The More Things Change...

“Voters expected change. The believed they have voted for change. [Now] they think they got more of the same.”

Steinmo and Watts (1995) draw attention to this quote from analyst Stuart Rothenberg, who, you guessed it, was referring to President B…ill Clinton. Rothenberg was talking about public disappointment with a professed reformer that was unable to effect significant change. Steinmo and Watts use the quote to make the larger point that individual leaders are insignificant in an American institutional system that (both intentionally and unintentionally) fragments power.

I want leave aside the merits of Steinmo and Watts’s argument for a second to highlight their critique of some alternative explanations of health care reform failure, which persist today and inform much of the unsophisticated “analysis” in the media. First, opposition to health care reform is not a function of American political culture. The authors’ critique of cultural explanations for Clinton’s failure holds today. I don’t have the polls on hand, but I would suspect the levels of people that support some kind of reform are similar to 1992- high. More importantly, however, cultural argument lacks comparative perspective. It is unable to explain why, if culture is relatively constant, reformers have been able to pass social welfare policies (education, medicare/medicade/social security) in the past. Demonstrating that the US has become more conservative since 1992 is an uphill climb indeed. Steinmo and Watts also point out that there is little empirical evidence to support the proposition that massive public demand resulted in health insurance reform in Europe. Like Steinmo and Watts, I find it more compelling that institutional change drives shifts in attitudes, rather than the converse.

Second, the authors argue that health insurance reform in 1992 did not fail because of opposition from powerful interest groups. This is the weaker of their two major critiques, especially since they show later how interest groups utilize particular institutional features to achieve their goal. Nonetheless, their critique is compelling. Opposition from entrenched, powerful interest groups is a constant in all reform efforts across time, and in different countries. Thus the strategies of interest groups cannot explain health insurance reform failure, except inasmuch as you are able to specify the unique institutional channels through which they exert influence.

Finally, although they (rightly) devote little space to it, the authors brush aside the sophomoric explanations that attribute health insurance reform failure to the abilities and strategies of Bill Clinton, his team, or idiosyncrasies of the plan itself. Their analysis traces the historical process by which the American institutional barricade to sweeping reform was constructed, intentionally by the founders, and as the unintentional byproduct of previous unrelated goals. Much is the same with Barack Obama. Steinmo and Watts published this article in 1995, but their descriptions of the reform effort, from the post-election atmosphere, to the effect of the media, to the strategies of the opposition, are uncannily familiar. When health insurance reform fails again in 2009 or 2010, Americans will once again express frustration at their leadership, failing to realize their beef is not with individuals, but with the rules that shape their leaders' options and strategies. Only this time, blame on the President may not be misplaced- for failing to heed Steinmo and Watts’s 1995 advice to change the rules of the political game before you attempt sweeping social reform.

The End of Maliki?

In contrast to the AP’s breathless declaration that the new Iraqi bloc, the National Iraqi Alliance, will increase Iranian influence, Juan Cole crunches the numbers and concludes that Prime Minister Maliki may not earn a second term.

The NIA is basically the old United Iraqi Alliance minus Maliki’s Dawa Party. Prof. Cole writes:

In the provincial elections held last January in Dhi Qar, ISCI, the
Sadrists and the Islamic Virtue Party got altogether about 40 percent of the
vote. The Da'wa got only about 23%. Other provincial tallies are
given here. In most provinces, with the exception of Baghdad and Basra, the
old United Iraqi Alliance did just about twice as well as Da'wa.

If the NIA does as well in provincial elections as the old UIA did in
provincial elections, it will again be the biggest party/coalition in the
national legislature. By the constitution, it would therefore form the next
government, and al-Maliki may at that point regret not having joined.

Iranian Influence

The AP reports today that a political shakeup in Iraq has brought the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (formerly, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq) and Muqtada al-Sadr’s bloc together but left the Prime Minister Maliki’s Dawa party out in the cold. The AP suggests that a Shiite political bloc that omits Dawa will increase Iranian influence in Iraq. The AP is overreaching.

Iran has been heavily involved with each of the major Iraqi Shiite parties and it is difficult to discern why the AP believes that Iran wields greater influence through SIIC and Sadr than through Dawa. Indeed, Maliki’s recent raid on the MEK base at Camp Ashraf signaled that Iran holds great sway over Prime Minister Maliki and presumably the Dawa Party. Further, Maliki and his Dawa party found refuge in Iran after the Islamic Revolution – though the independent-minded Dawa Party eventually fell out of favor with Iranian Mullahs who preferred their creation, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, over a native-Iraqi Shiite group.

