A Theory of Government – A Response

Our friend Colin at To Get Rich Is Glorious posted a two-part blog (one and two) over the weekend encapsulating his theory of governance. It is remarkable both for its scope and for its relative brevity, coming in at just about 2,600 words it addresses everything from democracy (the least bad option of governance) to politicians (which come in two varieties: malevolent or incompetent) to legislation (sausage) to bureaucracy (in gross, worse than politicians; in detail, victims of their own occupation). It is worth a read. It is also worthy of response. Because my own theory of government is not as fully developed as Colin’s, I will try only to respond to a few points.

Voters are Irrational. Colin adheres to this well worn trope of wisdom and subscribes to its insipid logic: voters are irrational ergo democracy is fatally flawed. He then points to all sorts of phenomena as evidence that voters are irrational—for instance, Barack Obama was endorsed by celebrities, therefore voters are irrational; Kennedy looked better than Nixon on TV and that influenced the election, therefore voters are irrational; and concludes that Obama’s victory over Sec. Clinton in the 2007–08 Democratic Primaries is attributable to youth, good looks, race, or oration (and, therefore, voters are irrational).

As someone who has spent a rather large amount of time interacting with voters and attempting to persuade them—and worked against the Sen. Obama in those very same primaries—I am sympathetic to the notion that voters are sometimes influenced by what we more policy-oriented folks view as insubstantial factors. But this being true for some voters does not render it so for other voters. In fact, a Project Vote analysis of the 2008 electorate found that the electorate that pushed Sen. Obama into the White House was more strongly progressive than the normal electorate, explaining both the gains of Democrats in 2008 and the retrenchment in 2010 when this electorate stayed home. In fact, these voters, by casting a ballot for the most progressive candidate in the race, acted rationally. (Notably, the same survey reveals that Tea Party adherents represent an extraordinarily small portion of the electorate—a true outlier community: lily white, well educated and fully employed or retired, upper middle-class to upper class, generally older and possessed of the notion that the poor or unemployed should be left to fend for themselves).

Nor is it true that a voter who votes based on a single issue is irrational—Colin may disagree with that particular voter’s calculus but the voter has surveyed the field of issues, weighted those issues, and accorded an overwhelming weight to the single issue that moves him or her to the polls. If one selects as the baseline of rationality doing something that garners to you the outcome you desire, then single-issue voting is not assailable as irrational.

Putting aside whether voters are or are not rational, and whether their relative rationality is uniform or even a fair characterization in gross, let us assume that they are all irrational. In this respect, Colin’s theory of government is the most curious. He argues (generally) that the market is the salve for all problems. Yet the free market is premised on the idea that economic actors (let us call them consumers) are rational. Who are these consumers? Well, by and large, they are the same as the voters. Why then would an individual behave rationally when making consumer decisions but not rationally when making electoral decisions? Is it any accident that political campaigns and products manufacturers both use advertising firms—sometimes the very same advertising firms—to win over consumers (voters) to their products (candidates)? Does this then suggest that consumer are not rational actors because they purchase Crest (Kennedy) over Arm & Hammer (Nixon)?

Worse, the market is premised on the notion that there is no information disparity between economic actors. This is of course ridiculous—it is, after all, an ideal; I will leave to another day the discussion of whether this particular ideal is more ridiculous than ideals in general. Democracy requires no such premise to function but, of course, prefers well-informed (although not fully-informed) voters.

Bureaucracy and Legislation. I will lump these two topics together because it is worth noting that the bureaucracy developed to fill the very gaps in the efficacy of legislation that Colin highlights. However, rather than acknowledging this, he unironically trots out progressive critiques of legislatures from the late 19^th and early 20^th centuries, used to argue for the administrative state. He then attacks bureaucracy with stereotypes that mostly ignore how the administrative state functions or how administrative law operates.

