Egypt - Different Obvious Lessons

Matthew Yglesias, writing in The American Prospect online, advocates for the United States to be on “the right side of history” and reconsider our support of at least un-democratic and at worst authoritarian regimes in the Middle East.  “The status quo in the Middle East is not sustainable and won’t be sustained,” Yglesias declares.  I think the sentiment is right, but the rose-colored glasses with which he reviews the region and revolution gives an incomplete picture.

The first issue is a matter of perspective.  I agree, the status quo is not sustainable and the U.S. concern is what comes next.  Don’t we still fear what will happen in Egypt?  Aren’t we still concerned that of an Islamist emergence a la Iran 1979 will take hold?  I think Yglesias discounts those concerns because he believes, “the longer the U.S. government stays in bed with kleptocrats, the more severe popular discontent against the United States becomes.”  I would contend there are limits to enmity, and a few decades of support to Middle Eastern autocrats builds a level of enmity that takes a long time to erase.  I subscribe to the “in for a penny, in for a pound” approach.  This would seem to conflicts with my post on reevaluating our alliances in the Middle East, but as I said in that post, we can’t turn our backs on these alliances.  From the perspective of the United States, autocrats give stability until they don’t. If the situation changes we will need to recalibrate our allegiances.  I would argue our most recent experience in Egypt is a strong example of the recalibration we can execute if we find a country at its tipping point.

Secondly, we have to work with the countries that are in power now.  Mr. Yglesias would have us side with the dissidents, causing immeasurable harm to our national security projections in some of the hottest corners of the world.  Mr. Yglesias might argue that it is our patronage of the governments in the region that makes them so hot, and I would not entirely disagree, but to my first point, ceasing that patronage would create good will, yes, but also undermine current stability, and limit our force projection in the region.  The cost-benefit analysis just doesn’t add up to a full-scale reversal of decades of U.S. foreign policy.

I’ll end by saying this: what happened in Egypt over the past three weeks may prove to be the turning point for the land of the pharaohs, but the jury is still out.  It’s a momentous thing to see people break the shackles of authoritarianism.  Regardless of the brotherhood I feel with the Egyptian people, from the perspective of the United States we can’t hop on the bandwagon of every protest or every dissident group.

The United States, by most accounts, managed the revolution in Egypt quite well.  I actually have confidence we can manage a similar situation as well, if not better, in the future.  I would like nothing more then to stick it to all the strongmen and monarchs that limit the freedom of their people in the Middle East, but the ideal and the practical are not one in the same.

With Friends Like These

Something happened last week, which was not widely reported (though we mentioned it in Thursday’s Short List).  King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia had a testy exchange with President Obama, cautioning Obama not to humiliate Mubarak.  This part actually has been reported widely, but there was a second part people have not devoted much time to.  The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia pledged to provide $1.5 billion in aid to the Mubarak government if the Obama administration decided to drop its aid.  This pledge may no longer be valid, but it’s worth coming back to because of what it means to the U.S. concept of allies in the Middle East.

It also ties in to a column David Ignatius wrote in Thursday’s Washington Post.  Mr. Ignatius considers the blind spot the CIA has developed because of their reliance on “liaisons.”  Liaisons are members of the intelligence apparatus in foreign countries.  In Egypt, it’s the General Intelligence Service. It goes by a similar name in Jordan and Saudi Arabia.  While in Pakistan, their intelligence service is called Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI.  Basically, Ignatius considers how the CIA has been relying on these liaison relationships to provide intelligence on terror threats.  These relationships have had their ups and downs, but has provided the U.S. with vital intelligence (and often legal cover) in dealing with various threats.  But, the reliance on these relationships has left the CIA blind to the unrest and discontent within the countries of our allies.  Part of the terms of the relationships, often times, makes it nearly impossible for the CIA to recruit its own sources or assets in the country.  The agency is beholden to these relationships.  It is a problem that has plagued our efforts in Pakistan for years.

These two pieces together should necessitate a reconsideration of the terms of these alliances.  That’s a big ask, but we need to learn from history.  In Steve Coll’s Ghost Wars, there is a lot of consideration of the interplay between the CIA, ISI, and Saudi Arabia’s General Intelligence Department (GID), and the more you read the more you get the sense that the ISI and the GID are trying to keep the U.S. on the leash.  The CIA was tossed some red meat, and ISI and GID were tossed some cash, but the larger objectives weren’t the same.  In addition to this lack of alignment in objectives, the Saudi regime routed money to jihadists training in Pakistan and Afghanistan long after the Soviet Union’s withdraw.  It has been widely reported that the money coming from Saudi Arabia was used to found madrases in the hinterlands of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

We need to reconsider the terms of these alliances for several reasons.  First, what we want and what the intelligence services of our allies want are not in alignment.  Second, the reliance on the foreign intelligence services has made us blind to what’s going on inside these countries, while at the same time perpetuating distrust and anger in the people of these countries against the United States.  Third, even if we are able to disrupt some terror cells, these allies, specifically Saudi Arabia, is more then happy to publicly break with us, while still enjoying the shade of our security umbrella.

