19th-Century Notions

Vice President Joe Biden derided Russia’s “19th-century notion of spheres of influence,” at the end of his trip to Georgia. But Biden’s careful deflection of Georgia’s various security proposals, including deploying US monitors to its border with Russia and supplying Georgia with additional weapons systems, suggests that such 19th-century notions aren’t yet outmoded.

Mr. Biden, through his National Security Advisor, Antony Blinken, deflected the suggestion of American border monitors, stating that the EU had not invited the US to join the mission. As for the Georgian National Security Advisor’s suggestion that the US provide more armaments, Mr. Blinken replied that the Georgians had yet to request weapons and training.

Mr. Biden was careful to urge the rest of the world to not recognize Georgia’s breakaway regions, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as independent states.

While Vice President Biden decried spheres of influence, his presence in Georgia was all realism, all the time. The United States may not be able to extend a serious defense umbrella over Georgia – especially given the recklessness exhibited by both its president and its National Security Advisor – but Biden’s blistering criticism of Russia was a short diatribe on the efficacy of soft-power:

“When all the people of Abkhazia and South Ossetia see prosperity and opportunity in the rest of Georgia, and when they look north into Russia — unless it radically changes — and don’t see the same opportunity, they’re going to say to one another, ‘Regardless of ethnic background, I want to be in Georgia,’ ” he said. “That’s ultimately why the Berlin Wall came down. That’s ultimately why the Soviet Union broke up peacefully.”

Georgia sits astride a strategically important portion of the globe that, like it or not, fits within Russia’s traditional sphere of influence. Georgia’s recklessness last summer, leading to the August War, thrust US strategic limitations into stark relief and aggravated its already cool relationship with Russia. Even without the August War, it was likely that the US and Russia would spar repeatedly in the coming decades over the role of the US, NATO and the EU in the Caucasus.

Americans on Georgia's Border

The New York Times reports:

Georgian leaders hope the United States will join the European Union’s monitoring effort along the boundary with two breakaway Georgian enclaves, a step they believe could deter aggression from Russian or separatist forces, a senior Georgian official said Monday.

The Georgian evidently believe that the inclusion of Americans on their border with Russia would deter any further aggression from the Russians. That is probably an accurate description, though the unarmed EU-monitors already there likely provide a similar deterrent, as is. The most likely outcome of the Georgian proposal is the continued frosting of Russian-American relations to say nothing of stoking Russia’s already acute fears of American encroachment in its near-abroad. Georgia’s proposal would represent needless provocation and would be a strategic mistake. Russia has communicated its red-lines clearly.

Clearly, managing an assertive Russia requires assertiveness on the part of the United States – but it must be intelligent assertiveness, and not indefensible line-in-the-sand drawing. Georgia's proposal fails this test. It is also not very likely to come to fruition.

re: Russia

The Economist’s editorial cartoon this week pretty well sums up NATO’s response to Russia – this pretty well describes the EU’s response to Russia during the war in Georgia, as well.

It jibes nicely with my bit from a few weeks ago, too.

To Russia with Love

Kristof wrote yesterday in the New York Times about Russia, Georgia and how Obama’s administration should approach the Caucasus. He thinks allowing Georgia into NATO is a bad idea, says we need a new approach to Russia to avoid a new Cold War.
Russia is flexing its muscles. That is beyond debate. A New Cold War, though? I’m not convinced. Moreover, I think analogizing our current relationship with Russia and the Cold War US-Soviet relationship is uninformative and likely obscures more than it enlightens. Much like the penchant for comparing negotiations to Munich, the Cold War comparison can lead to wrong impressions.

It is important for the United States to recognize that, regardless of what NATO countries may say about the eastward expansion of NATO, Russia views it as a threat. Not only has the expansion represented a weakening of Russia’s influence over its near-abroad-essentially Russia’s defensive buffer between Moscow and the rest of the world-but these states have, in Russia’s view, been turning away from Moscow and towards an organization that for fifty years was dedicated to defeating Russia. This is a difficult concept for those of us in the west, who viewed NATO as a benign entity, defending Europe and the World from the Soviet Empire. Nevertheless, Russia’s strongly negative reaction to NATO expansion is no way irrational and is eminently predictable.

The emerging difficulty for the United States and Europe is how to reconcile Russia’s legitimate security concerns, Russia’s apparent desire to project power-regionally, at least-and the strategic importance of the Caucasus. The governing principles for dealing with Russia, moving forward, should be based in Real Politik: 1) Russia’s assertiveness has increased as its revenues have increased and relative hard power has grown while the United States’ has diminished; 2) Russia has a long standing interest in dominating the Caucasus; the significance of the Caucasus to energy for both natural gas/oil extraction as well as pipeline transit has only exacerbated Russia’s interest in dominating the region; 3) re-read Kennan; drawing lines in the sand rhetorically and not backing them up will only encourage Russian aggression – also, take very seriously Russian statements about red lines, they tend to adhere to them.

The United States and Europe should not conflate power politics with the Cold War. Competition for resources and influence should not be an existential struggle. Injecting sensationalized rhetoric is the absolute wrong prescription for the United States. What the US needs now is cold, rational analysis about the state of the world as it is.