Think Again, Again: GOP Foreign Policy Soul Searching

Over at Foreign Policy, Danielle Pletka, vice president for foreign and defense studies at the American Enterprise Institute has a "Think Again" piece trying to both reassure and direct today's GOP toward some sort of foreign policy coherence. Pletka encourages the GOP to return to being "the bedrock of U.S. defense."  There are a myriad of things in the post I could quibble with, not the least of which is the preceding quote, but let's I'm going to pick just a few to focus on.

1) Foreign Policy Doctrine is dramatically overrated

Sure we've had a lot of doctrines. Some were rested in the divine, some helped safeguard our nascent revolution, some were about containment, and some were about putting a fist on the scale. Pletka clearly pines for the Reagan Doctrine and speaks glowingly of how "Reagan stirred the pot and worked with like-minded allies to oust communist dictators." Nevermind some of those "dictators" were duly elected. They were on the wrong team.

The example of Iran-Contra and Reagan's Latin American misadventures highlight the problem of doctrine. A doctrine can be a box, limiting options, the scale of a response, and neglecting the contours of a specific conflict. Perhaps I'm wishy washy but all the studying of the world I've done suggests the actors are too complex to be reduced to a simple doctrine and when we've tried, we've ended up doing things that seem, well, un-American.

2) Moral Imperatives are in the eye of the beholder

Pletka takes a lot of time talking about the distinction between Republicans and Democrats and how that difference centers around values and a feeling of a moral imperative. She says:

In the simplest terms, values are what divide us from them and them from us. There are those who believe that American values form a moral imperative for U.S. power in the world -- that because U.S. democracy is among the world's most durable and just, the United States has an obligation (not merely the occasional inclination) to help others attain the benefits of a free society. That is what Republicans have stood for abroad and the distinction they must now again draw with their Democratic counterparts.

I've a lot to take issue with. First off, is it a settled questioned that our democracy is the "most durable and just?" Haven't there been countless pieces on how broken our political system is? Aren't there a bevy of laws on offer in no small number of the states designed to disenfranchise as they chase after a voter fraud problem that doesn't exist? Isn't the durability of a democracy threatened with the distinction between the two parties foreign policies is rooted in the argument that one has "values" and the other does not? Doesn't a "moral imperative" sound a lot like a crusade? And where does waterboarding fall under American values?

I think it's fair to say all Americans would like the peoples of the world to enjoy our many freedoms and live in similar prosperity to what we have achieved, but let's not forget our own pyramid is unfinished. Let's not wrap those hopes in "American Exceptionalism" to the disregard of British Exceptionalism or Japanese Exceptionalism. I'm not prepared equate exceptional with superior. Pletka is and wants the GOP to do the same.

3) The Soviet Union =/= Al Qaeda (and AQIP =/= AQIM)

As is the want of many listless Republicans, Pletka waxes nostalgic for the Reagan years and a foreign policy rooted in opposition to a known enemy, the evil empire. Pletka suggests 

[A] new Republican foreign policy recommitted to the idea that where the United States is able to identify a strategic and moral imperative -- as in the fight against the Soviet Union or the battle against Islamic extremism -- it is in America's interests to use its power to help shape a safer world.

This is a dangerous comparison. The fight against the Soviet Union and the fight against terrorists who wrap themselves in Islamic rhetoric are incredibly different and require incredibly different solutions. Also, this leads back to the challenges created by something like a doctrine and being motivated by a moral imperative. Imagine a Truman Doctrine for Islamic extremism. What would it look like? Would we undermine any Islamist government? Be prepared to invade? If our motivation is a moral imperative that sounds a lot like a crusade to save heathen masses, are we really improving our safety or just fomenting more hate? It is simpler to stand in opposition to an ideology embodied by a country. There is symmetry there, but we lack similar symmetry in our fight against terrorists who are as Islamic as the KKK is Christian (West Wing shout out).

And that lack of symmetry leads to a sidebar rant. Al Qaeda is not a uniform entity. It is a series of disparate franchises with a myriad of motivations and leaders. Every article like this that speaks simply of an Al Qaeda threat does us a disservice by perpetuating the misconception that the organization is monolithic and dramatically overstates the ability of any specific franchise to pose an existential threat to the United States.

4) Money Doesn't Equal Effectiveness

One final note on this, since I had an argument with my mother about this over the holidays. Pletka makes the comment repeatedly that the GOP should advocate for a well funded defense and get rid of the notion of cutting the defense budget. It's certainly been a winning strategy in the past, but it's not grounded in reality or the requirements to fight the threats we face today.

Pletka is actually dismissive of the amount and percentage of GDP the US spends on defense. She notes:

The truth is the United States spends remarkably little on defense. The Pentagon's budget now represents about 4 percent of GDP, close to the lowest proportion in modern history. It is eminently affordable. Yet the country is on track to cut more than $1 trillion in military spending over the next decade. The lion's share of spending is not on operations or weapons systems, as some believe; nearly 50 percent of spending goes to veterans' benefits and uniformed and civilian personnel. So what can be cut? A better question is: What would America like to stop doing?

Now the 4% number is closer to 5% according to Wikipedia and the World Bank, but let's move past the conversation of the percentage of GDP, even if that 4.7% equals 41% of the world's spending on defense. My issue is thinking money equals effectiveness. Our national security threats have changed. We are technologically ahead of any and all our closest competitors and the Chinese boogeyman sitting just in the background of the entire post is only spending 2% of its GDP on defense. That's not the spending habits of a global power looking to have military parity to the U.S. It is ham handed to suggest and try to sell to the American people that our safety is entirely related to the amount of money we spend on defense. It's also bad policy.

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The bottom line: Pletka offers some ideas that would sound appealing on the stump, but they aren't good policy. They aren't ideas that move our country forward, rather they're designed to get the GOP some foreign policy points while doing nothing to help our national security. Perhaps that was the point of the exercise for Pletka, but I'd hoped for more distinction and less window dressing.

Sovereignty and Inapt Analogies

On Wednesday, the Wall Street Journal published a stunning article detailing the interaction between the United States and Pakistan—the CIA and the ISI, really—that the United States interprets as Pakistani consent for drone strikes.  The CIA faxes a geographic description of where strikes will take place.  Pakistan does nothing—previously, the ISI would fax a response acknowledging receipt of the description.  The United States effectively equates its notice with Pakistani consent and goes forth with drone strikes.  It bear emphasis here that Pakistan does take positive steps that indicate consent, such as clearing airspace in the region described in the faxes.  That said, the question of what constitutes actual consent by one state for another state to violate the first state’s sovereignty is extraordinarily deep.  Lawfare and Brooking’s Benjamin Wittes offers this:

In many ways, the CIA here is only behaving towards Pakistan the way it behaves every day in briefing Congress on covert actions. Members of Congress listen to briefers and often stay silent so as to be able to criticize the operation if it goes bad and not be too implicated in it. The CIA, in turn, has learned to consider such silence to be the intelligence committees’ consent: The agency, after all, has given the committees the information they need to stop a program and they have not acted to do so. Here it is really treating the ISI the same way. (Never mind that the if the Pakistanis acted to stop the strikes, the U.S. would probably consider that evidence that the country was unwilling or unable to stop terrorist activity emanating from Pakistan’s soil—and consider that to be legal grounds for U.S. unilateral action on Pakistani territory.) . . .
 On the other had, there’s a long history in property rights disputes of flagrant assertions of right leading to legally recognizable claims–squatters who acquire residency rights, residents who over time acquire title, and the like. So whether implied consent has any legs is highly dependent on context.