Bureaucracy may indeed connote those adjectives Colin ascribes it, however it denotes the specialization of government. It is intended to rectify the very problems Colin points out by alleviating the legislature’s burden of grappling with complex, technical questions beyond the ken of most if not all legislators. Is it perfect? No, of course not. No human construct is perfect, not even the market. But does it do a good job? By and large, the answer to that question is yes, it does do a good job. You may disagree—Colin certainly does—with the policy choices made by various administrations and the administrative state they have managed but is water and air cleaner today than it was 40 years ago? Yes. Are our cars safer to drive? Yes. Has malaria been effectively driven out of the United States? Yes. Do thousands of farmers rely on—and appreciate—the USDA’s Extension Service? Is our military the most advanced in the world? Yes. Have we explored more of the cosmos than the any other state—or collection of states—on the planet? Yes. What about land-grant universities, like Nebraska? Or a university established for the education of civil servants, like George Washington? These are all products of the administrative state. In fact, your ability to read this blog post right now is a product of the administrative state.

Now, because I’m a fair minded person, and because I’m committed to using this space not merely to advance progressive ideas but to actually engage in debate, I must acknowledge that there have been failures of the administrative state. Indeed, the failure of the enforcement side of the administrative state has played a significant role in the most egregious domestic crises we have witnessed over the last 10 years. But of these, several—Deepwater Horizon, Katrina, the Upper Big Branch Mine disaster—are not the product of the administrative state per se but a product of an administration committed to the destruction of bureaucracy. Unable to achieve that de jure it set about to do so in a de facto manner. And in so doing it was quite successful. And in its success we have had terrible results.

Quibbles. Finally, I must quibble with a few characterizations. First, the government to Apple analogy—though it never gets tired despite its patent baselessness—is flawed. The various departments of Apple are not akin to Congress. Rather, they are like the administrative agencies within the Executive Branch. Instead, the Board of Directors plays a more Congress-like roll (though this is still imperfect). And while Jobs need not get the buy-in of every department in Apple to pursue a new product, neither does the President need to get the buy-in of all the agencies. But as surely as the President needs the support of Congress to carryout those things that are not accorded to him, so does Jobs need the support of the Board of Directors to do those thing for which he is not solely empowered. Let us not forget, however, that ultimately both the Directors and Jobs are accountable to the shareholders. Who vote. Like in a democracy.

Second, the incentives argument, though persuasive on its face, ignores how the FDA (or most bureaucracies) actually function. There are numerous good lay and casebooks on this subject.

Third, the empire building critique can be leveled at anything. At literally any entity. Should we expect administrative agencies or corporation to commit suicide? Should this be valued? Or should we instead leave it to voters (and their agents) and shareholders (and their agents) to render these decisions. Ah, the very essence of democracy.

Finally, the critique of politicians—and the broader critiques leveled in the “Theory of Government”—is generally directed at the federal government but seems to cherry pick bad examples from local government, leaving the reader with the impression that 1) the federal government shutdown a lemonade stand; and 2) that bureaucracy across levels of government is somehow monolithic. More worrisome, though, is that the critique seems to conflate flawed politicians with flawed elections. The two certainly exist. But it is overbroad to say that all politicians are bad or incompetent—but, if you truly believe that, then perhaps you should run for office or at least find and go work for a candidate in whom you believe. As for elections, one solution to the problem of competitive elections would be to institute national election standards rather than allowing each state to parochially tweak its election code to suit established interests.

Opportunities in Egypt

As events have unfolded in Egypt over the last two weeks, the U.S. position has been undergoing near constant revision. By the end of last week, however, the United States had apparently gotten ahead of the curve and was no longer subject to accusations of being merely reactive—and, worse, reacting a day behind the events on the ground. Over the weekend, the United States—and other Western governments—apparently settled on a position of supporting the immediate removal of Hosni Mubarak from power and the establishment of an interim government under the newly appointed Egyptian Vice President, Omar Suleiman. The protesters occupying Tahrir Square are unmoved by this proposition and Western support for it.

The appeal to Western governments of the staggered transition from Mubarak to a Mubarakite interim government to eventual elections is obvious. It promises the introduction of a measure of stability and certainty to a tumultuous situation that has upset U.S. foreign policy, flummoxed Israel, and contributed to steadily rising oil prices. Moreover, the apparent U.S. position follows a long history of U.S. policymakers pursuing stability. However, too often in the post-war era the pursuit of stability has come at the expense of U.S. values—as is likely the case here.

