Targeting the Voice of a Government

For purposes of the following discussion, please assume that there is a non-international armed conflict ongoing in Syria. Thus, international humanitarian law is operative.

Today, Syrian rebels attacked a pro-Assad TVstation, killing seven people including journalists and security guards. The pro-Assad TV station attacked, Ikhbariya, is apparently not a state-owned enterprise. Instead it is a privately owned media with a pro-government view point. Although not necessarily relevant, the ownership status of the station may be an important indicator of whether the station itself was a legitimate target.

The question of whether the station itself was a legitimate target is answered by whether it was a military objective. To be a military objective, an object must by its “nature, purpose, or use make an effective contribution to military action” and the destruction of that object “must offer a definite military advantage” at the time of the attack (See, e.g., Additional Protocol I). Those objects not meeting this definition—civilian objects—are not legitimate targets. Clear military objectives are things like anti-aircraft batteries, general headquarters, or tanks. Objectives that may or may not make “an effective contribution to military action” at a given moment include things like power stations that service civilian electrical grids or trains.

Television and radio stations sometimes fall into the category of objects that, although generally civilian in nature, also serve a military purpose, making them at times legitimate targets of attack. For example, during the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999, NATO targeted a Serbian Radio and TV transmitter, killing several civilians, because it was integral to Serbian Command, Control, and Communications networks. The Office of the Prosecutor for the ICTY released a report on that and several other NATO attacks accused by Serbia of violating international humanitarian law. Said the Office of the Prosecutor:

[T]he attack appears to have been justified by NATO as part of a more general attack aimed at disrupting the FRY Command, Control and Communications network, the nerve centre and apparatus that keeps Milosevic in power, and also as an attempt to dismantle the FRY propaganda machinery. Insofar as the attack actually was aimed at disrupting the communications network, it was legally acceptable.

If, however, the attack was made because equal time was not provided for Western news broadcasts, that is, because the station was part of the propaganda machinery, the legal basis was more debatable. Disrupting government propaganda may help to undermine the morale of the population and the armed forces, but justifying an attack on a civilian facility on such grounds alone may not meet the "effective contribution to military action" and "definite military advantage" criteria required by the Additional Protocols .... The ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols interprets the expression "definite military advantage anticipated" to exclude "an attack which only offers potential or indeterminate advantages" and interprets the expression "concrete and direct" as intended to show that the advantage concerned should be substantial and relatively close rather than hardly perceptible and likely to appear only in the long term (ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977, para. 2209). While stopping such propaganda may serve to demoralize the Yugoslav population and undermine the government’s political support, it is unlikely that either of these purposes would offer the "concrete and direct" military advantage necessary to make them a legitimate military objective.

Notice that the Office of the Prosecutor took pains to discount the notion that a broadcast facility used strictly for the transmission of propaganda (or news) is a legitimate target, whatever impact it may have on the morale of opposition forces. However, the report also indicated that the use of a transmission facility, as in Rwanda, to incite violence may render that transmission facility a legitimate target.

The private nature of the Syrian television station attacked today means it is unlikely to comprise an element of Syrian C3 today. This is not to say it could not be used for C3 purposes in an ad hoc manner in the future if, say, regular Syrian C3 were degraded by a bombing campaign. However, the military objective test demands we examine the circumstance as they exist not as they could exist.

If that station does not form part of Syrian C3 then it is likely not a military objective. That said, if the station was being used by irregular pro-Assad forces to incite violence at the moment it was attacked, then it may have been a legitimate target. This reasoning seems to have guided the NATO bombing of a Libyan satellite transmitter last year but it is not without its detractors.

And what of the journalists? The journalists killed in today’s attack were almost certainly innocent civilians—as opposed to civilians directly participating in hostilities. Although IHL’s prohibition on attacking innocent civilians is strict, when civilians are killed as an incident to an attack on a military objective their killing does not violate IHL so long as their deaths were not in excess of the military advantage to be gained by destroying the military objective. Obviously, if the TV station was not a military objective in the first place then the killing of these journalists would in fact qualify as a war crime. 

As If To Ensure A Sectarian Character

Al Jazeera describes the massacre in Houla thus:

Houla then came under an intense artillery barrage that killed about 15 villagers. Members of the shabbiha then entered Houla from the nearby Alawite villages and killed scores of men, women and children by hacking them or shooting them at close range.

Spilling Over Into Lebanon; Lebanon Spilling Back.

For Lebanon watchers, the fighting in Tripoli over the last week was all but inevitable. As the conflict in Syria dragged on for months, the likelihood that that conflict would spillover into Lebanon only increased. Now that likelihood seems to be on the verge of realization.