For the moment, let us put aside the question of whether implied consent is sufficient consent for one state to authorize a violation of its sovereignty.  As noted, this is a deep question and requires, at the least, a discussion of the international community’s evolving understanding of sovereignty, and the debate between strong- and weak-sovereignty proponents—the debate that underlies the debate over R2P.

Instead, let us consider Wittes’ comparisons of supposed Pakistani permission for U.S. drone strikes to the interaction between the CIA and Congressional intelligence committees, and adverse possession.  Both comparisons are inapt and, with respect to adverse possession, Wittes clearly misunderstands its operation.

Wittes’ analogy between Congressional intelligence committees and Pakistan suggests that the CIA derives its authority to conduct operations in general from notifying Congress of an action and Congress failing to object.  But this is not correct.  The CIA’s authority to conduct operations—actually, the President’s authority to conduct covert actions—does not derive from prior notification to Congress met by Congressional silence.  Instead, the President’s authority comes from prior Congressional grant in a variety of acts including the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991. 

Congressional notification of covert actions is an accountability mechanism but Congress’ reaction to the notification—silence or vociferous endorsements—does not change the legality of the covert action.  So long as the action satisfies the other legal requirements including a presidential finding, the notice is just that: notice.  Notice is necessary for the action to be executed but Congressional reaction—positive, negative, or neutral—is immaterial.  Congress could, of course, legislate to prevent or specifically authorize a given covert action.

In contrast, there is no supervening license to violate sovereignty in international law—with the notable exception of self-defense.  Instead, sovereignty is presumptively inviolable and international law’s overarching norm is non-interference.  So far as we know, Pakistan has not provided the United States with a broad license to violate Pakistani sovereignty.  In the absence of such a grant—and under extant international law—mere notice (acknowledged or otherwise) is insufficient.  Thus, Wittes’ Congress-Pakistan comparison is inapposite.

If Congressional silence upon notification has taught the CIA to treat silence as authorization in all situations regardless of the applicable legal regime then the CIA’s very capable lawyers have failed singularly in this instance.  That strikes me as unlikely.

Wittes’ analogy between adverse possession and authorization for drone strikes is similarly unpersuasive.  But unlike Congressional authorization contingent upon notice, which is a regime founded on actual authorization with notice acting as an accountability mechanism, adverse possession by its nature unauthorized.  Indeed, the term itself—adverse possession—suggests that it is possession without consent.  It is the process by which one person gains title to another person’s property through squatting.  But adverse possession requires hostile possession of another person’s property—once consent is given, the process of title acquisition via adverse possession is interrupted.  You see, not only does adverse possession not result in consent, consent is actually fatal to adverse possession.

While Wittes is most certainly correct that what constitutes consent is context dependent, analogies are only useful in so far as they share similar premises.  In employing these two inapt analogies, Wittes not only fails to elucidate the real issues of sovereignty implicated by U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan, he downplays—wrongly in my estimation—the serious concerns raised by the CIA’s novel practice.  

UPDATE: Greg Miller in the Washington Post reports Saturday afternoon that Yemen's President approves every drone strike launched in Yemen.  Such approval would be an example of actual consent.

The Least-Bad Option in Pakistan?

Over at the Atlantic, JoshuaFoust takes issue with the new Stanford and NYU report, Living Under Drones, and argues that drone strikes are the least-bad option in Northwest Pakistan.  Says Foust:

In the short run, there aren't better choices than drones. . . .

Drones represent the choice with the smallest set of drawbacks and adverse consequences. Reports like Living Under Drones highlight the need for both more transparency from the US and Pakistani governments, and for drawing attention to the social backlash against their use in Pakistan. But they do not definitively build a case against drones in general. Without a better alternative, drones are here to stay.

But Foust is suffering from at least two ailments common to the debate about drone strikes in Pakistan.  The first is subscribing to the premise that action—specifically U.S. action—is required; the second is lumping all drone strikes against all targets in Northwest Pakistan together.

Under the first ailment, observers and policymakers presuppose that the situation in Northwest Pakistan demands kinetic action.  Across the spectrum of vectors by which to deliver that kinetic action—drone strikes, U.S. military incursions, Pakistani military actions—drones offer the least-bad option because they offer a high degree of precision and the impact from individual strikes is fairly circumscribed.  However, it is not entirely clear that military action is required—and, even if some action is required, it is not clear that the scale of U.S. action in Pakistan is appropriate.  First, Northwest Pakistan is home to a mélange of non-state actors pursuing varied agendas, targeting different populations.  The correct approach to addressing these various actors is almost certainly not uniform.  Instead, responses ought to be highly contextualized—drones, because of their relative ease of use, offer a low-cost alternative to formulating complex policy.  Second, to the extent that Foust is right and all of these actors exist due to “the Pakistani government’s reluctance to grant the FATA the political inclusion necessary for normal governance or to establish an effective police force,” drone strikes offer a solution wholly inapposite to the problem at hand.  Rather than in any way addressing the underlying causes that Foust identifies, drones strikes substitute a tactic for a strategy and act as a mere—if perpetual—stop-gap.

The second ailment that Foust and many others suffer from is lumping the myriad non-state actors in Northwest Pakistan together.  This facet, combined with the penchant for painting the targets of drone strikes with a broad brush, leads to statements like:

The targets of drone strikes in Pakistan sponsor insurgents in the region that kill U.S. soldiers and destabilize the Pakistani state (that is why Pakistani officials demand greater control over targeting). They cannot simply be left alone to continue such violent attacks.

The groups targeted by drone strikes in Pakistan include al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, the Haqqani Network, and many others.  These groups don’t have different names just to confuse the West.  No, they have different names because theyare distinct organizations, with distinct orders of battle, distinct agendas,and different enemies.  The last is perhaps the most important piece.  By treating these groups as an undifferentiated mass, the United States tends to drive them together—making them stronger—where it could potentially (in some cases, easily) drive a wedge between them.

More to the point, however, the targets themselves are not all “sponsor[ing] insurgents.”  The vast majority of the militants killed by drone strikes are not leaders.  The vast majority of those fighters killed are mere foot soldiers.  This fact alone begs the question of why drones are employed so frequently.  It is perhaps an inefficient use of resources to employ a drone—relatively cheap though it may be—to kill a grunt.