This long history of sacrificing values—democracy, liberty, freedom—for the sake of stability and ease of policymaking, has driven the U.S. to support autocratic regimes. It has also left many people with the indelible perception, rightly or wrongly, that the United States serves to oppress them—or at least support their oppressors—particularly in the Arab world.

This linkage between the United States and perceptions of oppression is one of the great strategic threats the United States faces. It has enabled radical Islamists to present an effective and largely unchallenged narrative.

The unrest in Egypt presents the United States with the opportunity to fundamentally reshape its perception in the Arab world. The simple act of lending the protesters in Tahrir Square full throated support is the first step along this path. Such support may not radically alter the fortunes of the protesters—Mubark is likely to go in the near term, and the Western-supported interim government is likely to come about regardless of Western support. However, the impact of the United States standing foursquare with the forces of democracy and liberty is likely to be regional and transformative.

The Beginning of History

Francis Fukuyama has a very concise summation(behind a registration wall) of the interplay between China and the U.S., both the places they hold in the world, the parts to envy about each system, and a warning of adjustments both need to make  Matthew Steinglass remarks that Dr. Fukuyama’s op-ed “puts it all together in a fashion that's close to perfect.”  Certainly it’s a fantastic summation, but it does raise some questions.

Without a doubt, the Chinese model is hard to classify but it allows China “to make large, complex decisions quickly, and to make them relatively well, at least in economic policy.”  Fukuyama contrasts this with India, where all manner of interests can derail a project, particularly infrastructure projects.  But the big question, one we don’t really have the answer to yet and one that Fukuyama foreshadows is how this system responds in an economic downturn.  

This authoritarian system, which has co-opted the business elite and essentially created a middle class, has been able to use sustained and extraordinary economic growth to dis-incentivize the desire for a more democratic government.  However, there is still a large portion of the population that has not seen any success from this economic expansion.  Perhaps given the sheer size of the country and the control the regime has institutionalized, they have been able to ignore this group.  It should also be noted the government has responded to many of the concerns of all their constituencies, but I have doubts about how long they can stay ahead of the eight ball.  The true test will come when GDP growth comes down to earth, which is not to say I hope it happens, only that it will happen.  (Yes, I understand the irony of saying this will happen like so many people said China would be more democratic as its economy grew.  Sometimes you gotta go out on a limb and think economic principles will hold.)

Fukuyama also takes aim at the American system and points out some of its weaknesses.  He writes, “Americans pride themselves on constitutional checks and balances, based on a political culture that distrusts centralised government. This system has ensured individual liberty and a vibrant private sector, but it has now become polarised and ideologically rigid.”  Quite right.  Balancing our democratic traditions with the demands of a globally inter-connected economy where countries, more so then companies, remain the dominant players presents a tough needle to thread.  I think we find ourselves at a crossroads in America with essentially two competing visions: we can move to weaken the federal government, lower taxes, continue to deregulate, and move back to something akin to the U.S. in the late 1700s or we will have to empower the federal government to make ever bigger decisions about the priorities and direction of the country, which could necessitate higher taxes and will necessitate greater bureaucratic autonomy (and maybe control). The former vision would likely guarantee an inability to compete with China, while the latter vision would compromise aspects of the American psyche that places a heavy premium on individual liberty.

Let me say clearly, I’m not a big fan of either scenario.  While I see the social value of a stronger federal government, I remain suspicious of empowering that government to have even half the power the Chinese government now wields over its populace.  This of course, presents a quandary since the middling-road hasn’t done much for us in the past 20 years or so to address our long-term fiscal challenges or allow our foreign policy to capitalize on that brief moment at the end of the Cold War to reinforce the benevolent hegemony of the United States.  To bring it back to Steinglass, he ends his laudatory post on Fukuyama’s op-ed by noting, “It's not clear where we're heading, and we should keep our wits about us and adapt; we can be left behind, just as others were before us.”  Alternatively, we’re not at the end of history, instead we are at the beginning of a new chapter in our history where the conventions of the last chapter will be challenged in new way.  How the U.S. responds today might tell us in the future if we are watching the sun set on American global dominance.