It’s impractical to break these alliances.  It’s not in keeping with the nuance of diplomacy to simply withdraw, but perhaps it’s time for the U.S. to take stock.  What is it we want to accomplish in the Middle East?  Are our current allies aligned with what we want to accomplish?  The revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt are being called part of an Arab Spring.  If that is true, if these revolutions give momentum to the disaffected within the borders of our Middle Eastern allies, the U.S. will be challenged with the same dance we have had to dance regarding Egypt.  It’s time to consider our dancing partners and if we are taking complimentary steps.

Mubarak Out

There was no coup d’etat in time for the Short List, but shortly after it went up, Mubarak was out. Mubarak and his family left Cairo today, as protesters continued to spill into the streets surrounding for the first time both the state television headquarters and the presidential palace. Egyptian Vice President Omar Suleiman announced that President Mubarak stepped down, leaving the Egyptian Armed Forces in control of the nation.

Whether Mubarak left voluntarily or left under threat of force or ultimatum from the armed forces is unclear. Nor is it clear what will emerge from this interim military government. It is instructive to bear in mind that weeks on from the ouster of Ben Ali in Tunisia, it is still unclear who or what will ultimatum take the reins of government there. 

Now, though, while little is settled by Mubarak's ouster, the mass of people in Cairo celebrating are a truly astounding sight. Two pro-Western dictators have been thrown out by mass protest in one month. As unrest persists elsewhere in the reason, 2011 looks more and more like 1848.

Opportunities in Egypt

As events have unfolded in Egypt over the last two weeks, the U.S. position has been undergoing near constant revision. By the end of last week, however, the United States had apparently gotten ahead of the curve and was no longer subject to accusations of being merely reactive—and, worse, reacting a day behind the events on the ground. Over the weekend, the United States—and other Western governments—apparently settled on a position of supporting the immediate removal of Hosni Mubarak from power and the establishment of an interim government under the newly appointed Egyptian Vice President, Omar Suleiman. The protesters occupying Tahrir Square are unmoved by this proposition and Western support for it.

The appeal to Western governments of the staggered transition from Mubarak to a Mubarakite interim government to eventual elections is obvious. It promises the introduction of a measure of stability and certainty to a tumultuous situation that has upset U.S. foreign policy, flummoxed Israel, and contributed to steadily rising oil prices. Moreover, the apparent U.S. position follows a long history of U.S. policymakers pursuing stability. However, too often in the post-war era the pursuit of stability has come at the expense of U.S. values—as is likely the case here.

This long history of sacrificing values—democracy, liberty, freedom—for the sake of stability and ease of policymaking, has driven the U.S. to support autocratic regimes. It has also left many people with the indelible perception, rightly or wrongly, that the United States serves to oppress them—or at least support their oppressors—particularly in the Arab world.

This linkage between the United States and perceptions of oppression is one of the great strategic threats the United States faces. It has enabled radical Islamists to present an effective and largely unchallenged narrative.

The unrest in Egypt presents the United States with the opportunity to fundamentally reshape its perception in the Arab world. The simple act of lending the protesters in Tahrir Square full throated support is the first step along this path. Such support may not radically alter the fortunes of the protesters—Mubark is likely to go in the near term, and the Western-supported interim government is likely to come about regardless of Western support. However, the impact of the United States standing foursquare with the forces of democracy and liberty is likely to be regional and transformative.

Egypt - What DCExile is Reading

• Michael Rubin at America Enterprise Institute says the White House "must stay one step ahead of the [Muslim] Brotherhood."


• Lawrence Pintak, writing at Foreign Policy, is jumping the gun labeling the situation in Egypt "The Al Jazeera Revolution" a bit in declaring, "The era in which government broadcasters can manufacture reality is as dead as the age of the fax. "


• Fareed Zakaria, writing at Time, gives the best assessment of what's to come in Egypt, admitting the level of uncertainty.  He notes that Egypt may be more inclined to result in an "illiberal democracy" more akin to Russia, then Iran.  He also notes that Islamist populism is an issue because under authoritarian regimes, "[t]he one place they could not shut down was the mosque, so it became the center of political activism and discourse, and Islam became the language of opposition."
  

Aggregated - Egypt Commentary

Links to what I've been reading on the situation in Egypt:

• Ed Husain says to bring in the Muslim Brotherhood.
• Shadi Hamid encourages the U.S. to get past its "Islamist Dilemma."
• Isobel Coleman considers the economic challenges Egypt (and any new Egyptian government) faces today and in the future.