Fundamentally, drone strikes are here to stay not because they are the least bad option but because the problems in Northwest Pakistan are complicated and, potentially, intractable.  Addressing those problems is both difficult and not the responsibility of the United States—it is, instead, the responsibility of the Pakistani state.  In so far as those festering problems present an immediate threat to the United States, and the Pakistani state is unwilling to address it, then the United States should—and has every right to—avail itself of self-defense.  However, rightly employed, these invocations would almost certainly occur far less frequently than do drone strikes today.

Coke Comes to Somaliland

Although Somaliland remains unrecognized--and remains substantially more stable and democratic than internationally recognized Somalia--the Coca Cola corporation has provided it with a measure of recognition.  That's right, Somaliland is the proud host of Africa's latest Coca Cola bottling plant.  NPR has the story.

Romney's International Gaffe Tour

It's a new convention to have a (presumptive) presidential nominee do a world tour, and one that might go out the window after Gov. Mitt Romney's gaffe ridden trip. The timing couldn't have been better. After enduring weeks of attacks from the left about his scant disclosure of tax filings and about this actual level of involvement with Bain Capital as the firm outsourced jobs, including a much lampooned retroactive retirement, the world was going to give reporters two big distractions. First, Romney was taking a road trip airplane ride to the United Kingdom, Israel, and Poland. Second, the Olympics were getting underway.  Clear sailing until after the closing ceremonies, right? Keep your head down, look presidential, smile, and just wait until August where you can steal the news cycle with the announcement of the winner of the veepstakes. If only.

The Romney camp made no friends in the UK or back at home as the candidate himself questioned both the country's preparedness and commitment to the Olympics and while a campaign spokesman said Romney understood the special relationship because of a shared Anglo-Saxon heritage. The Olympics comment became the story in the lead up to the opening ceremony, which even led British Prime Minister Cameron to make a rather backhanded comment about Salt Lake City and Utah. The Anglo-Saxon comment has been contested by Romney's campaign and I don't believe there was any intended racism in it, but boy it sounds pretty racist on it's face. Honestly, I think Cameron is in the bag for Obama. They may not agree on policy approaches, but I think they're too guys who like each other. Did you seem how loose they looked taking in a basketball game together?

Next stop, Israel. Romney did receive a warm welcome in Israel and clearly his relationship with Bibi is far stronger than Obama's consider the widespread speculation that the two men just don't get on. But Romney couldn't help himself, making a ham-handed comment that the reason the Palestinian territory is experiencing slower economic growth is because of cultural differences between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Now, I don't think Gov. Romney is too concerned about rankling the feathers of the Palestinian Authority, but it's the sort of comment that could come back to haunt a President Romney hoping to move the needle in peace talks.

Final stop, Poland.  Poland always seemed like a bit of an odd duck. Clearly the U.S. has a special relationship with the UK and Israel and we sure do like Poland a lot, but the depth of the bond isn't as strong.  So this was the gimme. No topics to trying, again, just go, smile, shake hands, take in the culture, and get out. Just don't talk...wait...what's that?  A Romney spokesman wants to say something to the press pool: "Kiss my a**. This is a Holy site." Yuh-ikes. And with that Romney was hurried away in a car and likely not going to be available to the media for a week or so.

With that, Romney's international trip is coming to an end, and the question that arises is simply. Does this impact Romney's chances back home?  It's tough to say at this point. I tend to think it could hurt Romney with independents for two reasons.  Number one, Obama's foreign policy has been rather strong and he can get up to the podium at the debates and with every foreign policy question just say, "I ordered the killing of Osama bin Laden."

Moderator: "Mr. President, China has been accused of currency manipulation. What if any recourse does the U.S. have to end this market distortion?"

President: "I ordered the killing of Osama bin Laden."

Moderator: "Mr. President, our ally, Israel, believes Iran will soon have a nuclear capability. What action are you prepared to take to prevent a nuclear Iran?"

President: "I ordered the killing of Osama bin Laden."

Moderator: "yes sir, but what else?"

President: " I would order his killing again if he were alive today. But he's not, because I ordered the killing of Osama bin Laden."

I call this the Rudy Giuliani approach to foreign policy debates. After that extended distraction, reason number two, these international trips are about looking presidential.  When you offend your first host, are passively racist against anyone not anglo-saxon and against Palestinians, and then your spokesman curses at the press pool. Well none of that looks very presidential.

Without a doubt this election is primarily about domestic issues, but people still want a president who acts presidential abroad and that moderator's quiver just got loaded up with foreign policy statements that need some explaining by candidate Romney during the debate. Time will tell how much this will really impact things, but I would imagine many in the Romney camp are now thinking to themselves they should have just stayed home.

UPDATED 2:58pm: Unsurprisingly, the Obama campaign doesn't believe Romney's international trip passes the "commander-in-chief test." This is entirely the sort of thing that hurts Romney with independents and once again he's on the defensive.

Casualties and Use of Force Decisions

Mark Penn's polling firm is out with a public opinion survey of Americans regarding genocide. You can review the complete results here (free SlideShare account required). The survey includes a question about U.S. military intervention to stop genocide, as well as a follow-up question about whether that opinion would change given the death of at least 100 U.S. troops. 

Remarkably, more than 30% of those in favor of using force to stop genocide cease favoring it faced with that prospect. These results ought to give pause to those who downplay the importance of casualty aversion to policymakers deciding whether and when to use force. While some have downplayed the practical significance of drones being pilot-less--given that drones are used in permissive environments--these data should serve as a reminder that even broadly popular reasons for using force will be undercut by U.S. casualties. Uses of force that receive far more ambiguous popular endorsements may suffer even more from casualties. 

Reflections on South Sudan: One Year After Independence

On July 9, 2012 South Sudan, the world's newest country, celebrated its first birthday. This past March I traveled to Juba, South Sudan and on the occasion of the first anniversary of the country's independence, Ben encouraged me to write about my experience and my thoughts on the country as it stands today.


The Deep End of the Pool

After nearly 24 hours'  travel, I stepped down the stairs and onto the tarmac at Juba Airport. It is March but the midday temp was already surpassing 90 degrees and the natural musk of  airplane food and recycled air was compounded by sweat. I followed the crowd into a sparse room split in two by a wooden counter. To my left was the immigration control window, which looked shabbier than the bullet-proof check-out counters that are becoming harder to find in the bodegas of Northwest DC. There was a vague system of lines, but mostly a mass of people, some wearing UN badges, some wearing suits; mostly, it was a seething mob hot and crowded into a third of a larger room after being trapped hot and crowded in the plane from Addis Ababa to Juba. This was my introduction to Africa. I'd never been to the continent before, but suffice to say I was starting in the deep end of the pool.

