Mousavi’s call for Thursday to be a day of mourning for the protesters already killed demonstrates that he is both savvy and that he knows his history.
During the 1979 Revolution, mourning demonstrations honoring killed demonstrators were a means of unifying the otherwise disparate groups who had taken to the street in opposition to the Shah. That all these groups, with different goals and different beliefs could be brought together, into the street, as one corpus under the aegis of mourning served as a fundamental organizing principle in 1979.
In 1979, mourning also served as a means to build and sustain momentum: every day a demonstrator was killed, the next day there would be a mourning demonstration. And then again, 40 days later, at the end of the traditional mourning period, there would be a further demonstration. Invariably, a demonstrator would be killed during the mourning demonstration which would then give rise to another demonstration the following day. And so on, and so forth.
Mousavi’s choice of this tactic is cunning. It is not, I think, an accident that a man steeled in the first revolution would reach back for a tactic prominently used then. I also do not think the parallels will be lost on the older generation, the members of the government who can still remember 1979.
Thursday, June 18, 2009
Wednesday, June 17, 2009
And what of the Bazaaris?
Andrew Sullivan has been doing a fantastic job aggregating the news and information coming out of Iran, and the analysis that’s been coming out of various sources outside of Iran. I think Andrew lacks enough background knowledge about Iran , however, to properly put a lot of the information in context, or to recognize what analysis is really ideologically driven crap and what reflects a good understanding of Iran. One such question I’d like to see him pose-since he seems to be able to drive some of the conversation throughout the blogosphere and the pundit class-is ‘what of the Bazaaris?’
The Bazaaris, of course, are the merchant class in Iran, particularly Tehran, that are widely viewed as having played a key role in the 1979 Revolution and the pro-Mosadegh demonstrations in the 1950s. Win the bazaaris and you win Iran, or so goes the conventional wisdom.
Answering that question, I think, would go a long way towards resolving the dispute between the Green Sea Optimists (like Lauren Secor) and the Green Sea Pessimists (like Steve Coll). Coll, a fantastic journalist who has done great work, and with whom I generally agree, is maybe too quick to dismiss the budding revolution out of hand. If the Bazaaris are with the people that have taken to the street, then, historically, I say this budding revolution has a fair chance of bringing about something new.
What that something new is, is an open question. It doesn’t seem like the people in the streets at this point have any particular end result in mind and it doesn’t seem like Mousavi himself has any thing in mind, either – indeed, Mousavi seems to have in many respects been caught up in the Green Sea himself and is still grappling for a goal with which to provide it direction.
The Bazaaris, of course, are the merchant class in Iran, particularly Tehran, that are widely viewed as having played a key role in the 1979 Revolution and the pro-Mosadegh demonstrations in the 1950s. Win the bazaaris and you win Iran, or so goes the conventional wisdom.
Answering that question, I think, would go a long way towards resolving the dispute between the Green Sea Optimists (like Lauren Secor) and the Green Sea Pessimists (like Steve Coll). Coll, a fantastic journalist who has done great work, and with whom I generally agree, is maybe too quick to dismiss the budding revolution out of hand. If the Bazaaris are with the people that have taken to the street, then, historically, I say this budding revolution has a fair chance of bringing about something new.
What that something new is, is an open question. It doesn’t seem like the people in the streets at this point have any particular end result in mind and it doesn’t seem like Mousavi himself has any thing in mind, either – indeed, Mousavi seems to have in many respects been caught up in the Green Sea himself and is still grappling for a goal with which to provide it direction.
Thursday, May 21, 2009
Pitfalls of American Foreign Policy
Steve Coll’s Comment in the most recent issue of the New Yorker is, as usual, excellent. While discussing US policy towards Afghanistan over the last 30 years, it speaks to a broader truth in American foreign policy. Namely, the United States is miserable-miserable-at policy-follow through. Not only do American policy makers evince an historical unwillingness to consider the long-term or even second order effect of their policies, immediate success or failures frequently result in utter abandonment of the policy, regardless of the effects of abandoning the policy.
Coll’s book Ghost Wars illustrates both of the above points with reference to US policy making during and following the Soviet war in Afghanistan. The first is illustrated by the well warn tale of the US providing arms, training and intelligence to the mujahideen and what would become of some of the mujahideen after the Soviets left. The second is the less well known story of what the US did with regard to Afghanistan after the Soviets left – and more to the point, how different American policies after the Soviet withdrawal may have resulted in a very different Afghanistan (and a very different America, for that matter).
The short version of that story is that America abandoned Afghanistan. After the Soviets left, Afghanistan was essentially a power-vacuum. The disparate resistance groups remained disparate, as they remain today, the country was fractured, and the lawlessness gave rise, rather quickly, to the Taliban.
