Mubarak Out

There was no coup d’etat in time for the Short List, but shortly after it went up, Mubarak was out. Mubarak and his family left Cairo today, as protesters continued to spill into the streets surrounding for the first time both the state television headquarters and the presidential palace. Egyptian Vice President Omar Suleiman announced that President Mubarak stepped down, leaving the Egyptian Armed Forces in control of the nation.

Whether Mubarak left voluntarily or left under threat of force or ultimatum from the armed forces is unclear. Nor is it clear what will emerge from this interim military government. It is instructive to bear in mind that weeks on from the ouster of Ben Ali in Tunisia, it is still unclear who or what will ultimatum take the reins of government there. 

Now, though, while little is settled by Mubarak's ouster, the mass of people in Cairo celebrating are a truly astounding sight. Two pro-Western dictators have been thrown out by mass protest in one month. As unrest persists elsewhere in the reason, 2011 looks more and more like 1848.

Opportunities in Egypt

As events have unfolded in Egypt over the last two weeks, the U.S. position has been undergoing near constant revision. By the end of last week, however, the United States had apparently gotten ahead of the curve and was no longer subject to accusations of being merely reactive—and, worse, reacting a day behind the events on the ground. Over the weekend, the United States—and other Western governments—apparently settled on a position of supporting the immediate removal of Hosni Mubarak from power and the establishment of an interim government under the newly appointed Egyptian Vice President, Omar Suleiman. The protesters occupying Tahrir Square are unmoved by this proposition and Western support for it.

The appeal to Western governments of the staggered transition from Mubarak to a Mubarakite interim government to eventual elections is obvious. It promises the introduction of a measure of stability and certainty to a tumultuous situation that has upset U.S. foreign policy, flummoxed Israel, and contributed to steadily rising oil prices. Moreover, the apparent U.S. position follows a long history of U.S. policymakers pursuing stability. However, too often in the post-war era the pursuit of stability has come at the expense of U.S. values—as is likely the case here.

This long history of sacrificing values—democracy, liberty, freedom—for the sake of stability and ease of policymaking, has driven the U.S. to support autocratic regimes. It has also left many people with the indelible perception, rightly or wrongly, that the United States serves to oppress them—or at least support their oppressors—particularly in the Arab world.

This linkage between the United States and perceptions of oppression is one of the great strategic threats the United States faces. It has enabled radical Islamists to present an effective and largely unchallenged narrative.

The unrest in Egypt presents the United States with the opportunity to fundamentally reshape its perception in the Arab world. The simple act of lending the protesters in Tahrir Square full throated support is the first step along this path. Such support may not radically alter the fortunes of the protesters—Mubark is likely to go in the near term, and the Western-supported interim government is likely to come about regardless of Western support. However, the impact of the United States standing foursquare with the forces of democracy and liberty is likely to be regional and transformative.

What Happened to Tunisia?

Excitement in the media over the turmoil in Egypt has preempted any and all coverage of Tunisia, which, just two weeks ago, captured the attention of the world. Though former President Zine El Abdine Ben Ali has been ousted and fled the country, matters in the small North African country are far from resolved. In fact, out of the world’s eye, the still inchoate revolution in Tunisia may be just beginning.

A curfew remains in place. Many schools and universities remain closed. Looting persists, as do clashes between protesters and police. And, Sunday, Rachid Ghannouchi, the exiled leader of the yet banned Tunisian Islamist party, Ennahda, returned to Tunisia, where thousands of supporters greeted him at the airport in Tunis.

Ghannouchi, in apparent recognition of the similarities between his return and the 1979 return of Ayatollah Khomeini to Iran, immediately sought to dispel such comparisons in his first interview following his return. However, in contrast to Khomeini’s return to Iran, Ghannouchi and his Ennahda party have reportedly little popular support within Tunisia. Moreover, Ghannouchi has sounded moderate tones in the two weeks since Ben Ali’s ouster. He has called for respect for democracy, women’s rights, and the development of Tunisia.

Yet, it is appropriate for Western observers to approach Ghannouchi’s return with caution. Revolutions are chaotic and unpredictable. Even the Iranian revolution existed in a state of flux from 1978 through 1982. After the Shah’s ouster and Khomeini’s return the first several governments—those established under Bakhtiar and Bazargan—were secular and moderate. Before Khomeini could consolidate power in a quasi-theocracy, he was forced to develop administrative and security functionality (the IRGC) in parallel to those which belonged to the secular state.

The longer uncertainty and insecurity persist, the greater the opportunity for individuals like Ghannouchi to consolidate power. It would be better for the people of Tunisia and for Western interest to have quick elections that would likely advantage the few currently functioning organizations in Tunisia like trade unions. These are more likely to return a moderate, Western-oriented government.

Forty Days Since Montazeri’s Death

Grand Ayatollah Ali Montazeri died forty days ago today. Traditionally, the deceased is memorialized on the fortieth day after his death. The cyclical forty day mourning period gave structure to the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and there had been hope that a similar structure might take shape in the wake of the violence following last summer’s election. Remarkably, while Montazeri’s death was accompanied by renewed, widespread demonstrations and violence, there have been no reports of demonstrations marking the fortieth day following his death.

In fact, the little news coming out of Iran today seems to suggest that the only people taking notice of Montazeri’s forty days are in the regime—and they have done so by executing two dissidents.

That said, the large protests following Montazeri’s death occurred seven days after he died, on the day of Ashura. Ashura itself commemorates the martyrdom of Hussein and a smaller commemoration usually occurs forty days hence. Perhaps today’s conspicuously absent protests will occur seven days hence, marking the fortieth day since Ashura.