Citizens United: Another Angle

Since it fostered so much debate yesterday, I thought it would be worth while to post a link to this piece in Democracy in America. Matt Steinglass raises the question of the appropriateness of foreign money being spent to influence U.S. elections. He lays out rather logically how the Citizens United decision makes it legal (and largely untraceable) for foreign governments to spend large sums of money to influence American elections. He notes:

Surely, the Supreme Court would hold it unconstitutional for Congress to pass a law prohibiting foreign citizens from getting up on a soapbox in Central Park and stating that they prefer one candidate or another in an American election. On what basis, then, can Congress bar foreign corporations from buying unlimited campaign advertisements advocating their preferred candidates in American elections? Ah, one might object, but buying campaign advertising is not the same as engaging in speech. And corporations are not the same as individuals. These are precisely the two principles that Messrs Kennedy, Roberts, Scalia, Alito, and Thomas rejected in Citizens United.

For me this brings back two things I thought were obvious until the Citizens United decision. 1) Buying advertising is not identical to practicing free speech and 2) Corporations (and unions) are not individuals. Of course, as Ben pointed out yesterday, the real kicker of the Citizens United decision was the removal of reporting requirements. We are now left with less data about the additional money being spent and where that money is coming from.

I wonder how the most vociferous defenders of the decision would feel if Saudi royals influenced city council elections in Dearborn, Michigan in the hopes of founding a Wahabi grade school? My gut says they would be non-plussed at the notion.

The Governator in his Closing Scenes

I've often considered the political existence of Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, but haven't dedicated the time to come to any conclusions. The Economist does that for me, and I think it's a nice little "history at present" roundup.

Time will tell what, if any, impact the Governator actually had. I can't help feeling that in many policies, Gov. Schwarzenegger advanced sensible, well-reasoned policies but failed to get the buy-in from the roustabouts on either end of the spectrum. Pity that. His story also makes me consider President Obama, promises of post-partisanship, and the inability to govern from the center.

The Economist piece closes on a back-handedly encouraging note, "Seven years ago Californians were furious enough to elect him but not to follow through. Now more of them realise what a mess their state is in."

Will we be saying the same thing about the United States in 2016? Will the Brits learn to use a "z" instead of that bastard "s"? Time will tell, but odds are greater on the former.

The Chicken or The Egg: Blaming....someone...

Matt Steinglass has a post up in Democracy in Action discussing Obama's pocket veto of a once uncontroversial piece of mortgage-related legislation. He gets into a defense of the intelligence of elected officials, but I think he gets off track when he says:

These people [member of Congress] aren't mindlessly partisan carney barkers, but they often play them on TV. Why? My working theory is that it's generally because we, the voters, demand it. We're frequently angry, and we're not very smart.

Slow down. I just can't get fully behind this point, and not because I think I'm a pretty smart guy (trust me, I am). My own "working theory" is a media monster that constantly needs fed and the degradation of professional journalism into a horse-race, process-centric smörgåsbord/trough that the monster can feed at. The gaffe, the audacious, indeed the irrational is sexy. The actual policy is tedious, plodding, and boring. Can you imagine watching Morning Joe (I watch at the gym. Yes the gym. Seriously.) for 3 hours in the morning where there is mostly a reasoned discussion of specific policy choices? Mika would fall asleep. Joe would run out of things to say (maybe).

But Stienglass doesn't stop there, he continues:

Rather, I think one of the things you have to recognize about politics is that it's to a great extent composed of very smart people forcefully saying things they know aren't true, in order to retain the support of the public to do the complicated things they know are actually in the public interest.

Let me get this straight: Our elected officials knowingly say things that aren't true to gain our support so when nobody is looking they can actually serve us. Is that really our reality? No wonder there's a Tea Party and people hate incumbents.

Steinglass presents a vision of the US political scene that makes me want to wave a Gadsden flag (h/t Wikipedia). I refuse to accept that 1) The American people want politicians to dumb it down and 2) Dumbing it down is the way to be reelected.