The nearly 15-year long Lebanese Civil War was one of the most complicated conflicts in modern history. Numerous militias, straddling various sectarian, political, and ethnic cleavages fought over neighborhoods in Beirut, villages in the countryside and even mountains. These militias often found state-sponsors and protectors but, for much of the conflict, the Lebanese managed to turn supposed proxy relationships on their head. Often, it seemed, the Lebanese controlled the sponsors rather than the sponsors regulating the Lebanese. And, as you might expect, the militias frequently abandoned one state sponsor for another. More importantly, though, the civil war in Lebanon managed to draw in the entire Middle East and much of the West. In fact, in many ways, the civil war in Lebanon was a realism sandbox for IR theorists; if one were to treat the Lebanese militia as states—not a difficult stretch given they controlled territory and populations, and replaced some nominally state functions—the machinations of the militias and their allies represent archetypal power politics. It is unfortunate that so often the civil war is viewed through a sectarian lens; doing so ignores the largely non-sectarian moves and counter-moves among the militias and the outside powers that really fueled the conflict. 

But I digress.

The spillover into Lebanon that the fighting in Tripoli represents indicates that the Syrian civil war is beginning to pull in the region. It is not the first sign. Reports indicate that the United States has begun to facilitate the flow of arms from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States into the hands of Syrian rebels. Clearly, these states have picked sides and are attempting to exert a sponsor’s influence over the widening Syrian conflict. However, just as clearly, the diffuse, locally-oriented, and shifting nature of the Syrian rebels suggests the emergence of a Lebanon-like militia structure. This point is underscored by the inability of either the Syrian National Council or the Free Syrian Army to rally local units to their banners and become true umbrella organizations.

At this point, the conflict appears to be mainly one of the Syrian state (and its minority adherents) versus the diffuse anti-Assad militias, with Islamists spoilers thrown into the mix. Importantly, Syrian minorities have remained on the sidelines and not reportedly taken to arming themselves. That greatly reduces the complexity of the conflict but has clearly not removed from it a clear sectarian milieu. It is also no assurance that they will continue to remain on the sidelines—particularly with the United States reportedly encouraging the Syrian Kurds to open a second front against Assad. Although that may hasten Assad’s departure, it will likely aggravate Turkey and encourage the Turks to back their own horse, increasing specific but not general support. 

And that potentially takes Syria a step closer to the Lebanon scenario. When fractious militias are armed and they are backed by different powers (regional or otherwise), the potential for a lengthy conflict that draws in Syria’s neighbors increases. There is no incentive to stay out of the mix when your neighbors (read: rivals) are able to improve their regional position through a Syrian proxy. With outside players willing to provide arms, intelligence, and logistical support to specific militias merely to improve that outside player’s regional standing, there is every incentive for local militias to abuse that willingness and cut the best (temporary) deal possible. 

Uniting for Peace

As UN Security Council action on Syria founders on the usual rocks of the veto-wielding permanent members, David Bosco has posted a series of entries on his Multilateralist blog at FP discussing the veto power and ways around it (Bosco posits shame). What he hasn’t included is a discussion of the “Uniting for Peace” resolution, the most direct (if esoteric) way around Russia’s veto obstruction.

Resolution 377 A—the so-called Uniting for Peace resolution—was adopted by the General Assembly in 1950 in response to Soviet veto obstructionism (the more things change?). At the time, the Soviet Union was preventing further UN Security Council action on the crisis in Korea after it ended its boycott of the Security Council. The text of the resolution reads in part:

Reaffirming the importance of the exercise by the Security Council of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and the duty of the permanent members to seek unanimity and to exercise restraint in the use of the veto,
 . . .
 Conscious that failure of the Security Council to discharge its responsibilities on behalf of all the Member States, particularly those responsibilities referred to in the two preceding paragraphs, does not relieve Member States of their obligations or the United Nations of its responsibility under the Charter to maintain international peace and security,
 Recognizing in particular that such failure does not deprive the General Assembly of its rights or relieve it of its responsibilities under the Charter in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security,
 Recognizing that discharge by the General Assembly of its responsibilities in these respects calls . . . for the existence of armed forces which could be used collectively . . .
 1. Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security. . . .

The Uniting for Peace resolution has been invoked on several occasions to circumvent a deadlocked Security Council in the face of a threat or breach of international peace and security. These occasions have included the United States’ invocation of Uniting for Peace during the Suez Crisis.

In theory, the Uniting for Peace resolution offers a path around the Security Council for Western actors that seek to intervene in Syria. Although it does not authorize military action under Chapter VII, as a Security Council resolution may, it may call for collective military action. Thus, the General Assembly could not invoke, as could the Security Council, endorse the Arab League plan for Syria under Chapter VII authority, which would compel Syria to follow that plan or face international force. But, Uniting for Peace, could be used to call on members of the international community to intervene in Syria because of its failure to carry out the Arab League plan (or because Syria’s actions are a threat to or breach of international peace and security). In the wake of intervention, it would then be up to the ICJ to determine whether such intervention under the guise of Uniting for Peace was wrongful.

Of course, like so many other technical devices, once used in this manner it can never be unused. The prospect of taking internationally sanctioned uses of force out of the hands of the Security Council and, implicitly, the hands of the permanent members thereof is the very reason this route is unlikely. Much like the elevation of R2P to the level of customary international law or (even less likely) jus cogens, this would represent a radical alteration in the power dynamics of the current international system.