballed from there and eventually the frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan was littered with every stripe of Islamic group training their soldiers for their specific jihad. It was easier for Pakistan to support the Taliban, or at least not denounce them, because they seemed to be the strongest group around and, Pakistan calculated, a group they could deal with. This situation was not totally altered, even after 9/11. Pakistan held nominal control over its tribal areas. The government's legitimacy rested on its ability to be positively identified with Islam, and while the personal religious conviction of Pakistan’s leaders would shift with time, the official adherence was paramount.
Where was the U.S. in all of this? Essentially, exactly where we are now. We’d fly in, shake some hands, make some requests, the Pakistani would demure or make vague assurances of cooperation, we’d fly out and it’d be business as usual. The U.S. simply lacked, and I believe still lacks, the operational assets to shape the course of events in AfPak.
Bringing it back full circle, this is the challenge. An administration will say some nice things about Pakistan. A high ranking official will fly in, shake some hands, and then we’ll leave. Hammes is right to criticize this, but what do we do given this situation? That’s the topic for my next post, when I’ll look at the policy options we have in working with Pakistan.
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