Am I living in denial? Meh, maybe. I prefer to consider it faith in the ability of our politicians, the media, and the we the people to strive for something better.

Free to Choose & Moral Responsibility

ThinkProgress has a link up about a house in Obion County Tennessee that was allowed to burn to the ground, while firemen stood by and watched. They watched and did nothing because the homeowner hadn't paid the $75 annual fee to get fire protection services. Obion County is outside the city of South Fulton, TN and for residents outside the city to receive fire protection, they must pay.

The conservative blogosphere didn't show much compassion for the family.

Krugman make's a useful comparison to the belief system that undergirds this situation and healthcare.

Me? I'm torn on the specific case, to be honest. No, the family didn't pay the fee and they made that choice, but I think the firemen should have fought the fire because that's their job. I don't know if I could have stood by and watched a family's house burn because they didn't pay $75. I understand their superiors might not have allowed action. It seems petty to me. Bill the family for goodness sake.

What if you contested your electric bill and didn't pay on time? Should the electric company be allowed to turn out the lights the day the money is late?

Course there are those that will say it was the homeowner's choice to not pay the fee and he must live with that choice. To me, that's a cold view of the world. I am left to ponder if people out there truly believe they have no responsibility to their fellow man. Isn't the world a scarier place in the face of this hyper-Hobbesian vision of something we once called society?

There is an overreach in the opposite direction where choice is denied to the individual in support of the collective, but when a house is allowed to burn to the ground over a $75 fee I think it's time to consider if the pendulum has swung too far in the other direction. Of course, that's not the message you'd get from the modern Republican party or the Tea party.

Facebook, Freedom, and a New Political Structure

Spurred on by Malcolm Gladwell's piece on social networks and the way they could potentially undermine autocratic states (I haven't read Gladwell's piece because I never received the refund I requested for buying and attempting to read Blink) set off a conversation between Matt Steinglass, Matthew Yglesias, and then a response by Steinglass.

The whole debate seems a little too much like navel-gazing to me, but in Steinglass's response he makes a statement I 100% agree with, but couldn't have said so well:

It is possible that single-party rule by a self-selecting, self-reproducing political elite that allows cultural and entrepreneurial freedom is a viable model for a modern state.

I think this is the lesson of modern China, and it is a lesson that won't be lost on future aspiring autocrats. Remember when capitalism would lead to democracy? I read an awful book about it in college. I think it's a flawed hypothesis.

Glenn Beck's Rally Write-ups

In case you didn't hear, and if you live in DC you had to have been under a rock not to, Glenn Beck held a rally at the Lincoln Memorial this weekend. I didn't wander down to the Mall myself.

I was concerned I would be found out as a socialist, fingers would be point, mob justice would commence, and some part of the Mall's landscape would be used to facilitate my end. I did, however, watch a little on C-SPAN. I only saw what I hope was the majority of Beck's comments, and on the whole his comments was just stupid blathering. I have no idea what point he was trying to make, but again, (finger point to self) socialist.

In fact, my biggest bone to pick was the whole "We were $600,000 short of our goal, and God provided." Now, a guy who made $32 million in 2009, should have $600,000 lying around and he certainly shouldn't weep because this ego-event wasn't going to make its goal. Maybe it's the socialist in me, but if a $5 million event is short by $600,000 and I make $32 million a year, I would just donate the other $600,000. But that's me and I also tend to believe social justice isn't a dirty word or Mao-ist plot.

Anyway, some interesting write-ups by reporters on the ground on Saturday and reflections on the people they talked with from Economist.com and from The Washington Post. They both reach the conclusion, rightfully in my estimation, that the grievances most members of the Tea Party have aren't new. The new part is the complete distortion of background information they are receiving (from Mr. Beck on pretty regular occasion) and how that creates an impossible environment to actually deal with their grievances.

That's the real pity. Fellow citizens with legitimate grievances that are getting bad information, making them incapable of contributing to the solution.