After arguing, some shoving, and handing over the USD 100 entrance fee--cash only from bills printed after 2006, as I learned from the discourteous immigration officer--I went to customs and had my bags searched and then okay-ed by writing "OK" in the bag with white chalk. None of the customs "officers" wore uniforms and it was difficult to see or perceive the official state. 


On the way to the hotel I experienced about 50% of the paved roads that exist in Africa's newest capital city. My hotel, the Nile Beach Resort, was behind the soccer stadium, down about a half mile of dirt roads. Later, I learned that my hotel was probably the fourth best hotel in Juba. You see, my room had running water (though not hot water), an A/C, a TV that got two channels (one channel would change based on the whims of the individual working in the registration hut), and if I stood close to the registration hut I could get a wifi signal. Belying its name, the resort has no beach whatsoever.

This was March 2012, two month after the government of South Sudan had refused to pay the extortionist rates Sudan wanted to charge to transit the South's oil through Sudan's pipelines to the coast. The South Sudanese decided the best bet was to just shut the oil off. But this was just before the violence in Heglig along the border. I was in Juba for a conference, an opportunity for the South Sudanese government to talk about all the investment opportunities in the country. And there were many. The country needs paved roads, clean water, agriculture, industry; you name it, Africa's newest state needs it.

The Afterglow of Independence

At the conference, there was a former Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) soldier who'd started a construction business based almost entirely on hard labor. His workers had literally dug the ditches and helped plain many of the dirt roads around the city. He joined the SPLA when he was 12 years old and now I figured him to be in his late 20s. Here was a man whose life knew more of war than of peace. Yet, to speak to him, you couldn't help but be excited. On the first day of the conference he came wearing the South Sudan flag like a cape and a beaming smile; this was a man who had fought for the freedom and independence of this country and the excitement of that victory still shown upon his face. When he took the stage he spoke in broken, nearly unintelligible English, but the pride, the care, the sheer commitment he had to his country was evident immediately. He encouraged many of the assembled potential investors to believe in South Sudan. He thanked the international community for its support. Juba is one place in the developing world where being a Westerner isn't a liability and the gentleman's energy was infectious. As he left the stage, all those assembled clapped and cheered. After a dizzying arrival, this man appealed to the optimist in me that South Sudan was a country full of opportunity, freed from the burden of state neglect, her freedom fighters were now rulers, and if they were anything like this man surely the country had a positive future, with or without the oil on.

Another speaker in the conference was a South African who had been sent by SAB Miller to open the South Sudan Brewery. Literally the first factory in South Sudan was a brewery (and having enjoyed a not insignificant quantity of their product while in Juba, I would say it beats PBR). The brewery gave way to general bottling of soda and filtered bottled water.  This brewery, the first industry, which on the surface strikes as a specious use of priorities was turning a healthy profit, but as just importantly it was providing an incredibly large quantity of free filtered water at various water stations around the city. I felt like I was hearing from the brewery a lecture on what corporate social responsibility is supposed to be: make a product, make money on that product, but use the byproduct of that profit to help a community that desperately needs it. The head of the brewery was a jovial man, excited to be in Juba (I would come to find this was a rather uncommon sentiment), excited about the work he did, and the ability of his company to give back. Again the optimism swelled within me. This was an investment that had paid off and was paying dividends to the community. But this was not my final impression of South Sudan and its prospects.

Unfortunately Out of the Country

If the conference began on a hopeful tone, it did not end so.  The agenda called for an impressive list of government ministers from all conceivable departments of the South Sudanese government. The goal was to put decision-makers in the room with investors, but time and time again we heard that "Minister so-and-so is unfortunately out of the country." For a young nation, it seemed curious that so many of it's high government officials would be out of the country. What became clear was "out of the country" more precisely implied "in Nairobi at his villa."


It became an open joke that many of the decision-makers, former generals in the SPLA, many whom had long toiled at war and had deep connections with Western diplomats, had gained independence for their country, fleeced what they could from the international development community and retreated to the modernity and solemnity of Nairobi rather than confront the stark poverty of their own country.  Imagine if the founding fathers of the United States, fatigued by war, prideful of their victory, had then largely retreated to estates in France, our ally and benefactor rather than stay to govern the country. Where would we be as a nation? South Sudan finds itself nearly bankrupt, playing games of brinkmanship with Sudan over oil and land, as a populace enjoys new found independence without progress. The fleecing of international aid is so pervasive that President Salva Kiir has actually demanded government officials return what is calculated to be $4 billion dollars in pilfered funds to help keep the country afloat as oil negotiations drag on between South Sudan and its erstwhile former masters in Khartoum.


Ground Truth
"Oh, the country will be bankrupt by September," said a friend of mine who'd spent the past year in Juba. In 2011, revenue from oil accounted for 98.1% of all government revenue collected by Juba. And the spigot has been off since January. But it gets worse than that. My friend continued, "And even if they turn the oil on, right now, today, it'll be six months before they receive payment." This was back in March and the oil is still off and doesn't look to be turned on anytime soon. The story I heard from my friend and many of his colleagues was one I saw played out at the conference.  The leaders in government had won the war and seemed quite disinterested in doing much more than that. Juba is the epicenter of more NGOs and aid groups than any other place in the world right now. The UN presence is huge, as is the U.S. presence.  The aid workers live in compounds, gilded prisons, with more stringent obvious security than I saw to get into the White House. I never felt unsafe in Juba. Ever. But no U.S. government employee could travel in Juba at night except by armored car. Those shiny, white Toyota Land Cruiser arrived in convoys after meals outside the compound like a mobster's taxi service.


I had a hard time reconciling the pessimism felt by the aid workers I talked with to the optimism felt by the man wearing the South Sudanese flag. I couldn't wrap my head around the notion that government leaders would leave so quickly after achieving independence, while this South African man opened a brewery and maintained a thriving business. There was opportunity here, good will, and people ready to do something for their new country, but the leaders were asleep at the wheel.


A Dangerous Game
Alan Boswell does a great job breaking down the massive lobbying effort by NGOs, celebrities, congressmen, and others that led to the sustained effort to have an indepedent South Sudan.  The effort was bi-partisan; it connected liberals with evangelicals; it was supported by the UN; and the final transition to independence was peaceful.  South Sudan's independence was not easy but its oil wealth (even if it can't get it out) and the support of the international community give it substantial advantages not enjoyed by other nascent states. But with so much support comes corruption. And, as patrons of South Sudan high-fived each other, the SPLA commanders picked the pocket of their own nation to enrich themselves.