Still, Iran provided safe harbor to Dawa throughout Saddam’s reign and Dawa has apparently been influenced by Iran since the US invasion of Iraq. On the other hand, Muqtada al-Sadr has spoken like and acted like an Iraqi nationalist consistently. Unlike the Hakim family, Muqtada al Sadr did not spend Saddam’s reign in exile in Iran. Sadr has also bucked Shiite norms by establishing himself as an Ayatollah without the experience and study generally necessary to earn that honorarium. His political activism diverges from the quietist philosophy of most Shiite clerics in Iran in particular. Additionally, Sadr has used his influence and forces as a foil against the American occupation of Iraq and in defense of Iraqi sovereignty, apparently without reference to Iranian goals – see, for instance, his solidarity with Iraqi Sunni insurgents in 2004 and 2005.

Undisclosed CIA Program More Operational Than Thought

Last month, the New York Times was the first outlet to report that (previous blogpost here), in the period following September 11, 2001, the CIA had begun a program to capture or kill members of Al Qaeda. At the time the story broke, much ink was spilt discussing how operational the CIA program had been – the extent to which the CIA’s program was operational, it was argued, had a direct bearing on whether the CIA was required by law to inform Congress of its activities. I did not buy the argument that the supposedly nascent CIA program escaped the reporting requirements of the National Security Act at the outset but now it appears the CIA’s program was further along than previously thought.

The New York Times reports today that in 2004 the CIA hired Blackwater, the infamous private security contractor, “as part of a program to locate and assassinate operative of Al Qaeda.” The Times cannot say whether “the CIA planned to use the contractors to actually capture or kill Qaeda operatives, or just to help with training and surveillance in the program.”

Either way, as the Times rightly notes, the CIA’s relationship with a private security force in an operation designed to kill or capture people raises serious concerns.

So, the CIA’s until-recently-undisclosed program to kill or capture member of Al Qaeda is troubling on two fronts. The CIA, supposedly at the behest of the Bush administration, avoided its reporting requirements under the National Security Act of 1947. And the CIA looked to outsource some portion of a lethal program to a private security contractor.

Is it a Republic if the Leader is a Dictator?

The New York Times reports today that an anonymous letter, written by clerics, questioning Ayatollah Khamenei’s authority is circulating in Iran. According to the New York Times, the letter accuses Khamenei of fomenting violence in the wake of the June 12 elections and transforming the IRGC into his personal guard. He is, the authors suggest, a dictator.

The cleric’s letter comes at the same time the Assembly of Experts has scheduled an emergency meeting to consider criticism leveled against Khamenei since June 12. The Assembly of Experts theoretically has the power to remove and replace the Supreme Leader.

Khamenei’s removal remains unlikely. But his influence has waned significantly. Once God’s unquestioned representative to the Iranian people, by condoning (if not coordinating) June 12’s election fraud and subsequently attempting to consolidate power, Khamenei has forfeited his position as senior jurist and in doing so, he has forfeited legitimacy conferred upon him by the people and by many clerics in favor of raw force of arms. The import of Republic in Islamic Republic was too often over looked in the Western press.

Republicans, for Death Panels Before They Were Against Them.

Amy Sullivan does some old fashioned reporting and discovers that the Death Panels – that is, reimbursing Doctors for providing end of life counseling to patients – appeared in the Republican’s 2003 Medicare Prescription Drug Bill. You remember that bill, the one that made it illegal for the federal government to negotiate costs with prescription drug manufacturers.

Sullivan notes that the text of the bill includes this statement:

The covered services are: evaluating the beneficiary's need for pain and symptom
management, including the individual's need for hospice care; counseling the
beneficiary with respect to end-of-life issues and care options, and advising
the beneficiary regarding advanced care planning.

She goes on, “The only difference between the 2003 provision and the infamous Section 1233 . . . is that the first applied only to terminally ill patients. Section 1233 would expand funding so that people could voluntarily receive counseling before they become terminally ill.” (hyperbole omitted).

Incidentally, not only did Sen. Grassley join 41 other Republicans in supporting the bill, he was a cosponsor of the Senate version of the bill, introduced by former Senator and Majority Leader Bill Frist.

Quiet and Persistent

The seeming quiet in Tehran’s street deceives us into believing the uprising has been crushed. Yes, Ahmadinejad has been sworn in as President of the Islamic Republic for a second term, squelching the most obvious near-term goal of the opposition. But his inauguration was marked by both public snubs – in the form of many Majlis deputies and Ayatollah Rafsanjani’s absence – and by demonstrations in the street.

The show trial of dissidents arrested during the unrest following the June 12 election has proven to be a debacle. Accusations of rape have given way to heated rhetoric flying between supporters of the regime and the opposition: Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami (not to be confused with former President Mohammed Khatami) declared such allegations to be a “total slander against the Islamic system.” Calls for the arrest and trial of Karroubi have resumed.

On the other hand, Reformist politicians sent a letter to the Assembly of Experts demanding that the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, be investigated. The Assembly of Experts is the Iranian body that appoints the Supreme Leader – in theory, it also has the power to remove him, though this has never been tested. Ayatollah Rafsanjani is the head of the Assembly of Experts.