A blog that focuses on international and domestic politics and economics (with a progressive slant)
Tuesday, September 29, 2009
Protecting the Population
On this last point, protecting the population, NATO’s forces in Afghanistan have been dreadful. Instances of ISAF airstrikes killing dozens of Afghan civilians have been abundant over the last eight years. It is to Gen. McChrystal’s credit that in response to the disastrous airstrike in May that he issued an order acknowledging the counter productive nature of airstrikes and heavily restricting their use.
So, one would think, today’s report of 30 Afghan civilians killed when their passenger bus struck a roadside bomb near Kandahar would work to NATO’s favor, beginning to wean the population of Kandahar from the insurgents. However, in today’s bombing, we can see the paradoxes of counter insurgency well illustrated. While the population will turn against NATO for collateral damage emanating from its use of air strikes, a bombing like today’s will not compel the same reaction vis-à-vis the insurgents. Rather, the population will look at today’s bombing and ask, “Why can’t NATO secure the highways, and prevent bombings of passenger busses?” The question is a fair one. NATO cannot secure the highways for many reasons, not least of which is that there are too few NATO troops in Afghanistan generally, and in Kandahar province in particular.
Afghans will not countenance the indiscriminant killing of their brothers and sisters by either NATO or the Pashtu insurgency. But, the technological advantage, the foreign origins, and the transitory nature of the ISAF sets the standard of conduct for NATO much higher – and for the insurgency, much lower. The careful, conscientious use of force by a sufficiently large contingent of NATO troops is the only way forward in Afghanistan.
Friday, September 25, 2009
Generals Kelly and McChrystal
Gen. Kelly was remarkably candid throughout his discourse and, when asked whether we can win in Afghanistan, his answer was simultaneously cautious and unequivocal. Gen. Kelly averred at the notion of winning but he stated without equivocation that the ultimate endorsement of COIN strategy in Iraq – the sort of thing I’ve argued for in this space previously – is absolutely reproducible and necessary in Afghanistan. Which, unsurprisingly, is the sort of thing that Gen. McChrystal has argued for and is why the request for additional forces is necessary must be fulfilled. Additional forces are not sufficient, however; they must be tasked with protection of the population not simply hunt-and-kill operations, the commitment must be long-term, and the commitment of more troops must coupled with civil-society and works projects.
Thursday, September 17, 2009
Online Polls Redux
The Equivalency of Death Threats
But Joe Klein makes an even more fundamental error. He writes:
It will resist any suggestion to leave Helmand and redeploy to Kandahar. "ThatKlein is wrong. Counter-insurgency demands gaining the local population’s trust. For the local population to work with, let alone trust, NATO forces, it must believe that NATO will stick around – it cannot believe that NATO forces will be transitory, moving into an area, taking advantage of local support, and then leave, abandoning the local population to returning Taliban fighters and exposing it to reprisals. For most of NATO’s 8 year history in Afghanistan, it was undermanned to provide the sort of guarantee of long-term presence and involvement to warrant local support and trust. Only now is NATO beginning to reach areas of the country long controlled by the Taliban – to leave those areas, as Klein suggests, would be to destroy any goodwill earned and reinforce the local population’s belief that NATO is transitory and cooperation is a death sentence. In this way, death threats in Helmand and death threats in Kandahar are not equivalent. NATO should not abandon Helmand. Kandahar should come next, but not at the expense of Helmand and NATO’s ultimate goals.
would be a death sentence for all the people in Helmand who have supported us,"
a military expert told me. It is a compelling argument but, ultimately, a flawed
one; death sentences are being delivered every night in Kandahar.
Tuesday, September 15, 2009
Is Society Becoming Less Civil?
Online polls frequently get on my nerves because, instead of asking for pure opinions, they ask people to hazard uneducated guesses on questions that are ultimately empirical. Case in point is a CNN.com Quick Vote poll from earlier today, which asked:
“Is society in general becoming less civil?”
Respondents, who for the purposes of this post I will assume were predominantly American, overwhelmingly answered “yes.” I am skeptical of this assessment. My cynicism about the role of deliberation in liberal democracy aside, situating the current state of American discourse in historical perspective gives us no reason to believe we have become less civil. Certainly the tenor of the health care debate, taken as a whole, is not more contentious than the discourse that characterized the Iraq debate, or even Bill Clinton’s health care plan. Going back two more decades, it may even be safe to say we’ve made serious improvements since the Vietnam controversy and the civil rights debate in the 60s.