It was like the objective of independence blinded the international community to the corruption. So what happens now?  Don't believe the hype about an oil pipeline to Mombasa, that's a dream and the initially suggested timeline of 18 months is laughable to anyone who knows anything about the extractive industry--worse, it still hasn't gotten started. For now, it looks like Juba will go bankrupt, but maybe so does Khartoum. Right now, I think the South Sudanese government is playing a dangerous game with Sudan and with the international community.  I think President Kiir and the country's leaders feel like they've been propped up and pushed along by the international community for this long.  Why would that change, especially with Khartoum falling off more people's Christmas card list every day? But that's a big if and in the end those government leaders can retreat Nairobi. It's the populace, long neglected by Khartoum, that will now suffer the brinkmanship its leaders have engaged in.


When I had arrived at Juba airport, I had missed it.  My friend told me about the old Russion MiG jet, crashed off to the side of the runway, now obscured by the long grass that had begun to overtake it. When I walked back out onto the tarmac to board the plane home I made a point to look.  And there it was rusting in the sun, a souvenir left behind by Khartoum, inoperable, in shambles. No one has bothered to move it, the battle over, the debris remains unattended.

War in Pakistan, You Say?

Over at Danger Room, Spencer Ackerman blogsthat Defense Secretary Panetta today admitted that the United States isfighting a war in Pakistan. As Ackerman notes, this is hardly revelatory—by 2010, I was arguing that U.S. use of force in Northwest Pakistan rose to thelevel of an armed conflict, at least against Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan.

Ackerman states this, however:

In case you’re wondering, there aren’t many legal implications or obligations prompted by Panetta’s admission. The 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force, the legal wellspring of the war on terrorism, clearly authorizes attacking the perpetrator organization of 9/11 unbounded by geographic limits. Besides that, the short document is vague enough to fly a Predator through. There is little upside and much risk for any politician arguing it’s time to end the 9/11 Era. To paraphrase Oliver Wendell Holmes, the life of the war has not been law; it has been politics.

His butchering Holmes aside, Ackerman is correct—but not for the reasons he thinks. The fact is, the existence of an armed conflict, irrespective of the AUMF, does have legal implications for the United States. More importantly, whether an armed conflict exists is a question of fact determined by the intensity of hostilities and the degree to which the parties are organized. If the conflagration in question exceeds this so-called Tadic threshold, then an armed conflict exists. And, if an armed conflict exists, then international humanitarian law—otherwise known as the law of armed conflict or the law of war—is triggered, giving rise to very particular legal implications and obligations. Noticeably absent from this analysis is whether a state has declared itself to be at war.

More importantly, Ackerman’s characterization of the AUMF as being territorially boundless is at least controversial. The Bush and Obama administrations have certainly treated the AUMF as such but they’re practice is hardly the final word. IHL clearly recognizes territorial bounds to armed conflict. In inter-state conflict, the geographic limits are defined by the law of neutrality. In intra-state armed conflict, the geographic scope of the armed conflict is limited to the state(s) in which, under Tadic, the armed conflict exists. Thus, an armed conflict in Pakistan is limited to Pakistan, meaning that a member of the TTP—one party to the armed conflict in Pakistan—who happens to be walking around Iran, say, would not be subject to use of force in the same way he would if he were walking around South Waziristan.

Why Drones Are Different—And Why They Aren’t

For the last few years, unmanned aerial systems (“drones”) have been the source of a number of sometimes overlapping debates. For example: Are drone strikes legal? When are they legal? Are drone strikes dishonorable? Are they counterproductive when used in COIN?

At the same time, a parallel debate over whether these other debates (relative merits aside) are a waste of time altogether. The question animating this corollary debate is whether drones are in fact different from the other weapons platforms available to U.S. policymakers. At heart, this debate centers around the sense that for all their virtues, drones are really just air systems. They fly. They launch missiles. They come home. Sure, drones are unmanned. But so are cruise missiles.

In general, the drones are really just air systems approach is the correct one. Drones and their operators are subject to the same law as manned air craft and their pilots, for example. Unfortunately, hewing too closely to this position tends to lead observers to ignore or discount the ways in which drones actually are different—and why these differences have caused drones to be perceived so differently by the public and policymakers alike.

Unlike manned systems or cruise missile or most other standoff platforms, armed drones are able to stay on station for incredibly long periods of time. Whereas an F-15, for example, can remain airborne for only about 5 hours without refueling, a (now obsolete) MQ-1 Predator is built to loiter over a target for 14 hours (and at least one declassified flight lasted for 40 hours) and MQ-9 Reapers are built to loiter for 24 hours.

Also, unlike manned systems, drones are expendable. Necessary support infrastructure aside, individual drones are substantially cheaper to purchase than their manned counterparts. An F-15E costs approximately $31 million dollars; an individual MQ-9 Reaper costs about $13 million. Although that price tag blows a cruise missile out of the water—depending on the version, a Tomahawk will cost between $500,000 and $1.5 million—a cruise missile delivers just one warhead and returns no intelligence.

Finally, unlike manned systems, drones are unmanned. That is, putting a drone in harm’s way does not put a pilot in harm’s way. This seems like an obvious point but the impact of it has been discounted in some circles. No, the absence of an onboard pilot does not mean there are no U.S. (or allied or proxy) personnel on the ground supporting the operation. Nor does it mean, absolutely, that the United States will not suffer casualties. One need only look at the suicide bombing of FOB Chapman in Afghanistan in December 2009 for evidence of U.S. casualties directly related to the operation of armed unmanned aerial systems over Pakistan. But U.S. personnel are not necessarily in proximity to the targets of U.S. drone strikes—in stark contrast to strikes by manned systems.* What’s more, although drones operate almost exclusively in permissive environments—those where air defenses are actually or effectively non-existent—which means that manned systems would face a low probability of being shot down in the same airspace, removing the pilot also removes the more realistic threat (in these environments) of casualties due to accidents, weather, or operator error.

Although infrequent losses of U.S. personnel due to these causes may seem relatively trivial, the impact on policymakers is clearly not. The fact that the United States is relying on drones instead of manned systems despite the limitations of drones is a prima facie indicator that policymakers in fact view drones as different from other systems. This is likely due to the fact that, as described above, drones have operational capabilities that are not matched by other standoff platforms. More compelling, the unique capabilities of drones are paired with a tantalizing ability to avoid or minimize U.S. casualties. When a policymaker dispatches drones to survey and attack a target, that policymaker need not worry about images of U.S. pilots being dragged through the streets of some God-forsaken warren in Mogadishu, Sana, or Peshawar. Nor does that policymaker have to worry about the political backlash that such images would engender.

Again, it is tempting to downplay the impact that casualties (or potential casualties) have on policymakers. Doing so is folly, however. The relative marginal effect of casualties on public support for U.S. troop deployments has steadily increased since World War II. That is, the public was more tolerant of U.S. casualties in World War II than Korea, in Korea than Vietnam, Vietnam over the most recent war in Iraq. Avoiding U.S. casualties was one of the primary drivers of U.S. decision making around the 1990–1991 Gulf War, leading both to the large (and long) deployment of U.S. forces, and the decision to curtail operations after liberating Kuwait (rather than going to Baghdad, e.g.).