Time to Go

Iraqis went to the voting booth on Sunday for national elections. They were to select a new parliament and potentially a new prime minister. After a morning rife with explosions and some death, the cities quieted and the citizens reportedly voted in droves. There are no early reports of widespread fraud, no reports of voter intimidation (save the bombings), and now the country waits for the results. Even reading about it in the New York Times this morning, it just sounded kind of mundane, normal. Sure there was violence, but it was limited and desperate. Perhaps more remarkably the Iraqi people saw the violence for what it was, a desperate attempt by a marginalized insurgency to derail through violence Iraq's path to democracy. The public didn't buy it.

So now what? I think it's time to go. I'm not alone in this and I'm not going to set a timeline, but if things keep progressing the way they have I see no reason for us to stay for two main reasons. First, there is a democratic Iraq, even if it's a shaky democracy. Second, despite the fact that it's shaky there is almost nothing the US can do to make it any less shaky.

The successful vote will be followed by protracted jockeying for a ruling coalition. Many people put these post elections negotiations in terms of months, not days. That said, there isn't a major concern of violence with regard to the negotiations, at least not the kind of sectarian violence that lead Iraq to the edge of civil war in 2006. Iraq will remain a shaky democracy for some time, but there's little we can do about that.

We have toppled a government, botched reconstruction, lost the people we tried to liberate, and yet were able to correct course and helped create a viable, if not thriving democracy in Iraq. What is left to do? If this isn't victory, what is? Sure there are areas of concern, but they aren't our concerns in any direct way. We have done enough, spent enough, spilled enough blood to give Iraq a chance.

We went in for specious reasons. We fumbled, repeatedly, reconstruction. We lost the lives of American servicemen and women in a war that was and is not tied directly to our national security. And yet, now, seven years on, from all the missteps, mistakes, and misdirection we can leave Iraq politically better then we found it. We've done all we can. It's time to go.

On Media, Deliberation, and General Silliness in the Healthcare debate

In a blog entry for Newsweek, Jenny Hontz discusses the influence of Facebook on healthcare reform, and spuriously concludes that it has some. In contrast to some other shameless glorifications of technology in the media, Hontz at least provides some evidence for her inference: one advertising cliche, one B-list celebrity, and 7 or 8 anecdotes/off the cuff comments from "experts." The reality is that there is no evidence to support the idea that Facebook status updates have ever affected major policy decisions, and no reason to believe they ever will.

Hontz's reference to social networks as "the real town halls" leads to me to believe the root of this general silliness in the media lies in a popular, and fundamental, misunderstanding of the nature of democratic politics. Much animosity and general frustration generated by the healthcare debate would be ameliorated if we just dispensed with the myth that American democracy is somehow deliberative. Over 50 years ago, Joseph Schumpeter conceived of democracy as a marketplace in which political entrepreneurs compete for customers in the form of voters in elections. Democracy is not a process by which reasonable people come together to discuss differences and arrive at a common good, which becomes policy. Politicians make policy, or don't, because of their calculations about what will win them elections, not by getting together in the Senate chamber and changing each others' minds about what serves the best interests of society.

Viewed in this sense, the healthcare debate looks less passionate and more rational. The idea that town halls are deliberative is silly. Elected representatives in opposition are in the privileged position of not having to make policy. Instead the opposition just does what it does best- oppose. Not with specific alternatives or reasoned debate, but with misinformation, name calling, and general populist rhetoric. Of course they have no incentive to reign in this type of rhetoric at town halls, because town halls are primarily a mechanism for the transmission of voters' intentions, not for deliberation.

Analogously, there are two mechanisms by which online social networks might affect policy. The first is that they facilitate deliberation, which Hontz argues is occurring on healthcare, a proposition for which there is absolutely no evidence. Second, networks may facilitate the transmission voter intentions. This mechanism is certainly more plausible, but the evidence that representatives respond to these intentions is thus far scant. As Hontz rightfully notes, updating your Facebook status is cheap talk, and may not be a credible signal of your intention to support. In any case, a more careful consideration of the democratic process, and more accumulation of serious evidence is necessary before we start declaring that "Facebook Revolts" are shaping policy making.