Fortunately, we have relatively objective measures of civic attitudes and behavior. The World Values Survey has compiled data on political and social attitudes with hundreds of survey questions to hundreds of thousands of people in dozens of countries since the early 1980s. I’ve compiled summary data for a few indicators (many of which are commonly employed in political behavior research) of civic attitudes in the US that were available for multiple years. A casual analysis of the results below provides some interesting, if ultimately inconclusive insights about variation in civic attitudes in America. First, interpersonal trust, one of the most widely used indicators of civic-ness in comparative survey research, has stayed remarkably constant since 1995. Second, the proportion of people that identified members of another race as people they would be uncomfortable having as neighbors has stayed relatively constant as well. Third, the proportion of people identifying with their local geographic unit, as opposed to the country as a whole, has not changed significantly. As anomalies, active membership in charitable organizations seems to have decreased, as has the proportion of people that report a high level of life satisfaction (although this effect could be from my aggregation of the responses). In short, although none of these indicators directly measure the vitriol of discourse, they do suggest that political and social behavior in the US has changed little, at least since 1995. I suppose it’s always possible that this particular health care debate brings out the worst in people, but I think that’s a tough case to make. (By way of caveat, I have not performed any statistical tests on these data, and I use “significant” in the colloquial, and not statistical, sense.)
| 1995 | 1999 | 2006 |
Total Sample | 1542 | 1200 | 1249 |
Interpersonal Trust | | | |
Most People Can Be Trusted | 543(35%) | 431(36%) | 491(39%) |
You Can’t Be Too Careful | 968(63%) | 757(63%) | 750(60%) |
| | | |
Member of charitable/humanitarian organization | | | |
Not a member | 895(58%) | | 847(68%) |
Inactive member | 233(15%) | | 170(14%) |
Active member | 399(26%) | | 198(16%) |
| | | |
Would not like to have as neighbor- members of different race | | | |
Mentioned | 110(7%) | 97(8%) | 48(4%) |
Not mentioned | 1432(93%) | 1103(92%) | 1192(95%) |
| | | |
Life satisfaction | | | |
1-3 | 68(4%) | 38(3%) | 51(4%) |
4-7 | 513(33%) | 436(36%) | 537(43%) |
8-10 | 953(62%) | 726(61%) | 653(52%) |
| | | |
Geographical identification | | | |
locality | 486(32%) | 384(32%) | |
region | 147(10%) | 128(11%) | |
country | 606(39%) | 405(34%) | |
The Repudiation of Rep. Joe Wilson
Whereas the conduct of the Representative from South Carolina was a breach of
decorum and degraded the proceedings of the joint session, to the discredit of
the House:
Now, therefore, be it Resolved, That the House of Representatives disapproves of the behavior of the Representative from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson, during the joint session of Congress held on September 9, 2009.
In anticipation of the Wilson Resolution, RNC Chairman Michael Steele released this statement:
[C]ongressional Democrats are wasting taxpayers’ time and resources . . . so they don’t have to talk about their exceedingly unpopular health care plan . . . .
If we are going to march members down to the well of the House to apologize, Joe Wilson is going to have to get in line behind Nancy Pelosi, who attacked the intelligence community who protects us, Charlie Rangel who cheated on his taxes, Jack Murtha – a walking scandal, and we all know how the Democratic leadership tried to protect William Jefferson.
Steele's statement is of course nonsense. Not only is the healthcare reform not unpopular - it is, as Nate Silver pointed out yesterday, at best a matter of confusion for the American people - none of the individuals he mentioned embarrassed the House of Representatives - and in doing so, violated House rules - with such a grave breech of decorum as Rep. Wilson did last Wednesday. If any of those individuals have violated House rules it is up to the House to punish them, as it is doing with Rep. Wilson, and as it has done in the past.
Monday, September 14, 2009
re: The President's Healthcare Speech
UPDATE: Shorter Nate Silver: the American people are confused. (h/t Bret)
Wednesday, September 9, 2009
Meet Joe Wilson
Why the President's Health Care Speech Doesn't Matter
Tuesday, September 8, 2009
Assessing Options in Afghanistan
the argument that terrorism can be prevented essentially by remote control wasHoffman continues:
“immensely seductive” — and completely wrong. “We tried to contain the
terrorism problem in Afghanistan from a distance before 9/11,” [Hoffman] said.
“Look how well that worked.”
UPDATE: Peter Bergen weighs in on Afghanistan, noting that[T]he success of strikes from Predators in killing Qaeda suspects in Pakistan
depended on accurate information on terrorists’ whereabouts from Pakistani
intelligence. In Afghanistan, without such sources, “we’d be flying blind,” he
said.
- More than five million refugees have returned home since the fall of the Taliban. This is one of the most substantial refugee repatriations in history, yet it is little remarked upon because it has largely gone so smoothly.