Casualty-avoidance is a good thing for numerous reasons, including that it encourages the safety and protection of U.S. personnel. It also reduces the likelihood that policymakers will rely on force—or significant amounts of force—for fear of evoking the ire of the public (over U.S. casualties) and facing electoral sanction.

But offering policymakers a use-of-force option like that of drones, which promises nearly cost-free (or casualty-free) use-of-force is problematic. First, it may lead policymakers to wrongly believe that drone strikes are in fact insulated from casualties. As noted early, these strikes often involve spotters on the ground who may become casualties. We have already witnessed one suicide bombing that directly targeted drone operations. Second, it may lead policymakers to rely on force in situations where force is either unwarranted or warranted yet ultimately counterproductive to the overall mission—whatever that happens to be. Indeed, the extent of the drone campaign in Pakistan, and its growing scale in Yemen, suggests that the United States is already using force in situations it would not have previously. There are second order effects of such frequent uses of force—for instance, the frequency of drone strikes in Pakistan likely placed the United States in an armed conflict in Pakistan, making the civilian (CIA) drone operators unprivileged belligerents there. Third, the brilliance of the virtues of drones may obscure their costs, leading policymakers to rely on drones when a riskier means of using force may be more appropriate. Fortunately, in at least one high-profile situation (the killing of Osama bin Laden), the United States chose to rely not on drones (or manned air systems), but on a higher-risk deployment of SEALs.

*It is also worth noting here that manned strikes may also involve the presence of spotters on the ground. Thus the drone strikes that rely on similar spotter arrangement are, at the very least, removing one or two U.S. (or allied or proxy) personnel from harm’s way.




UPDATE: Dan Trombly kindly took the time to both link and respond to my post at his own blog. I'm (mostly) off the grid for work so I've only skimmed it. It's a solid post and I hope to respond in the coming days. In the meantime, go read it. 


UPDATE2: Buried at the end of the Joe Becker and Scott Shane's excellent piece in the New York Times on President Obama and Targeted Killings is this bit from former Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair: 

Mr. Blair, the former director of national intelligence, said the strike campaign was dangerously seductive. “It is the politically advantageous thing to do — low cost, no U.S. casualties, gives the appearance of toughness,” he said. “It plays well domestically, and it is unpopular only in other countries. Any damage it does to the national interest only shows up over the long term.”

Drones & Accountability

After a back-and-forth with Dan Trombly on Twitter last night, I thought this paragraph from the conclusion of a draft chapter I'm writing might be appropriate:

The United States’ current accountability system for use-of-force decision making is imperfect. Unmanned systems are not the source of these imperfections but when policymakers rely on drones for both overt and covert uses of force, they take advantage of and exacerbate existing flaws in the accountability system. The primary advantage drones offer is that they allow policymakers to choose force without risking U.S. casualties. The absence of casualties dramatically lowers the political costs associated with resorting to force, making it easier for the President to choose force and undermining Congressional incentives to enforce supervisory accountability. The absence of casualties also allows the President to use force overtly and for long periods without triggering the WPR—even if the President acknowledged its Constitutionality. Although cruise missiles and in some environments manned aircraft afford policymakers casualty-free—or nearly casualty-free—use of force, these systems cannot match the precision, persistence, or flexibility available through drones. In combination, these features dramatically lower the barriers to using force. By doing so they increase the likelihood that policymakers will rely on force and that those uses of force will escape accountability.

All of this comes out of an article I'm in the midst of writing—a very rough draft of which is available on SSRN—and a talk I gave at the Patuxent Defense Forum in early May (that I should be reprising at the Center for International Intervention in July). 

Spilling Over Into Lebanon; Lebanon Spilling Back.

For Lebanon watchers, the fighting in Tripoli over the last week was all but inevitable. As the conflict in Syria dragged on for months, the likelihood that that conflict would spillover into Lebanon only increased. Now that likelihood seems to be on the verge of realization.

The nearly 15-year long Lebanese Civil War was one of the most complicated conflicts in modern history. Numerous militias, straddling various sectarian, political, and ethnic cleavages fought over neighborhoods in Beirut, villages in the countryside and even mountains. These militias often found state-sponsors and protectors but, for much of the conflict, the Lebanese managed to turn supposed proxy relationships on their head. Often, it seemed, the Lebanese controlled the sponsors rather than the sponsors regulating the Lebanese. And, as you might expect, the militias frequently abandoned one state sponsor for another. More importantly, though, the civil war in Lebanon managed to draw in the entire Middle East and much of the West. In fact, in many ways, the civil war in Lebanon was a realism sandbox for IR theorists; if one were to treat the Lebanese militia as states—not a difficult stretch given they controlled territory and populations, and replaced some nominally state functions—the machinations of the militias and their allies represent archetypal power politics. It is unfortunate that so often the civil war is viewed through a sectarian lens; doing so ignores the largely non-sectarian moves and counter-moves among the militias and the outside powers that really fueled the conflict. 

But I digress.

The spillover into Lebanon that the fighting in Tripoli represents indicates that the Syrian civil war is beginning to pull in the region. It is not the first sign. Reports indicate that the United States has begun to facilitate the flow of arms from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States into the hands of Syrian rebels. Clearly, these states have picked sides and are attempting to exert a sponsor’s influence over the widening Syrian conflict. However, just as clearly, the diffuse, locally-oriented, and shifting nature of the Syrian rebels suggests the emergence of a Lebanon-like militia structure. This point is underscored by the inability of either the Syrian National Council or the Free Syrian Army to rally local units to their banners and become true umbrella organizations.

At this point, the conflict appears to be mainly one of the Syrian state (and its minority adherents) versus the diffuse anti-Assad militias, with Islamists spoilers thrown into the mix. Importantly, Syrian minorities have remained on the sidelines and not reportedly taken to arming themselves. That greatly reduces the complexity of the conflict but has clearly not removed from it a clear sectarian milieu. It is also no assurance that they will continue to remain on the sidelines—particularly with the United States reportedly encouraging the Syrian Kurds to open a second front against Assad. Although that may hasten Assad’s departure, it will likely aggravate Turkey and encourage the Turks to back their own horse, increasing specific but not general support. 

And that potentially takes Syria a step closer to the Lebanon scenario. When fractious militias are armed and they are backed by different powers (regional or otherwise), the potential for a lengthy conflict that draws in Syria’s neighbors increases. There is no incentive to stay out of the mix when your neighbors (read: rivals) are able to improve their regional position through a Syrian proxy. With outside players willing to provide arms, intelligence, and logistical support to specific militias merely to improve that outside player’s regional standing, there is every incentive for local militias to abuse that willingness and cut the best (temporary) deal possible. 

Conduct- versus Status-based Targeting in Yemen (and Pakistan)

Greg Miller reports in the Washington Post that the CIA is seeking authority for “signature strikes” in Yemen. Miller defines signature strikes as those that “hit targets based solely on intelligence indicating patterns of suspicious behavior, such as imagery showing militants gathering at known al-Qaeda compounds or unloading explosives.”