Test of Wills

As autocrats in the wider Middle East make preemptive concessions, the Old Survivor finally responds. The Mubarak regime seemingly inexplicably restored both internet access and Al Jazeera’s broadcasts today. The restoration of both coincided with the appearance of approximately 10,000 pro-Mubarak demonstrators in Tahrir Square—some of whom are apparently plain clothes policemen. As well as a warning from the Egyptian military that protestors should restore normalcy.

The pro-Mubarak demonstrators evidently had to—and were allowed to—pass through Egyptian army barricades. Shortly thereafter, clashes broke out between pro- and anti-Mubarak demonstrators. Then, into the crowd, rode men on horses and camels, beating anti-Mubarak demonstrators. 

The timing of these events is not coincidental. Mubarak is on his way out but is clearly trying to set the terms of his exit--and by turning both news and the internet on, he has assured that Egypt and the world will see that he is still in control, despite the throngs in the street.

The events thus far today indicate that the Egyptian military has reached some sort of agreement with Mubarak as to the timing and order of his exit. These signs do not point to the establishment of genuine democracy. But neither do they signal the defeat of the protest movement. It is likely that, should the opposition not break in the face of the first attack, the Mubarak regime will ratchet up the force and the level of violence over the coming days.

Tuesday’s march was an incredible demonstration of strength but the week-old uprising now faces its first real test.

UPDATE: Perhaps the most important headline you'll see today:

Best Outcomes in Egypt

Sunday morning, watching Meet the Press, my roommate turned to me and asked, “What’s the best outcome in Egypt?”  My initial response was a question back about who’s perspective she wanted to look at it.  So in this post, I’m going to consider the situation and the best outcome for a few different constituencies.  For a primer, Steven Cook has a great post up at CFR that identifies many of the same players I do.

Hosni Mubarak
This is the easy one.  For President Mubarak, the best outcome is to somehow retain power, give up no ground on democratic reforms, and essentially put down this insurrection.  His best outcome is a return to the prior status quo.  Now that seems increasingly unlikley, so a second best option is to grant limited democratic reforms in exchange for the support of the army.  He’d be in power, but diminished and likely be able to slowly transition out.  His third best option at this point is to simply make it out alive.  Of course, as Will Wilkinson points out, Mubarak is a survivor.

The Egyptian Army
With the decision by the army, at least as I write this, that they will not fire on the protesters.  This would seem to confirm the interesting space the army holds in Egyptian society, where it has benefited from the patronage of Mubarak, but also has the respect of the Egyptian populace.  I would not be at all surprised if the army brass are extracting concessions from Mubarak now, or, in their best scenario, they are inserting themselves into a settlement that would give them temporary control while a transition government is assembled.  They could move independently to restore law and order and under that guise assume control without a settlement.  If they are given control they could extract a high cost to relinquish it.

The Muslim Brotherhood
There is a lot of commentary out there that doesn’t believe the Muslim Brotherhood is in a strong position to gain from this unrest, but I think that commentary is misguided.  They didn’t start the protests, but they are out there giving protesters water, developing a constituency.  They have been the regime’s foil for pretty much all of Mubarak’s three decades in power, and were really the original Islamist group inspiring all manner of off shoots.  While they don’t have the power or organization to seize power, if the protests drag out and the vacuum remains unfilled I could seem them stepping into the void a la the Iranian revolution of 1979.  This would likely be the best outcome they could hope for.  Though I agree with Matt Steinglass that this situation is quite different then the one in Iran in 1979.  Meanwhile, Les Gelb isn’t optimistic about the Muslim Brotherhood.

The United States
As you might expect, given Mubarak’s client status, our best option is Mubarak’s second best.  It’s clear from the media appearances of administation officials that the US doesn’t want Egypt to return to the prior status quo.  They want a peaceful transition to something closer to democracy in the country, but  it doesn’t do us any good to have Mubarak thrown out entirely.  He and his high level lieutenants give the US some connection to the transition and the only shot the US has to influence the final outcome.  Let me also say, I agree with Matthew Duss posting at The American Prospect, the US has to work with (or at the very least not undermine) Islamist political parties, particularly parties that demonstrate a commitment to human rights.  That has not been the traditional outlook of the Muslim Brotherhood, but power can be a moderating venture.

The Egyptian People
There is no good outcome for the Egyptian people.  In the immediate, they could be looking at sustained weeks or even months of a breakdown of law and order.  The problems they face economically will take decades to solve.  Countries without a tradition of democracy have a hard time with the transition and often ineffectual governments spin like revolving doors providing little comfort to the people.  The best outcome is modest democratic reform that allows the nation to get used to the practice and hope that the this leads to broader liberalization of the electoral system.

So that’s what I see as the best outcomes for a number of groups.  These predictions are subject to change given the situation on the ground, but I think there are good chances they’ll hold.  It’s disappointing that the Egyptian people won’t come out of this better, but I just don’t think that’s how it will happen.