Again, this is not a critique merely of American policy in Afghanistan; rather, American policy in Afghanistan is emblematic of American foreign policy. Foreign policy is rarely one-dimensional. Frequently, the effects of policy are non-linear and multifaceted. The same is true for the effects of abandoning policy without a replacement. The moral, I think, is that we must become better at thinking policy through and at not acting with caprice or out of pique.
Coll’s book Ghost Wars illustrates both of the above points with reference to US policy making during and following the Soviet war in Afghanistan. The first is illustrated by the well warn tale of the US providing arms, training and intelligence to the mujahideen and what would become of some of the mujahideen after the Soviets left. The second is the less well known story of what the US did with regard to Afghanistan after the Soviets left – and more to the point, how different American policies after the Soviet withdrawal may have resulted in a very different Afghanistan (and a very different America, for that matter).
The short version of that story is that America abandoned Afghanistan. After the Soviets left, Afghanistan was essentially a power-vacuum. The disparate resistance groups remained disparate, as they remain today, the country was fractured, and the lawlessness gave rise, rather quickly, to the Taliban.
Again, this is not a critique merely of American policy in Afghanistan; rather, American policy in Afghanistan is emblematic of American foreign policy. Foreign policy is rarely one-dimensional. Frequently, the effects of policy are non-linear and multifaceted. The same is true for the effects of abandoning policy without a replacement. The moral, I think, is that we must become better at thinking policy through and at not acting with caprice or out of pique.
Monday, March 23, 2009
Richard Holbrooke on Afghan Poppies
Richard Holbrooke, the new US envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan described the US and NATO attempts to arrest Afghan poppy production as “wasteful and ineffective.” The BBC reported on Saturday, that Holbrooke reported that despite US expenditures of $800 million/year in poppy eradication efforts the US is getting no return for their investment. Holbrooke recommends that the US should redirect money spent on eradication to assistance to farmers.
About a month ago, I wrote here about the damage US poppy eradication policy was doing on the overall effort to stabilize Afghanistan and defeat the resurgent Taliban. Holbrooke’s comments are a hopeful indicator that US policy will shift over the coming months, away from destroying the livelihood of farmers (which ultimately encourages their support of the Taliban) to providing alternative means of wage earning. As I wrote a month ago, if this means purchasing crops from these farmers t several times the market price, it will be money well spent. Aggressive eradication methods not only do not work to stem the tide of poppy farming but actively undermine the US mission in Afghanistan.
About a month ago, I wrote here about the damage US poppy eradication policy was doing on the overall effort to stabilize Afghanistan and defeat the resurgent Taliban. Holbrooke’s comments are a hopeful indicator that US policy will shift over the coming months, away from destroying the livelihood of farmers (which ultimately encourages their support of the Taliban) to providing alternative means of wage earning. As I wrote a month ago, if this means purchasing crops from these farmers t several times the market price, it will be money well spent. Aggressive eradication methods not only do not work to stem the tide of poppy farming but actively undermine the US mission in Afghanistan.
US Unemployment County-by-County
The New York Times published this map of the United States illustrating the unemployment rate county-by-county. It is instructive to remember that the traditional unemployment measure undercounts the unemployed. Unsurprisingly, the heavily agrarian plain states seem to be doing better (that is, less poorly) than the rest. Oddly enough you’re better off living on the East Coast rather than the West Coast, and if you live in Alaska, well, Federal Subsidies notwithstanding, you should consider moving.
Sunday, February 22, 2009
Indivisible Insurgencies
Joe Klein, after reading this article by Fred Kaplan, posts this on Swampland:
Without sealing the border, increasing pressure on Taliban and Pashtun anti-government forces in Afghanistan while allowing them safe haven in Pakistan affords those forces strategic depth. Likewise, attacking those forces in Pakistan without maintaining pressure in Afghanistan allows them an avenue of escape. Thus, while there are anti-government forces in Pakistan who have focused their attacks on Pakistan and may separable, both the restiveness and its underlying causes, in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, must be addressed for NATO to achieve any discernible success in Afghanistan.
In fact, I haven't heard a coherent strategy yet from anyone about Pakistan. (And from what I hear, the accumulated U.S. diplomatic, military and intelligence knowledge of that benighted, and ridiculously complicated, country is surprisingly minimal.) As Richard Holbrooke said last night on Lehrer, there is a notable level of disagreement among U.S. experts about the intent of the Pakistani Army and ISI (inter-services intelligence agency).But Klein and Kaplan are wrong – Pakistan should not take precedence over Afghanistan. Neither should Afghanistan take precedence over Pakistan, though, at least in so far as the US is concerned with the Pashtun tribal belt that straddles the two countries and is fomenting unrest in each. The challenge posed by the ongoing insurgency in Afghanistan cannot be addressed without addressing it corollary in Pakistan at least not without sealing the border between the two countries – a task that has proved impossible thus far and, in its impossibility, has lead or contributed to the destabilization of Pakistan.