Miller’s description of the “signature strike” authority would seem to suggest that the CIA—in Pakistan and now potentially in Yemen—operates under targeting rules that are either a very liberal interpretation of Direct Participation in Hostilities (DPH) or that are status-based. This is a stunning revelation for two reasons.


First, irrespective of whether the CIA is employing DPH or status-based targeting, the authority Miller describes suggests that the CIA considers its targeting authority stems from the existence of an armed conflict—actually, two armed conflicts: one in Pakistan and one in Yemen. Because the targets of these strikes—various militant organizations in Pakistan and AQAP in Yemen—are not states, the existence of an armed conflict turns on the organization of the parties and the intensity of the hostilities between the United States and these organizations. While the intensity of U.S. drone operations in Pakistan in 2009-2010 almost certainly rises to the level of an armed conflict, the intensity of U.S. operations in Yemen (although increasing) does not seem to rise to the level of an armed conflict (10 airstrikes in 2011, just 10 airstrikes so far this year). That said, the United States may be engaged in an armed conflict through intervention into Yemen’s civil war, assuming that the intensity of hostilities between AQAP and the Yemeni government are sufficient to constitute an armed conflict. 


The existence—or not—of an armed conflict is a question of fact and it is very important. When an armed conflict exists, the law of armed conflict is triggered, imposing certain constraints and providing certain authorities to the parties to the conflict. For example, Common Article 3 provides a minimum level of treatment for captured or wounded non-state fighters in an armed conflict not of an international character. At the same time, the existence of an armed conflict vests a state with the authority to use force as a first resort. It also provides soldiers with combatant immunity. Simply put, what would be murder outside of an armed conflict may not be within the context of an armed conflict.


But it is also the source of the notion of unprivileged belligerency. You may remember this from the Bush administration’s phrasing: unlawful enemy combatants. The law of armed conflict defines two classes of people: combatants and civilians. Combatants are soldiers: uniformed members of the armed forces of states. Civilians are everyone else. Anyone who is not a uniformed member of the armed force of a state is a civilian. Combatants are entitled to prisoner-of-war status when captured, they enjoy combatant immunity, but they are also subject to status-based targeting. That means combatants can be targeted anytime, anywhere, unless they are hors de combat. Civilians, on the other hand, are protected from targeting and attack unless and for so long as they are Directly Participating in Hostilities. 


DPH is a concept that has garnered a fair amount of attention and controversy since September 11, 2001. The limiting language—unless and for so long as—has generated debate over the proverbial farmer-by-day, fighter-by-night and whether he can be targeted while he’s using his hoe or only when he bends low to pick up his rifle. A liberal interpretation of DPH has evolved, recognizing that some civilians join non-state armed organizations just to be fighters, and they are fighters all the time. As such, they assume a continuous combat function and are targetable all the time, regardless of whether they are then performing a hostile, much like a combatant. But this understanding of DPH is by no means uncontroversial nor universally accepted. 


The authority described by Miller—“hit targets based solely on intelligence indicating patterns of suspicious behavior, such as imagery showing militants gathering at known al-Qaeda compounds or unloading explosives”—suggests that the CIA is adopting either a continuous combat function approach or a status-based approach to targeting. That is, the CIA believes that people who gather at known al-Qaeda compounds or unload explosives are fulltime fighters, satisfying the continuous combat function criteria, and are therefore always targetable. Alternatively, the CIA may be adopting a status-based targeting approach to non-state fighters. Such an approach would violate extant law of armed conflict but may be a data point indicating an emerging revision of the customary law governing targeting.


Finally, notice that the employees of the CIA, because it is a civilian agency and its employees are not uniformed members of the armed forces of the United States, do not benefit from combatant immunity. That is, they too are civilians directly participating in hostilities. 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Limiting Factors

Slouching Towards Columbia has dedicated a fair amount of space over the last two weeks to unmanned aerial vehicles ("drones")--a topic with which I'm somewhat familiar. One post, "Drones and the False Allure of Impunity," assesses a Zenko piece about the future of drone operations in Afghanistan if Pakistan were to oust our drone bases there. Trombly notes rightly:

The ability of the United States to conduct drone campaigns and other so-called standoff strikes is in fact heavily constrained by geopolitical and logistical considerations. While the drone aircraft may be unmanned, they are just as dependent on bases, ground crews, and a logistical tail as their manned counterparts. So too are they dependent on permissive airspace.

To which I would that drones are also dependent on human-source intelligence and the ability of intelligence agencies to operate in theater. Although the topic of drone reliance on HUMINT has been fairly downplayed, one need only look at the suicide bombing of FOB Chapman to understand it. FOB Chapman was manned by CIA agents who were looking over the border from Afghanistan into Pakistan to support the U.S. drone campaign in Pakistan. One of the sources the CIA was operating, Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi, a Jordanian doctor, proved to be a triple agent, tasked by Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan with attacking FOB Chapman. The TTP targeted that base because of its role in drone operations in Pakistan and because the TTP were one of the primary groups targeted by the drone campaign. 

I would also add that the comparison between CIA operations in Pakistan and JSOC operations in Yemen is not necessarily apt. In none of the reporting I've seen regarding drones in Pakistan has there been anything like Foust's depiction of 300-500 U.S. troops on the ground in Yemen supporting UAV operations. If the CIA is able to operate drones in Pakistan with a lighter footprint--and one that is likely reliant on contractors rather than U.S. military personnel--then there is little reason why the CIA could not do so similarly in Yemen. The choice for JSOC over CIA operations in Yemen--and the attendant larger JSOC footprint--likely has more to do with the legal framework underlying U.S. operations in Yemen. That is, the United States views its operations in Yemen as part of an armed conflict--either with AQ proper or through intervention in Yemen's IAC with AQAP--and, as such, must employ uniformed military personnel. As opposed to the apparent view that of the United States that it is not engaged in an armed conflict in Pakistan -- a point of view with which I disagree, at least with respect to the TTP during 2009-2010.

Accountability, Mischaracterization, and American Use of Force

It’s been a busy week for international law—particularly the international law of armed conflict and, more particularly, the interaction of that body of law with municipal U.S. law. Both the Attorney General’s speech at Northwestern University Law School and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta’s remarks before the Senate Armed Services Committee have sparked a bit of outrage, as well as a fair measure of hyperbole and mischaracterization.

Interestingly enough, the visceral reaction to Holder’s speech has come from the left—both Professor Jonathan Turley and GlennGreenwald piled on—while the negative reaction to Panetta’s remarks has come from the right—unsurprising given they emerged from a contentious exchange withSenator Jeff Sessions. And, while the AG’s speech was a defense of the Obama administration’s rather robust approach to national security—in particular, the claimed authority to lethally target individuals, including U.S. citizens, who are either imminent threats or civilians directly participating in hostilities against the United States—Sessions’ assault sounded in themes of the Obama administration prostrating itself before international institution and that horror of horrors: international law.