- One in six Afghans now has a cell phone. Under the Taliban there was no phone system.
Millions of kids are now in school, including many girls. Under the Taliban girls were not allowed to be educated. - In 2008, Afghanistan's real GDP growth was 7.5 percent. Under the Taliban the economy was in free fall.
- You were more likely to be murdered in the United States in 1991 than an Afghan civilian is to be killed in the war today.
Sunday, September 6, 2009
More on Stability (A Methodological Detour)
A casual survey of the 2009 index reveals some potential empirical inconsistencies. Do we really believe that North Korea is at roughly the same risk of failure as states like Haiti and Ethiopia? Are China’s communist party and Israel’s democracy really as vulnerable as the regimes in places like Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, or even Russia for that matter? Regional comparisons are also problematic. For example, Uzbekistan, under the control of Islam Karimov’s authoritarian regime since independence, is rated at greater risk of failure than both Tajikstan, which is less than ten years removed from civil war, and Kyrgyzstan, which less than five years removed from the Tulip Revolution, and is arguably characterized by organized crime groups competing for power.
Part of the reason for these discrepancies is that Failed States Index is a bit of a misnomer. I suspect many casual analysts, including myself at times, have used the FSI as an indicator of state strength or weakness. In fact, Foreign Policy argues that the index is a measure of a state’s risk of failure (loosely defined as vulnerability to collapse or conflict). The index is composed of the aggregation of 1-10 rankings on 12 indicators of social, economic, and political cohesion and performance. As such, the FSI is an implied explanation for why states fail, and a poor one at that.
If your aim is to produce an explanation (or prediction) for state failure, social and economic indicators should be analytically separated from the political. Strong political institutions may be able to absorb the demands arising from the economic and social pressures the FSI incorporates. Furthermore, state strength must not be defined in terms of its ability to incorporate these demands. A better way to explain state failure would be to establish independent measures of state capacity or efficacy (say an index including degree of monopoly on force, degree of autonomy/meritocracy of the bureaucracy, quality of public goods provisions, degree of “stateness” problems, etc). The FSI political indicators actually provide a rough approximation of what this measure should look like (arranging the rankings according to these indicators results in some interesting reorderings. Then, having established variation on this index, the degree to which social and economic factors explain this variation is an empirical question. Regressing the political indicators on the social and economic indicators would provide a better idea of the significance and relative weights of these factors’ effects on state failure. An alternate approach would be a survival model using these 12 indicators as independent variables. I’m sure there is no shortage of academic analyses of this type (the State Failure Project/Political Instability Task Force comes to mind), but the inability of social science to make their work accessible to the policy community is another matter.
The way that you conceptualize and explain failed states has real and important implications for policy. For example, the argument that al Qaeda was nourished in an environment of relative state capacity strikes me as revisionism. Going forward, this debate requires the explicit identification of what constitutes a strong state capacity, and the careful identifications of the most important factors that cause variation in capacity. In short, the FSI succeeds in its goal of providing a “starting point for the discussion of why states fail.” However, the uncritical use of these types of indices in policy analysis and decision making is likely to lead to the misallocation of scarce resources to either A) prop up states that don’t need it, or B) correct problems that really have no effect on state failure.
On Stability
Let me begin by noting that I do not agree with every aspect of the United States strategy in Afghanistan. As I have noted in previous posts, there are facets of US strategy that need great reform, particularly the US approach to poppy growth and opium production. I am also in agreement with Colin in so far as I question whether that is an achievable goal. Colin and I – so far as I can tell – diverge on the question of what US goals ought to be and whether those goals are achievable. As I have written previously, I do not believe that western style democracy is in the offing in Afghanistan but I do believe that stability there is achievable and that it is worthwhile goal for the United States from a national security perspective.
States are best able to deal with other states. It is unsurprising that after several hundred years of a state-centric international (or at least, western international order), states are predisposed to develop and effectuate policies with a view towards other states. The international system is likewise designed to account for interactions between and among states. This system provides a convenient hierarchy for decision making – it is a heuristic that allows decision makers to contextualize events and place them in appropriate bins: international organization, state or individual; interstate or intrastate.
Stability within and among states is thus convenient and, to some extent, necessary for states to craft responses. But stability for its own sake is not a sufficient reason for the United States to be involved in Afghanistan. Indeed, creating instability has, at times, been a useful tool for the United States and an appropriate goal for the United States. For example, the United States fueled the anti-Soviet insurgency in Afghanistan because creating a quagmire in Afghanistan for the Soviet army allowed the United States to inflict non-trivial damage on the Soviet Union for little cost. Instability there, and at that time, was an appropriate goal.
