RE: What To Do With Pakistan

I take issue with the pros that Jason believes will fall out of disengagement with Pakistan. It is not clear to me that our current engagement in Pakistan in anyway constrains U.S. or NATO freedom of action in Afghanistan. What constraints the U.S. faces have more to do with the role the Afghan government plays in coordinating or approving operations or, in cases like Marjah, the Afghan government’s inability to find Afghan civilians to fill key governmental positions. As far as I can tell, the United States concerns itself little if at all with Pakistan when operating on the Afghan side of the border. Indeed, there is a least some evidence that the United States concerns itself little with Pakistan when operating on the Pakistani side of the border!

That brings me to my next point of departure with Jason’s assessment: concern for Pakistani public opinion. I do not see much evidence that the United States has been concerned a great deal with Pakistani public opinion. The United States drone operations in Pakistan are unsurprisingly very unpopular among the Pakistani public. Despite this, drone strikes are increasingly common. There were 118 drone strikes in 2010, more than double the 2009 tally and triple the 2008 tally.

Finally, I do not see how disengaging will afford greater mission clarity, which is not to say that there is presently any mission clarity.

What to do with Pakistan: Part Two

I haven’t forgotten you Pakistan, but China stopped by and the whole day job got in the way.  Now where were we.  Last time I was commenting on T.X. Hammes and more generally about the messy history between Pakistan and the U.S.  This post is about just a few of the pros and cons of disengagement with Pakistan.

So what happens if the U.S. disengages from Pakistan?  First the pros:

• Greater autonomy to operate on the Afghan side of the AfPak border
• Be less concerned about the Pakistan public reaction to U.S. actions
• Have greater mission clarity and direction from unilateral action plans

And now, the cons:

• Loss of access to superior human intelligence network.
• Loss of international legitimacy for the mission since it would likely be unilateral.
• Loss of input/leverage over Pakistan’s nuclear program.

This is not even close to an exhaustive list, but I think it illustrates the point.  It’s easy to knock the current policy, but it’s very hard to come up with an alternative.  There are benefits from disengaging from Pakistan, however Pakistan, if not the best of allies, is an important power in a region that we can’t afford to have a blind spot.  I have a feeling the frustrations that T.X. Hammes outlines are some of the same frustrations voiced in meeting rooms at the White House, the Pentagon, and the State Department (or at least I hope they are) but sometimes there isn’t a good alternative and all you’re left with is the least bad alternative.  Obviously as a super power it sounds neither super nor powerful to pursue a least bad policy, but I don’t see a clear alternative.  Do you?

Negotiating with Iran

Our good friend, Reza Marashi, got published somewhere people actually read. His article with Trita Parsi on 5 tips to make the next round of US-Iran negotiations better then the last recently published in Foreign Policy magazine is an interesting and quick read.

While I defer to Reza on just about everything Iran, I have some thoughts to share (that's what the blog is for after all):

1. Tip #3 is the biggest tip of all in my opinion. There was a study put out by the RAND Corporation last year titled Mullahs, Guards, and Banyards. If you want to have the first clue about Iran power dynamics, it's a must read. It also really reinforces Tip #3. There are so many stakeholders in Iran. You could draw a Venn diagram, but in the end it would look like a bad acid trip with all the overlapping circles. I think it's important for the U.S. to remember that there are people in position of power in Iran interested in working with us and while we can't cater to them exclusively, it's an opportunity.

2. Could we get a corresponding article about what Iran can do to make the negotiations productive? That's like saying "Thank you for the apples, but how about some damn oranges!" but I had this nagging feeling reading the tips that the U.S. had to do X, Y, and Z and Iran did not. Thirty years of enmity will cause that kind of reaction.

3. Let's accept we were wrong to support the Shah the way we did. Let's maybe even apologize. Guys, as a nation we messed up in Iran. We messed up in a lot of nations during the Cold War, but the reaction in Iran was perhaps the most stark and the relationship sense likely the worst. It is not a sign of weakness to apologize. It's a sign of humanity and a dignified gesture (since we can't undo what happened) befitting a superpower. Our arrogance and own ignorance/denial of history make us look childish.

One final thought: It's all connected. The Islamic revolution of 1979, the overthrow (and subsequent hanging) of Bhutto by Zia al-Haq, the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and America's impotence in the entire region is all connected. We spent many decades messing about in the affairs of Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, and I don't think we could be considered a net positive. Negotiating with Iran, earnestly, patiently, and in anything resembling good faith could be the first step in trying to reverse the reviled perception of the U.S. in the region.

Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan

The Senate released what The Washington Post has called a "blistering" report about security contractors in Afghanistan. (h/t JC) It an unflattering recounting of lackadaisical background checks (or none at all), and stories of employing duplicitous (or flat out enemy) warlords and their militias. Of course the contractors pay the warlords money for services rendered (though not evaluated) and some of that money may be getting into the hands of Taliban insurgents.

There has already been a lot written about the use of private security contractors. There is a big down-side and an as yet unclear upside. The concept of private security contractors has even been lampooned in a recent movie. I don't have much to add except a few points.

1) How many times we do need to have an incident reported in a newspaper or an official report before closing these guys down becomes a priority? Clearly their use doesn't change hearts and mind.

2) The reporting has an incredulous tone that these warlords would work with the Taliban (and take money from the highest bidder). This is essentially how Afghanistan has worked for centuries, and indignation doesn't really help us.

3) Ben pointed this out to me yesterday, and I think it's worth stating. The Taliban were the recognized or at least de facto government in Kabul from 1996 to 2001. Also, the Taliban does not mean Al Qaeda and vice versa. I think in the minds of the American public the two are inextricably linked. This creates a problem when reports come out that Afghan warlords are working with the Taliban. It gets read as "Afghan warlords are working with the people that attacked us on 9/11." This is not factually accurate. We need to disaggregate the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

Back to the original point. This is an unflattering report, though certainly not the first of its kind. It sounds like maybe the Pentagon is prepared to do something about this, but that something means putting more American servicemen and women in harms way. As repugnant as private security contractor utilization might be, it's easier to periodically decry them in reports then it is politically viable to advocate to put more Americans in harms way.