Last summer, I first reported that the U.S. intelligence community now considered Pakistan the centrol [sic] front in the war on terror. Well, we're not talking about wars on terror any more, but the situation in Pakistan is, without question, the most sever [sic] foreign policy problem that we're facing right now. Kaplan's right: it needs to take precedence over Afghanistan.
Without sealing the border, increasing pressure on Taliban and Pashtun anti-government forces in Afghanistan while allowing them safe haven in Pakistan affords those forces strategic depth. Likewise, attacking those forces in Pakistan without maintaining pressure in Afghanistan allows them an avenue of escape. Thus, while there are anti-government forces in Pakistan who have focused their attacks on Pakistan and may separable, both the restiveness and its underlying causes, in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, must be addressed for NATO to achieve any discernible success in Afghanistan.
Wednesday, February 18, 2009
Where Empires go to Die
It has become a truism that Afghanistan is proving to be as intractable a problem for the United States as it was for the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and many empires before. McClatchy reports that the majority of the additional 17,000 troops to be dispatched to Afghanistan will be slated for deployment to Helmand province and will be tasked with taking on poppy growers. While I do not echo Juan Cole’s strident assessment that the current Afghan insurgency is due to ISAF efforts to eradicate poppies, it is a terrible mistake to believe that poppy eradication will substantially improve security efforts in Afghanistan.
Indeed, poppy eradication will likely exacerbate the current insurgency and work to further destabilize Afghanistan. While there is little doubt that the sale of poppies and their conversion into opiates funds the insurgency, their growth and their harvest form the livelihood of many rural Afghan farmers. It is the most profitable crop those farmers can raise. The only effect of forcibly eradicating the poppies will be the destruction of those farmers’ livelihoods which will inevitably lead to their alienation from the United States, NATO and the Afghan government, and their embracing the Taliban.
Rather than forcibly eradicating the poppy crop, NATO should approach this problem with a mixture of carrots and sticks. First, NATO must position itself to act as competitor-buyer to the Taliban for the coming year’s poppy crop. NATO should out-bid the Taliban and offer to provide seed and subsidies or inflated purchase prices to farmers to produce alternative crops next year – prices should be inflated with a view towards making alternative crops substantially more profitable per acre than poppies. Simply disrupting production is foolish and works cross-purposes with our ultimate goals in Afghanistan. This commitment to incentivizing the production of alternative crops or livelihoods must be long-term and systemic; while we must be wary of having an entire nation on the dole that risk is substantially less threatening than either aggravating the insurgency or allowing the Taliban access to funds while dumping heroin on the world market.
Second, if the purchasing of this year’s poppy crop is successful the Taliban will not sit idly by. There will be serious attempts to intimidate and compel farmers to continue growing poppies. The likely Taliban reaction will require a heavy, protective NATO presence in poppy producing regions like Helmand.
Afghanistan poses a difficult challenge to the United States and, as the situation in Pakistan continues to devolve, Afghanistan is becoming ever more intractable. The imperative to act, and to act quickly, is a good one, however to act – even in a localized way – without considering the obvious ramification is to needlessly exacerbate an already dreadful situation.
Indeed, poppy eradication will likely exacerbate the current insurgency and work to further destabilize Afghanistan. While there is little doubt that the sale of poppies and their conversion into opiates funds the insurgency, their growth and their harvest form the livelihood of many rural Afghan farmers. It is the most profitable crop those farmers can raise. The only effect of forcibly eradicating the poppies will be the destruction of those farmers’ livelihoods which will inevitably lead to their alienation from the United States, NATO and the Afghan government, and their embracing the Taliban.
Rather than forcibly eradicating the poppy crop, NATO should approach this problem with a mixture of carrots and sticks. First, NATO must position itself to act as competitor-buyer to the Taliban for the coming year’s poppy crop. NATO should out-bid the Taliban and offer to provide seed and subsidies or inflated purchase prices to farmers to produce alternative crops next year – prices should be inflated with a view towards making alternative crops substantially more profitable per acre than poppies. Simply disrupting production is foolish and works cross-purposes with our ultimate goals in Afghanistan. This commitment to incentivizing the production of alternative crops or livelihoods must be long-term and systemic; while we must be wary of having an entire nation on the dole that risk is substantially less threatening than either aggravating the insurgency or allowing the Taliban access to funds while dumping heroin on the world market.
Second, if the purchasing of this year’s poppy crop is successful the Taliban will not sit idly by. There will be serious attempts to intimidate and compel farmers to continue growing poppies. The likely Taliban reaction will require a heavy, protective NATO presence in poppy producing regions like Helmand.
Afghanistan poses a difficult challenge to the United States and, as the situation in Pakistan continues to devolve, Afghanistan is becoming ever more intractable. The imperative to act, and to act quickly, is a good one, however to act – even in a localized way – without considering the obvious ramification is to needlessly exacerbate an already dreadful situation.
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