However, persistent instability, once a policy goal has been achieved – in the case of Afghanistan, depleting Soviet resources, driving the Red Army out of Afghanistan, and contributing to the collapse of the U.S.S.R – serves no positive foreign policy objective and can become a source of insecurity.
Afghanistan is frequently depicted as having been chaos under the Taliban. That was not in fact the case. While the Taliban were a backwards and despicable regime, they did provide some semblance of order. There writ was weak and the extent of their control territorial speaking was limited. Within this limited control, Al Qaeda was able to carve out what amounted to a fiefdom in Afghanistan – an area of the country, nominally under Taliban control, run by Al Qaeda. Within that space, Al Qaeda was able to conduct its operations, culminating with the September 11, 2001 attacks.
So, non-state threats to the United States are not necessarily born from chaos. But a weak state allows non-state threats to operate with impunity. When those non-state threats are given access to infrastructure that facilitates a global reach – airports, say – through porous borders, then the ability of that non-state organization to act with impunity within a putative state is a threat to the national security of the United States.
Additionally, a weak state affording the non-state actor safe haven (potentially unknowingly or unwillingly) presents the United States with a policy dilemma. How does the United States address the non-state threat? Traditionally, the United States could demand the state to turn over member of the non-state organization, or demand that the state cease facilitating the non-state organization under threat of some sort of state-driven reprisal. But this presumes that the state is sufficiently cohesive to comply with US wishes, or sufficiently cohesive for the United States’ state-driven reprisals to have effect. The United States might pressure the non-state actor directly and by-pass the putative state. Or, the United States might attack both the sheltering state and the non-state actor simultaneously – as it did in Afghanistan in 2001.
This is not to say, however, that instability does not present a threat to the United States as well. First, it would be hard to imagine a state that is sufficiently chaotic in which a cohesive non-state actor would not be able to setup a fiefdom like Al Qaeda managed to do in Afghanistan before 2001. Even in Somalia, the preeminent example of a collapsed state in chaos, features areas of either incredible stability (Somalialand) or areas that have been pacified by a non-state actor to facilitate the non-state actor’s goal (see Islamic Courts Union). Second, the net effect of one state’s instability on US national security must be examined on a case-by-case basis: Has there been spillover? If so, what are the consequences of the spill-over? How do those consequences impact US national security? This is not a linear system and its effects may not be immediately nor readily identifiable.
In Afghanistan, spill-over has been obvious. The Pashtu-based insurgency that rose up in the wake of the US invasion in 2001 has traditional cross-border links. The porous nature of the Afghan-Pakistan border and the relatively weak control Pakistan exerts over its border areas provided the Pashtu insurgency with safe haven – another, though slightly removed, example of instability threatening US national security. This, in turn, has fueled a Pashtu-based insurgency in Pakistan, attacking the state. Disruption of Pakistan is a threat to the national security of the United States – that is self-evident.
At this point, while the Afghan and Pakistani insurgencies have separate goals, they clearly contribute to each other. It is highly unlikely that in leaving Afghanistan, the insurgency in Pakistan will burn-out. Leaving Afghanistan, however, will remove whatever ability the United States has had to prevent the Pakistani Pashtu insurgency from using Afghanistan as a safe haven in its war against the Pakistani state. That the Afghan state is currently too weak to provide a similar role is apparent, and the likelihood that an abandoned Afghanistan would give the Pakistani Pashtu insurgency strategic depth militates against the United States leaving. Further, there is little reason to believe that, should the United States abandon Afghanistan, that Al Qaeda or some other non-state actor would not be able to carve out yet another fiefdom where it could enjoy operational freedom, engendering an additional threat to the United States.
Building a stable Afghan state with a government able to exercise its writ sufficiently to prevent the development of a new non-state fiefdom is no easy trick. That said, abandoning the Afghan project is the only way to guarantee failure with regard to that strategic objective. Yes, leaving would stem American expense of blood and treasure in the short-term. It is likely that in the medium and long term, however, quitting Afghanistan at this stage, will only cost the United States greater expenditures of both. Failure of long-term policy thinking and engagement during and following the last Afghan war contributed directly to the attacks of September 11, 2001. These failures are hallmarks of US foreign policy making in the post-War era. But making the same mistake, in the same place, twice is not just bad policy, it’s criminal. Simply abandoning Afghanistan would be just that.
UPDATE: Ahmed Rashid writes in today's Washington Post:
Many dissenters in Washington, such as columnist George Will, insist that the Afghans are incapable of learning and unwilling to build a modern state. Others, including former British diplomat Rory Stewart, argue that Afghan society should be left alone. But the dissenters do not sufficiently acknowledge the past failures of the Bush administration that led us to this impasse. What's worse, they offer no solutions.