Two things other than temporal proximity unite the left and the right in these two episodes: gross mischaracterizations and an underlying concern over accountability.

Take Glenn Greenwald’s article on Salon following Holder’s speech. While Holder articulated two fairly uncontroversial—and, by the way, correct—frameworks for justifying use of force (self-defense and the existence of an armed conflict), Greenwald ignored these and located his criticism in the legal frame of law enforcement. Greenwald used terms like accuser, judge, jury, and executioner and, critically, implied that the drone strike targeting Anwar al-Aulaqi in September 2011 was an extrajudicial execution. What’s more, whereas Holder properly discussed due process, Greenwald honed in on judicial process.

Similarly, Senator Sessions attempted to characterize the Obama administration’s inaction in Syria as evidence that the Obama administration believes international law trump U.S. law. Sessions wielded the intervention in Libya as evidence thereof: the Congress didn’t authorize that intervention but the UN Security Council did therefore Obama believes in government via the UN. Enter black helicopters.

Looking past these mischaracterizations, it is clear that both Greenwald and Sessions—and many others—are really concerned with accountability. At bottom, I believe what animates Greenwald’s arguing past the AG is not a fear that the Executive claims an untrammeled authority to use force against U.S. citizens—indeed, the President does not and could not claim such authority—but instead a fear that technology and circumstance have conspired to vest the President with the ability to use precise amounts of force abroad without political or institutional accountability.

In the same vein, I believe Senator Sessions tips his hand with his umbrage not of supposed preeminence of international law but when he highlights the War Powers Resolution. What goads Sessions is that the Obama administration avoided the War Powers Resolution—an act that every President, regardless of party, has regarded as unconstitutional—by: (1) withdrawing the majority of U.S. combat air assets within the reporting window; and (2) from that point on, relying on drones for combat operations which, because they do not place servicemen and women in harm’s way, avoid the WPR trigger of “hostilities” embraced by 30 years of Presidents.

It is, I believe, the Presidency’s apparent lack of accountability when making use of force decisions that bothers two men as diverse as Greenwald and Sessions, and unites this week’s criticism from both the left and right. Accountability in the resort to force is integral to ensure the use of force is lawful, to protect the citizenry, and to ensure that force used in our name is reasonable and warranted. This is a worthy discussion to have. We would be better off if both Sessions and Greenwald stated it plainly.

The Taxonomy of Herman Cain’s World View

Herman Cain released his vision of U.S. foreign policy this week. The primary document containing his vision weighs in at just6.5 pages. In that brief space, Mr. Cain really simply assesses U.S. relations with a handful of states. In an even briefer brochure, Cain lays out his “pillars” of U.S. foreign policy. In the short exposition of his philosophy he notes that his is a “pragmatic and principled approach.” One might suggest the two are necessarily contradictory. If Mr. Cain has found a way to resolve the apparent contradiction between principle and pragmatism, it is certainly worth some description that his foreign policy vision currently lacks.

These pillars consist of platitudes that, unsurprisingly, don’t address any real issues or problems. For example, the pillar “Reassert U.S. Leadership” includes “reassure our friends and deter our adversaries.” Outstanding, Mr. Cain; your nuanced perspective on the world would do George Kennan proud. Let us not bother with any sort of criteria or principles to assess who is a friend and who is an ally. Let us instead skip to the chase and reassure our friends and deter our adversaries. How might we do that? Are we not currently providing assurance to our friends?

This pillar also includes, “re-examin[ing] our role in the United Nations.” Obviously, this trope is meant to be red meat to the anti-UN constituency of the GOP base. There is no indication of what this would entail—though, as a member of that base, we are supposed to infer this would mean quitting the UN—no indication of the criteria used to reassess our position, no indication of what the better position would be. Indeed, as one of the five permanent members of the Security Council, vested with a veto, there is no better position to have within the United Nations. Oddly, in his exposition, Cain declares he will “never relegate the U.S.A. to being just another country in the United Nations.” The U.S. is of course not “just another country”—it’s one of five possessing a veto. So far as this Editor knows, there is no move afoot to make it one.

Further, it is unclear to this Editor, at least, how quitting the UN—again, presumably the inference we are to draw, as members of the GOP base—exhibits leadership, unless we are leading the U.N. to its demise. Of course, a number of our friends—e.g., the United Kingdom, classified as “special relationship”—apparently buy into the utility of the United Nations. This Editor is not sure how leading the U.N. to its demise would reassure our friends.

Another pillar, “Restore Our Global Competitiveness,” is really focused on domestic policy and includes implementing the 9-9-9 plan, making free trade work for the United States, outgrowing our competitors, and ending our dependence on overseas oil. With the exception of implementing the 9-9-9 plan, there is no indication of how any of these would be implemented in practice. Although, improving our global competitiveness is a worthy goal, this Editor would like to see more details. Additionally, the 9-9-9 plan reportedly increases the tax burden on poor Americans, how this improves our global competitiveness is lost on this Editor.

The third and final pillar of Mr. Cain’s plan, “Counter Urgent Threats” is quite specific in its goals but, unfortunately, light on details. This pillar includes stopping Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, fixing border security “for real,” and shielding us against “cyber and electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) attacks.” There is no indication as to why cyber attacks and EMP attacks are lumped together. They both deal with (vaguely) electronics, but beyond that they are totally different. It is nice to see, however, that Newt Gingrich’s reference to EMP attacks in the last debate has penetrated the public consciousness enough that Mr. Cain felt it necessary to address.

Perhaps the most controversial portion of Mr. Cain’s foreign policy vision is his taxonomy of nations. Cain has categorized select nations into the following categories “special relationship,” “friend and ally,” “friend and partner,” “friend,” “strategic partner,” “danger and opportunity,” “competitor,” “rival,” and “adversary regime.”

Classification	State
Special Relationship	United Kingdom
Friend and Ally	Canada, Israel, Japan
Friend and Partner	Mexico
Friend	Brazil
Strategic Partner	India
Danger and Opportunity	Egypt, Pakistan
Competitor	China
Rival	Russia
Adversary Regime	Iran, North Korea, Venezuela

This taxonomy of nation-states is certainly more nuanced than President Bush’s dichotomy—with us or against us—but it is hardly nuanced. What makes Mexico merely a Friend and Partner rather than a Friend and Ally? Why is Egypt, like Pakistan, a Danger and Opportunity? What does that mean for uncategorized Tunisia? But what strikes me most is that Israel is lumped in as merely a Friend and Ally with Canada and Japan. This is an odd downgrade for a candidate in a field that has been falling over itself to be the greatest friend to Israel (particularly, the right wing of Israel) imaginable. That too is worth some explanation.